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Abstract 
This thesis identifies the gaps in the literature on foreign aid, and tries to fill some of them 
focusing particularly on Niger, a country that has received aid since its independence in 1960, 
yet remains one of the world’s poorest. The work contributes to the literature in three ways: 
First, it addresses moral hazard: the relationship between the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the country is analysed through a historical case study. Niger’s requests for 
assistance are accompanied by promises to undertake reforms; however, once aid is disbursed, 
these undertakings rarely materialize. Despite this record of poor (and deteriorating) 
compliance, IMF aid continues to flow, engendering perverse incentives and moral hazard. 
Secondly, it analyses whether aid is associated with poverty reduction. Aid is correlated 
with poverty, which is to be expected due to its pro-poor targeting nature. However, this study 
found increases in poverty associated with communities which were recipients of aid. To shed 
more light on this, households receiving aid were compared with those receiving no project 
assistance at all, and with households who benefited from non-aid based development projects. 
The results showed that changes in poverty levels among aid recipient households were not 
statistically different to those among households receiving no assistance. However, households 
benefiting from aid under-performed those who benefited from other projects. 
Thirdly, it explores whether aid brings utility to households through the provision of public 
goods. The results suggest that aid projects do help households. However, other sources of 
development projects are more efficient at doing so. Information is the key: it is a vital 
prerequisite for projects to address the needs of the population, and not all donors have the 
same information. Information can be obtained through co-funding projects with other donors, 
although there are also coordination costs.  
The models estimated allow the prediction of the benefits a project could provide to a 
household. Such predictive abilities could allow policymakers to coordinate donors’ initiatives 
to maximize their effectiveness. However, at present Niger lacks the capacity to achieve such 
coordination. Furthermore, such an approach would involve having to reduce the least efficient 
donors to mere providers of finance (i.e. channel their resources through other donor types), a 
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Chapter 1. Foreign Aid 
“Why would a donor pay a recipient to do something that is anyway in his own interest? And if it is not in 
his interest, why would the recipient do it anyway?” 
(Streeten 1988) 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces foreign aid.1 It presents the main features in the research literature, the 
policy realm and other practical concerns. Based on the knowledge gaps and trends identified, 
the contributions of this dissertation are highlighted. 
Foreign financial assistance was conceived as a source of finance to poor countries and 
territories between World War I and World War II, however, aid as we know it today emerged 
with the Marshall Plan after World War II (Lal 2006). The world political context changed in 
the aftermath of that war and development aid soon became a tool to gain political clients (ibid). 
Decades later, the end of the Cold War led to another reconversion of aid’s goals, this time 
towards humanitarian purposes, although the old ones were not necessarily abandoned. Thanks 
to these changes, aid has not only survived, but thrived. The number of aid agencies has 
continued to increase and their business models have been reinvented, while most of the 
agencies created since 1945 still exist (Harford, Hadjimichael & Klein 2004a). For example, 
the UNICEF broadened its mandate from emergency situations to long-term issues relating to 
children and women everywhere.2 As a result, the ‘aid business’ (Hancock 1992) has become 
very substantial in many developing economies, going beyond 20 per cent, 30 per cent, and 
even 50 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) (Lensink, White 1999). Without counting 
donors that are not part of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for 
1 The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD/DAC) defines Official Development Assistance (ODA) as “those flows provided by official agencies 
under the following two criteria: i) they are administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as their main objective, and ii) they are concessional in character and convey a 
grant element of at least 25 per cent” (OECD Stat 2016). 
2 UNICEF was established in 1946 to meet the emergency needs of children in post-war Europe and China. Its 
full name was the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. In 1950, its mandate was broadened 
to address the long-term needs of children and women in developing countries. UNICEF became a permanent part 
of the United Nations system in 1953, when its name was shortened to the United Nations Children's Fund (but 
its acronym did not change). Source: https://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_faq.html  
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Cooperation and Economic Development (OCDE/DAC), the mean number of donors per 
recipient country has been estimated at 16 (Rahman, Sawada 2010). 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of aid is that, despite this expansion, it remains unclear 
whether it works. The debate, as old as aid itself, has intensified over the decades. Several 
features of the discussion can be highlighted. At its core is the disagreement as to whether aid 
contributes to development or not. On the one hand, some authors argue that aid leads to growth 
(Hansen, Tarp 2001), although it has also been suggested that national growth-inducing 
policies may reduce its effectiveness because good policies and aid are substitutes (Dalgaard, 
Hansen 2001). A second group of authors argues that aid’s ability to engender growth is 
conditional on some key feature; for instance, aid works if it is provided to countries that 
implement good policies (Burnside, Dollar 2000), or if the climatic environment is appropriate 
(Guillaumont, Chauvet 2001). A third group argues that aid is clearly counterproductive, 
although the recommendations within that group also differ. Some authors argue that aid should 
be stopped altogether (Friedman 1995) whereas for others, the reason why the different 
development panaceas (such as investment or debt relief) have not worked, is because 
purported basic economic incentives were not taken into account in the policy making (Easterly 
2002). 
A fourth group adopts a different perspective and argues that aid’s effectiveness depends 
on the goal set. Several objectives may be considered, such as poverty reduction, non-income 
factors such as starvation, education or health, donor countries’ guilt-relief or political support, 
or the maximization of some aid agencies’ flows (Kenny 2006). For instance, it has been found 
that school feeding programmes significantly improve the growth and cognitive performance 
of disadvantaged children in developing countries (Greenhalgh, Kristjansson & Robinson 
2007), or that male circumcision significantly reduces the risk of Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV) acquisition in young men in Africa (Bailey et al. 2007). It is argued that it is the 
high cost-effectiveness of aid that targets public health interventions which makes this aid 
worthwhile on average, even when other aid interventions may be worthless (Ord 2011). 
Different diagnostics lead to different policy recommendations. Some economists call for 
more aid (Sachs 2014), while others say developed states should ‘give what they can’ (Ord 
2011), and yet others claim that the international community should stop looking for big ideas 
and adapt its expectations to small incremental improvements (Hobbes 2014). Although 
warning against superficial and overly optimistic judgments on aid, a different view notes that 
there may be no convincing case for abandoning or rejecting aid, because the enduring 
justification for development assistance lies in its fundamental expression of the humanitarian 
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impulse (Riddell 1987). Hence, the focus can only be how to improve it. To better a system 
that is too technocratic and accountable to donors rather than recipients, a paradigm shift may 
be necessary though, and complex adaptive systems has been proposed as the way to go 
(Ramalingam 2013). This view envisions a reformed aid system in which donors do not rigidly 
adhere to pre-determined blueprints, but instead engage in experimental innovation, implement 
projects that work in partnership with local systems, and adapt on the fly to changing conditions 
(ibid). The political agenda underpinning aid is a central element in the debate: focusing on 
small interventions weakens the scope for donors to drive recipient countries’ agendas, which 
has been identified as a key source of the trouble aid brings to Africa (Glennie 2008).  
There are also calls to finish aid. It has been defended that it is immoral to prolong aid when 
the results upon which aid’s moral case is built (i.e. to help others) are missing (Mende 1973). 
Some even defend that African countries are poor precisely because of all the aid they have 
received, and add that ending aid would redirect accountability away from donors, towards 
recipient countries’ citizens (Moyo 2009). In a similar vein, development strategies in the 
poorest countries should be about how to leave aid behind and end its dependence (Tandon 
2008), with the central idea of reasserting an indigenous path out of poverty – especially using 
countries’ diasporas (Phillips 2013). 
1.2. Exploring aid 
As recently as 2009, the lack of texts explaining how aid organizations work in practice was 
described as ‘striking’, especially given the enormous interest in the topic (De Haan 2009). 
Although there has been little emphasis on microeconomic explanations of why and how aid 
would work (or not), there are two notable exceptions. The first, Martens et al. (2002), analysed 
aid focusing on principal-agent theory. The second, Mikesell focused on the assessment of 
development projects and programs in relation to their objectives, and the alternative forms of 
aid available for achieving those objectives (Mikesell 2007).  
For decades, the thinking of western development economists was heavily influenced by 
the Solow model and its emphasis on capital accumulation through investment. Under this 
framework, it was expected that countries would be able to escape the poverty trap that 
prevented them from taking off. Once started on their virtuous circle, growth would continue 
and aid would no longer be needed. The successes of Marshall Aid in post-war Europe could 
be replicated in the Third World. The weakness of this approach as a theoretical foundation for 
aid became clear once it was obvious that aid investments were not leading to growth and that 
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policies and ‘soft issues’ such as governance were critical (Krueger, Michalopoulos & Ruttan 
1989). 
Much of the aid debate has been driven by macroeconomic empirical evidence, usually in 
the form of regression-based research, a methodology that commenced in the early 1970s 
(Papanek 1973). That modus operandi has taken different forms to ascertain the influence of 
aid on (most often) economic growth (Rajan, Subramanian 2008), but also on human 
development indicators (Kosack 2003). The use of the regression-based methodology (or its 
abuse) has been criticized on technical grounds, a classic example being the 145 right-hand-
side significant explanatory variables with 100 degrees of freedom (Durlauf, Johnson & 
Temple 2005).3 
Another macroeconomic issue on which aid research has focused is Dutch disease. The 
potential concern is that large inflows of aid may induce a real appreciation of the recipient 
country’s currency, thereby reducing its exports’ competitiveness. Evidence of aid-based cases 
of Dutch disease is weak (Isard et al. 2006), although some authors have noted that aid affects 
a country’s competitiveness adversely, lowering the relative growth of its export industries 
(Rajan, Subramanian 2011). This may partly explain the lack of robust evidence between aid 
and growth (ibid). In their examination of twenty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Fielding 
and Gibson (2013) noted a variety of macroeconomic responses, but did remark that the adverse 
effects of aid on exports would be mitigated if aid led to investments in the traded goods’ sector 
(Fielding, Gibson 2013).  
An interesting characteristic of the debate was the tendency to treat aid as homogeneous, 
neglecting the differences between its types. Such lack of attention, probably rooted in the 
unavailability of data characteristic of developing countries, persisted until relatively recently, 
even though some aid critics recognized long ago that there are different aid modalities (Bauer, 
Yamey 1982). The different types of aid singled out include: “emergency and humanitarian aid 
(likely to be negatively associated with growth, since aid is given when calamities happen); aid 
that affects growth only over a long period of time, if at all, such as aid to support democracy, 
the environment, health, or education (likely to have no relationship to growth in periods of 
four years); and aid that is directly aimed at achieving growth: building roads, ports, and 
electricity generators, or supporting agriculture” (Clemens, Radelet & Bhavnani 2004). These 
authors find a strong positive relationship between growth and the third type of aid, while the 
relationship with the other types is less evident. Nowadays, even the strongest critics of aid 
3 As cited by in Easterly (2007). 
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distinguish the types of aid (Moyo 2009). 
Aid has also been analysed by comparing it with other financial flows. For instance, while 
aid is influenced by political variables, foreign direct investment (FDI) is more sensitive to 
economic incentives, and particularly to ‘good policies’ such as property rights in the receiving 
countries (Alesina, Dollar 2000). Besides capital accumulation, it is generally acknowledged 
that FDI promotes economic growth mainly by way of technology transfer, which explains 
why FDI only works with a minimum critical mass of human capital – since this limits the 
economy’s capacity to absorb that technology (Borensztein, De Gregorio & Lee 1998). Thus, 
the effects of FDI come from higher productive efficiency: foreign firms have more 
‘knowledge’ applied to production, owing to a combination of foreign advanced management 
skills with domestic labour and inputs (ibid).4  The main advantages of FDI over aid are 
therefore twofold.5 Foreign Direct Investments encourage economic growth and poverty relief, 
partly due to the incentives they provide for the transfer of ‘know-how’, partly because they 
are subject to the market test – this ensures they are carefully allocated and monitored (Klein, 
Harford 2005). As aid flows are not subject to these disciplines, they are not expected to be as 
effective. The comparison with other financial flows focused on their different qualities as 
follows (ibid, p.3): 
Qualities6 Example 
Benevolent, monitored, smart  Ideal development assistance 
Indifferent, monitored, smart   Foreign direct investment 
Benevolent, unmonitored, smart Careless development assistance 
Benevolent, monitored, dumb Workers’ remittances 
Indifferent, monitored, dumb  Bond market finance 
Benevolent, unmonitored, dumb Populist emergency aid 
4 A different issue would be what has been called the FDI-natural resource curse, i.e. do natural resources crowd 
out FDI? In this regard, evidence shows that natural resources have an adverse effect on FDI and that the FDI-
resource curse persists even after controlling for the quality of institutions and other important determinants of 
FDI (Asiedu 2013). However, this topic goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
5 This does not imply that FDI may not have negative effects. For instance, in Venezuela some authors have 
reported negative spillover effects from FDI on the productivity of domestically-owned plants (Aitken, Harrison 
1999).  
6 The criteria are: 
a. ‘How benevolent is the finance? The most benevolent finance would flow to the poorest people in the
poorest countries exactly when they need it and would never need to be repaid.
b. How well is the finance monitored? Perfectly monitored financial flows would go exactly where their
owners want them to go. Imperfectly monitored flows might be spent on pet projects, stolen, or wasted.
c. How much knowledge flows with the finance? Knowledge matters, whether provided as standalone
advice or alongside financial flows. Much official aid is bundled with technical advice, but some private
flows like foreign direct investment also come with advice and training.’
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One of the problems of regression-based research into aid is that the mechanism through which 
it would work is not explained, and it cannot be seen as a “black box” if its pertinence is to be 
assessed (Bourguignon, Sundberg 2007). Three sequential steps are proposed: “a) External 
donors/IFIs to policy makers (the way aid is given), b) Policy makers to policies (governance 
and institutional capacity), and c) Policies to outcomes (knowledge of what works)” (ibid, p.3). 
In this regard, since the 1990s there has been a move towards analysing the transmission 
channels through which aid would improve people’s lives. A first step was to investigate 
whether national budget allocations in certain sectors were associated with better outcomes, an 
approach that provided mixed results. For instance, the effect of public spending for education 
and educational attainment is low, while for health outcomes the picture is more mixed (Gupta, 
Verhoeven & Tiongson 1999). In a different sector, higher spending on water and sewerage 
might not lead to a proportional increase in the quality of service delivery, as leakages –both 
physical and financial– are high (Wolf 2007b). More recently, economists have also analysed 
the determinants of public services, such as leaders’ decision-making processes to provide 
public goods in resource-rich countries (Sarr, Wick 2010). Three aspects of sustainability have 
been identified as key for the success of service delivery programs: finance, leadership, and 
targeting of the most vulnerable populations (Mubangizi 2009). However, overall there has 
been little empirical research on the links between aid and service delivery. While Wolf (2007a) 
explores this area, her work focuses on the effects of aid volatility in low-income countries, 
where a large part of public expenditure for education, health, and water and sanitation is 
financed through aid (Wolf 2007a). 
The governance dimension is central in the debate about aid effectiveness, and is usually 
used against aid. For instance, some economists have analysed aid effectiveness across 
different political models (elitist, egalitarian and laissez faire) to note that aid does not increase 
investment nor benefit the poor across political regimes (Boone 1996). According to this 
research, aid only increases unproductive consumption, as reflected by the size of Government 
(ibid).  
One of the most insightful theoretical frameworks of aid and political economy is probably 
the Selectorate Theory of Political Survival (De Mesquita, Smith 2009). This is based on the 
premise that leaders grant favours to retain office. If the system is a democracy, the coalition 
for leaders to stay in office is large, and leaders need to provide public goods. However, in 
autocratic regimes the coalition is small and private goods are offered instead (ibid). In this 
setting, aid is an instrument which political leaders use to retain office (not to alleviate poverty). 
To the extent that policies in the leaders’ interests favour the citizenry, policies to reduce 
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poverty can be implemented, but such instances are coincidental (ibid). Leaders of donor 
countries (big-coalition countries) give aid in exchange for policy concessions from recipient 
(small-coalition) countries (ibid). Thus, aid favours leaders of donor and recipient countries, 
and harms recipient-country (but not donor-country) citizens on two accounts: with bad 
policies and autocratic incumbent leaders who continue in power. A caveat is that, while this 
theory may apply to bilateral aid, it has little to say on multilateral aid (ibid). 
Another attempt to discern why aid succeeds or fails has concentrated on institutional 
inefficiencies and implementation issues. It has been observed that there is a critical 
information feedback loop, whereby those who pay – taxpayers from donor countries – are not 
in touch with those who receive the services – beneficiaries in poor countries (Martens et al. 
2002). Therefore, correction of errors in the selection and delivery of aid is very difficult. 
Adding the fact that those actions may already be badly designed (e.g. due to a lack of local 
knowledge to conceive optimal initiatives) the problem is twofold: on the donor side, foreign 
aid agencies usually have multiple principals (especially multilateral organizations) who may 
represent conflicting interests – both for the donor and for the beneficiary. And on the recipient 
side, embeddedness is a critical for success in the implementation of institutional reforms 
(understanding embeddedness as the fact that those national officers working with donors to 
implement reforms may be part of the problem themselves, as those reforms may go against 
their own interests). Indeed, those in office are not independent of the world and, thanks to 
asymmetrical information, may not push hard enough for the desired change, in what has been 
called the ‘formal-versus-informal’ reform conflict (Martens et al. 2002). 
Using institutional analysis, Easterly (2002) exposes some key problems in the 
environment that created aid bureaucracies. He argues that this environment led those 
international development organizations to, “(a) define their output as money disbursed rather 
than service delivered, (b) produce many low-return observable outputs like glossy reports and 
“frameworks” and few high-return less observable activities like ex-post evaluation, (c) engage 
in obfuscation, spin control, and amnesia (like always describing aid efforts as ‘new and 
improved’) so that there is little learning from the past, and (d) put enormous demands on 
scarce administrative skills in poor countries” (Easterly 2002). This obfuscation may have 
political motivations, as donors only want to highlight the positive results of their aid and keep 
evaluation reports on their programs very close to their chests (Riddell 1987). Ironically, this 
provides ammunition to aid critics, who ask: if aid is doing so well, how come there is still 
poverty? (ibid). 
Other aspects may be solved through more rigorous evaluations. Aid evaluation has always 
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been challenging due to the high number of factors involved in aid programs. Up until the 
1970s, cost-benefit analyses were common. From them 1980s, new challenges to evaluate aid 
appeared as changes in aid took place – in particular, the trend away from project-based aid 
towards policy-based lending (Berlage, Stokke 1992). As a result, traditional approaches such 
as cost-benefit analysis became increasingly limited (ibid). To achieve better evaluations, and 
although all economists do not necessarily agree (see e.g. Ravallion 2011), in recent years there 
has been a significant emphasis on randomized evaluations as the most scientific method to 
assess aid programs (Banerjee 2007).7 
Despite the issues that remain open in the debate, a number of facts about aid have been 
learnt over the years. With regard to growth, for example, foreign assistance seems to matter 
more to tackle large negative shocks (Guillaumont, Chauvet 2001), and aid and growth don’t 
have a linear relation (Kourtellos, Tan & Zhang 2007). Aid shows decreasing returns 
(Dalgaard, Hansen 2001), which may even follow a Laffer style curve, i.e. turning negative 
beyond a certain threshold of around 40-50 per cent of GNP (Lensink, White 1999). 
Regarding the determinants of aid, it seems evident that a vital factor determining aid flows 
(and their effectiveness) is how recipient governments use the aid they receive (Feeny 2007). 
In a model assuming bounded rationality and an interactive relationship between the two 
factors of donors’ aid-giving behaviour (internal memory and environment), four main motives 
for aid were detailed: instrumental or self-centred, humanitarian or recipient needs-based, 
ideological, and incremental or inertia – i.e. where actual levels of aid allocations depend on 
previous levels (Imbeau 1989). The conclusion was that the instrumental reason is the best 
explanation once inertia has been accounted for (ibid). Thus, it seems clear that in addition to 
economic need, aid donors respond to political and strategic considerations such as colonial 
past and political alliances (Alesina, Dollar 2000). These motives can also change over time; 
for instance, the rising importance of Chinese aid in Africa (motivated by the availability of 
natural resources), may have contributed to a shift of US foreign aid to make it more recipient-
needs’ based (Amusa, Monkam & Viegi 2016). 
Other authors have also examined the extent to which aid is allocated to reduce poverty. 
Sawada et al. (2008) find that in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, grant allocations from 
Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands and the UK were consistent with the necessary 
conditions to reduce poverty (Sawada, Yamada & Kurosaki 2008). The overall results show 
allocation patterns consistent with poverty targeting, although there is a negative population 
7 Also known as randomized control trials (RCTs). 
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scale effect, reinforcing the view that “strategic motives exist” (ibid). Finally, the coordination 
among major donors towards global poverty reduction has recently improved (ibid).  
It has also been argued that with a poverty-efficient allocation, aid would sustainably lift 
out of poverty around 19 million people per year, whereas with the actual allocation it lifts out 
an estimated 10 million (Collier, Dollar 2002). From that standpoint, the other goals of aid (e.g. 
support to donors’ strategic interests) could be considered as a tax to poverty-reducing aid. 
1.3. From theory to policy 
Given what is known, how should foreign assistance be provided? Policy-makers do not always 
follow economic theory principles (as aid may be given for other geostrategic political 
motives), and translating knowledge into policy-making remains a challenging issue. With 
inconsistencies in the body of knowledge it is not easy to offer consistent policy advice; e.g. 
while there is no agreement about whether aid leads to growth, it is also argued that aid 
volatility is negatively associated with economic growth in the long run (Markandya 2010), 
and that donor proliferation linked to free-riding leads to a sub-optimality of aid flows 
(Rahman, Sawada 2010). 
What seems clear, looking at aid flows over time, is that conditionality has decreased 
(Harford, Klein 2005a)and country selectivity has increased (Dollar, Levin 2006) — effects 
that may have been associated with one another.  It has been argued that the reason for increased 
country selectivity is the lack of credible punishments for breaching conditionality clauses 
(Djankov, Garcia-Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2006). Increased selectivity meant seeking 
recipients with better policies (Dollar, Levin 2006) and stricter screening of recipient countries 
by donors. For instance, in 2004 the USA established the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC), which a country has to undergo performance assessments on 17 policy indicators 
before it can become eligible to receive assistance.8 In the multilateral arena, in 2005 the World 
Bank started elaborating its Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), which rate 
countries against 16 criteria from four clusters: i) economic management, ii) structural policies, 
iii) policies for social inclusion and equity, and iv) public sector management and institutions
(World Bank 2011b). These initiatives for higher selectivity were probably a consequence of 
evidence that more corrupt governments had not been receiving less aid – if anything the 
opposite (Alesina, Weder 2002). The emergence of such evidence supported the thesis that aid 
8 The MCC is a U.S. foreign aid agency whose most distinctive feature is ‘competitive selection’: before a country 
can receive MCC assistance through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), its performance is examined on 
21 independent indicators (Source: https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/indicators). 
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helps dictators, and had strong effects on some donors (De Mesquita, Smith 2009). 
Aid can be classified according to several criteria, e.g. food aid, etc. A key typology relates 
to the way of delivering it. From World War II till the late 1970s, the main modality to deliver 
assistance in poor countries was project-based aid, at the core of what has been called the 
“Western” model (Hayter 1971). The Western model is characterized by funding from donors 
extended on a project basis and managed by expatriate professionals (Tisch, Wallace 1994), 
who typically can be in the country from a few months to about 3-4 years. This has been 
criticized because it can lead to cultural imperialism, as Western advertising, media or 
consumer goods reach all everywhere in the world (ibid). Though project-based aid is still 
important at present, the period when project-based aid reigned was characterized by a 
combination of growing world demand, foreign aid and stable commodity prices that favoured 
a worldwide decline in poverty and an improvement in basic measures of human welfare 
(Mohan et al. 2000). During this time, there was ‘international adjustment’, and the burden was 
shared by donors and developing countries (ibid). In the 1970s, events such as the end of the 
gold standards in the US or the oil price crises favoured a paradigm shift towards 
neoclassical/market-oriented policies (ibid). The shift led to structural adjustment programs in 
the early 1980s, where the burden of adjustment fell disproportionally on vulnerable segments 
of the population (Mohan 2000; Tisch, Wallace 1994). Structural adjustment programs were 
characterized by lending (notably by the World Bank/IMF) conditional on countries’ 
undertaking the policy reforms required.9 When aid is lent, the amounts tend to be considerably 
larger than when aid is granted (i.e. given). Heavy lending for structural adjustment programs 
was at the root of great criticism against aid; pumping substantial amounts of money in poor 
countries with weak governance systems can result in corruption spikes where what was lent 
was lost (Payer 1991). Besides corruption, towards the late 1990s it became clear that structural 
adjustment was costly: it was widely criticized for its effects on the poor, countries’ debt kept 
mounting, and the expected results were hardly being achieved. Debates about how to help 
countries ease their debt burden started (e.g. with Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, 
HIPC10). Thus, from the early 2000s grants increased in importance –vs loans (Harford, 
Hadjimichael & Klein 2004b). Both grants and loans became increasingly aimed at middle-
income countries and at recipients with good policies –vs. low-income economies and those 
9 Also known as policy-based lending. 
10  In 1996, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund launched the HIPC Initiative to create a 
framework for all creditors, including multilateral creditors, to provide debt relief to the world's poorest and most 
heavily indebted countries, and thereby reduce the constraint on economic growth and poverty reduction.  
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with bad policies (Harford, Klein & Tilma 2004). 
Budget Support (BS) also grew from the early 2000s (Eifert, Gelb 2005), a move to support 
their fiscal consolidation from the revenue side also motivated by debt sustainability concerns, 
as well as to promote more ownership in recipient countries. Later, some evidence has shown 
that BS is correlated with progress in the Human Development Index and the Millennium 
Development Goals (Beynon, Dusu 2010). However, BS is no magic bullet either, a number 
of authors arguing that it may contribute to moral hazard by expanding recipients’ national 
budgets and avoiding necessary reforms (Brautigam, Knack 2004). Thus, if more aid does lead 
to deteriorations in governance, BS may lead to moral hazard in the form of lower tax-to-GDP 
ratios, or reduced efforts to mobilize national resources (Feeny 2007). 
Turning further into policy, the most central initiative to promote aid results was the 2005 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD). The PD is based on five principles (OECD, 2012): 
1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction,
improve their institutions, and tackle corruption.
2. Alignment: Donor countries align with, and use, local systems.
3. Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures, and share
information to avoid duplication.
4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift to, and measure, results.
5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results.
It was argued that the PD would make a difference because it was intended to monitor progress 
on accountability (OECD 2006). However, the PD proved to be no panacea and was 
complemented by the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, the aim of which was to 
strengthen and deepen implementation of the PD (OECD, 2012). The AAA pushed some PD 
principles into concrete actions, especially in the areas of ownership, inclusive partnerships, 
and delivering results (OECD, 2012). One of the most noteworthy recommendations of the 
AAA was that the predictability of aid should be increased. The issue of predictability was a 
reaction to recipients’ demands and involved two aspects. The first one was to give at least a 
medium-run horizon (typically 3 to 5 years), so that the recipient country could better plan 
ahead with the help of policy tools, such as Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF).11 
The second aspect demanded by recipients was that donors meet their pledges, as often 
commitments are incompletely materialized. Indeed compliance with commitments to deliver 
11  An MTEF is a planning and budget formulation process that Governments can use to establish credible 
projections of public revenue collection (usually within 3-5 years), and to allocate those resources based on 
strategic priorities. 
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more aid has received mediocre ratings (G8 Research Group 2007), although donor countries 
performed well when it came to debt cancellation (G8 Research Group 2015).  The delivery of 
the 0.7 per cent target of ODA relative to donor’s Gross National Income (GNI) has also been 
a challenge which few donors have achieved (OECD 2002). Since Sweden became the first 
country to meet it in 1974, Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Finland or Norway have 
had the best performance in that regard, although other countries such as the Netherlands or 
Luxembourg have also performed relatively well (OECD 2002). 
Although incomplete aid delivery may be an issue, many recipient countries often lack the 
capacity to absorb the aid they receive (even though it is not all the aid they were promised). 
Isard et al. (2006, p.12) insist that these absorptive capacity constraints “are largely 
microeconomic phenomena and should be analysed and addressed as such” (Isard et al. 2006). 
1.4. Other practical issues 
As noted above, the overall challenge in the aid discussion is that there isn’t a very clear idea 
about whether it works, and/or under what conditions it does so. It has been asserted that, “the 
winners write economic history” (Easterly 2002). This incomplete understanding is rooted, at 
least partially, in the data deficiencies which characterize developing countries. The paucity of 
good quality data has had several effects on the aid literature, including some selection bias. 
The nature of these effects is conceptually similar: insufficient hard evidence impedes an 
understanding of the intricate channels through which aid may have a positive impact on the 
final beneficiaries. However, although the distinctions are more illustrative than clear-cut, there 
are degrees of ignorance with different consequences. First, extrapolating from developed 
countries, economists may sometimes defend a specific viewpoint without the rigorous data 
analysis warranted, which can lead to poorly substantiated statements about the pertinence of 
aid (see e.g. Friedman 1995). 
The lack of data may also impede us from seeing the broader picture. If aid can be 
considered as a “market”, aid assessments are mostly based on the supply of aid, whether 
primary (donor’s principal—often taxpayers), or secondary (aid agencies), but rarely on the 
demand of aid (beneficiaries).12 When the demand of aid is analysed, it is usually at the level 
of recipient countries’ governments, and rarely at the level of the ultimate beneficiaries 
(citizens – ideally the poor). Such lack of attention to the final beneficiaries arises because 
household surveys hardly collect data on development projects. Therefore, the emphasis is 
12 Authors are increasingly adopting the view that aid is a market, see e.g. Harford, Klein (2005b). 
13 
often placed on inputs, frameworks, plans, technical assistance or training instead of results 
(Martens et al. 2002). Additionally, since the clear mechanisms through which the final 
beneficiaries would benefit are not well defined, it is not difficult to see aid as a ‘black box’ 
(Bourguignon, Sundberg 2007). As noted earlier, to address such deficiencies there have been 
calls for more monitoring and evaluation (Martens et al. 2002), as well as for better evaluations 
(Banerjee 2007). 
Even where data is available on all sides of the aid market, its informational value vis-à-vis 
the intended analysis may be limited. A clear example of this is the failure of OECD data on 
aid to distinguish between types of aid (i.e. disaggregating aid flows by sector only started in 
2002). A second example of data shallowness hampering research relates to aid fungibility. It 
is well known that aid is fungible, however, the aid literature has rarely taken this characteristic 
into account – probably a result of difficulties in measuring how decisions are made and how 
shadow savings would be used (e.g. if a donor condones debt to a poor country). After decades 
of development aid, the most influential work on the issue was done in the late 1990s 
(Devarajan, Rajkumar & Swaroop 1999). 
Despite these caveats, it seems clear that the traditional aid-growth regressions have been 
exhausted. Research on development aid has begun refocusing from macro to micro relations. 
This new approach may extend to include a geographical perspective and/or the nature of the 
relations considered. Regarding the geographical perspective, analyses in the past were 
typically performed across countries. Individual national studies can be of real value, however. 
For instance, a case study from Uganda found that only 13 percent of aid reached its intended 
objective (Reinikka, Svensson 2004). Despite its potential to enrich the debate on aid 
effectiveness, research at national level has only become popular in recent years (De, 2015). In 
terms of the nature of the relations considered, the new research approach tends to concentrate 
more on such micro issues as donors’ incentives (Mattesini, Isopi 2008), or whether aid is 
associated with specific subsector results, e.g. by investigating the extent to which aid aimed 
at private sector development responds to constraints identified by private firms as problems 
(Ferro, Wilson 2011). This new focus may be due to increasing doubts about the value of aid, 
or to growing pressure by taxpayers to know they are getting value for their money.  
There may be trade-offs to such direct, sub-sector level approaches to the assessment of aid 
effectiveness. Narrow relationship analyses may miss spill over effects or synergies, and 
assessing a development portfolio by evaluating its components individually may be incorrect. 
Ravallion makes the point succinctly, “the bundling of (often multi-sectorial) components in 
one portfolio is often justified by claimed interaction effects. But evaluating each bit separately 
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and adding up the results will not (in general) give us an unbiased estimate of the portfolio’s 
impact” (Ravallion 2011). 
1.5. Contribution of this thesis 
In line with recent works, this dissertation is empirical in nature and focuses only on one 
country (Niger). The choice is grounded in the objective of providing useful policy advice to 
improve the country’s situation. Niger is one of the poorest countries of the world, yet very 
little has been written on its aid. Previous works have mostly focused on the results of aid at a 
macro level: whether it is associated to growth (Nafiou 2009), and how much more aid would 
be required to achieve some defined growth targets (Farah, Sacerdoti & Salinas 2009). At a 
micro level the country’s aid has been greatly under-researched, the few exceptions being 
qualitative studies (Sambo 2009) and field project descriptions (Rossi 2006). 
An interesting generalization about the literature reviewed may be that aid supporters tend 
to emphasize results (whether it saves lives, reduces poverty, etc.), while its detractors tend to 
highlight the mechanisms or incentives it provides (although they may still acknowledge some 
of aid’s positive results, particularly on public health, see e.g. Moyo 2009). Notable examples 
to criticize aid relate to moral hazard (e.g. as beneficiaries know that donors will be there for 
them, they make less effort to undertake much-needed reforms, mobilize internal resources, 
etc.) or adverse selection (e.g. corrupt governments are more likely to receive aid, which helps 
their leaders to stay in power).  
The three main contributions of this dissertation relate to incentives, results and 
mechanisms of work, and address gaps identified in the literature both from a global 
perspective and in the context of Niger. Considering lending for policy-based reforms, the first 
relates to incentives in the donor-recipient relationship. The interaction of Niger with its donors 
is analysed with a focus on the existence of moral hazard, to assess whether aid is associated 
with reforms. This takes the form of a historical case study about the dynamics of the 
relationship between Niger and the IMF.  
The second contribution of this thesis focuses on a result, poverty reduction, and its link 
with aid. Keeping the ultimate demand of aid (the poor) at the centre of attention, an 
econometric analysis of household survey data is undertaken to assess whether aid is associated 
with poverty reduction. 13 Hence, the key modality of aid in this analysis is the traditional 
13 Poverty is usually measured from an income or a multidimensional perspective. Using an income approach, 
poverty can be defined in absolute or relative terms. In absolute terms, the World Bank defines extreme poverty as 
living on less than US$1.90 per day (Purchasing Power Parity), and moderate poverty as less than $3.10 a day. 
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project-based aid portrayed in the Western model. 
Finally, the provision of public goods is also explored as a mechanism through which aid 
may alleviate the consequences of poverty, i.e. regardless of whether income poverty is reduced 
or not, aid may at least be useful to local communities by improving their living conditions. 
Also within the traditional project-based aid, this analysis sheds light on Bourguignon and 
Sundberg’s ‘black box’, and intends to be holistic by comparing all the suppliers of 
development projects (e.g. aid, Government, etc.). Perhaps more importantly, it also provides 
hints on how to deliver aid if the objective was to maximize the utility households derive from 
development projects. To my knowledge, so far this perspective has been largely missing in 
the literature on aid. 
Relative poverty is the condition in which people lack the minimum income needed to maintain the average 
standard of living in their country. The difference between absolute and relative income poverty can be substantial. 
For instance, in advanced economies absolute poverty is virtually non-existent but relative poverty can be 
significant in some cases. Multidimensional poverty is usually measured as people's experience of deprivation in 
areas such as poor health, lack of education, inadequate living standard, lack of income, etc. While there are some 
references to income poverty, the notion of poverty utilized in the analyses of this dissertation is closer to the 
concept of multidimensional poverty. 
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Chapter 2. The Setting: Niger
“I grew up being poor in Lesotho, but when I came to Niger I had the awful feeling that if there was a 
place God had forgotten, this was it. The weather, the dust... poverty around greenery is not as bad” 
(Khalikane 2005) 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes Niger with regard to three groups of factors likely to influence its 
development: environment, economy and institutions. This structure responds to three broad 
groups of development theories: those rooted in environmental conditions, those emphasizing 
economic features and those highlighting institutions.14  
In the first group, perhaps the best-known exponent is Jared Diamond, who explains world 
development patterns since 13,000 B.C. (Diamond et al. 2005). According to Diamond, the 
first communities in the Middle East’s Fertile Crescent were blessed with key natural 
endowments that led to high productivity farming (ibid). The ability to ensure food security 
with fewer resources facilitated labour specialization patterns, which in turn led to 
technological progress, human capital accumulation and the development of more complex 
political systems (ibid). After high-yield agricultural and farming techniques were developed, 
being located with a large landmass in the same latitude favoured a quick expansion of crops 
and animals that gave a vital advantage to Eurasian and Northern African inhabitants (ibid). In 
turn, higher population densities and close contact with farming animals meant increased 
exposure to diseases, which over time led to a higher resistance of the immunological systems 
14 This rationale is only to have a structure in the chapter. Other criteria could have been used. For instance, based 
on international relations, dependency theory states that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor underdeveloped 
states to a "core" of wealthy states. This theory had two versions: a radical one that claimed that the centre 
(advanced countries) grew at the expense of poor countries; and a milder version which maintained that under 
capitalism both rich and poor could grow but would not benefit equally (Velasco 2002). An alternative option 
could be the neo-Weberian state perspective, which emphasizes paths for public management reform (Pollitt, 
Bouckaert 2004) but is difficult to define (Lynn 2008). A third option could be historical (Stavrianos 1981), 
including how the legacy of late colonialism affected the political context in contemporary Africa (Mamdani 
1996). However, given the objective of the chapter, i.e. to introduce key factors that can affect developmental 
performance in one country (Niger), the current structure is selected. In so doing I do not intend to endorse or 
disregard any specific theory, or even list them comprehensively. For a more complete list of development 
theories, see Willis (2011). 
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of people from that part of the world. Later, when Europeans entered in contact with new-world 
communities, this factor would prove to be a great advantage for Europeans (ibid).  
The pattern experienced in the Fertile Crescent would not have been possible in Niger. 
Powerful kingdoms did thrive in the Sahel in the past, their existence being greatly facilitated 
by trade corridors (e.g. in Niger, Agadez has long been the hub of a trade road between West 
and North Africa). However, the other ingredients noted by Diamond were absent, especially 
a generous environment that led to high productivity farming. As section 2.2 shows, food 
security remains a serious challenge even today. 
Diamond’s theory is useful to explain overall patterns of world development and historical 
phenomena such as colonialism, e.g. why European countries progressed faster than Papua 
New Guinea. However, it hardly explains narrower differences, e.g. why Germany is wealthier 
than France. Economics has provided explanations. Although the emphasis differs across 
theories, the most prominent highlight the role of innovation, savings and investment. In this 
vein, the main economic features of Niger are described in section 2.3. 
Finally, soft matter factors such as culture, religion, values or property rights have also been 
provided to explain differences in development. Although some of the theories linking 
institutions and economic performance may date back as far as the early 1900s (e.g. Max 
Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism), since the 1990s there has been a 
renaissance of the view that institutions are the fabric leading to economic development, thanks 
to some remarkable works such as North (1990) or Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & Robinson 
(2001).15 Niger’s available data on institutions are presented in section 2.4. 
2.2. Environment 
Niger is a vast landlocked country in the Sahara-Sahel region of West Africa, located between 
Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Benin and Burkina Faso (Figure 2.1). With a surface of 
1,267,000 square kilometres the country is bigger than France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom combined. The bulk of the country’s territory is part of the Sahara Desert, although 
the Southern areas are in the Sahel –where most of the population lives. 
The country’s climate is exceptionally hot. The average daily minimum and maximum 
temperatures in the capital are 22.4°C and 36.2°C, respectively (United Nations 2006). 
15 This does not imply, however, that scholars have reached total consensus. For example, the work by Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) has been convincingly criticized by other economists (Glaeser et al. 2004), as well as historians 
(Austin 2008). 
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Environmental conditions are harsh and only 1% of the land forested, and this area is decreasing 
with increased desertification. In 2013, only 12.6% of Niger’s total land was arable (World 
Bank 2016) and food security is a recurrent concern that is serious even by Sub Saharan African 
(SSA) standards. The average rainfall in the capital, Niamey, between 2009 and 2013 was 
531.3 mm per year (INS Niger 2014). Rainfall is very uneven, with both droughts and floods 
occurring. The average number of rainy days during the 1990s was 52.6 per year (INS Niger 
2014).16 Agriculture uses 95.4% of all the water consumed in the country, while industry uses 
0.5% and domestic usage accounts for 4.1%, respectively (FAO 2011). The country’s 
agricultural sector is mainly rain-fed, which makes it very vulnerable to droughts. 
Figure 2.1. Map of Niger 
2.3. Economy 
Niger is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), sharing a common currency (the 
CFA franc or FCFA) and a Central Bank (the Central Bank of West African States) with six 
other countries.  
16 For a comparison, the average annual rainfall and number of rain days in Cape Town (South Africa), is 475 mm 
and 101 days, respectively (Source: http://www.cape-town.climatemps.com/precipitation.php) 
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The country has exhibited elusive and volatile growth since its independence (Figure 2.2), 
although its GDP expanded remarkably between 2000 and 2014, when it grew at an annual 
average of 4.7% in real terms (World Bank 2016b). With a per capita income estimated at 427.4 
USD in 2014 (vs 1,813.8 USD in SSA), the country is one of the poorest nations in the world 
(ibid). Using purchasing power parity, 81.8% and 50.3% of the population lived on less than 
3.10 USD and 1.90 USD a day in 2011, respectively (ibid). Savings are scanty: from 1981 to 
2015, annual gross domestic savings averaged 7.4% of GDP, while the average figure in SSA 
developing countries was 18.4% (ibid). 
Figure 2.2. Niger’s annual GDP growth since 1960 (%) 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2016 
Niger’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is based predominantly on services (43.6%) and 
agriculture (36.7%), with less value added in the industrial sector (19.5%) (ibid).17 In the 
services sector the most noteworthy activities are banking and financial services, but the 
country’s financial sector is nonetheless little developed. For instance, in 2009 there were only 
11 recognized credit institutions and the banking penetration was estimated at 2.4 accounts per 
17 The value of agricultural output that is self-consumed or that is not exchanged for money, i.e. subsistence 
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100 people (UEMOA, 2009), the lowest figures in the ECOWAS community.18 In 2014 the 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector was a meagre 12.3% of GDP (World Bank 
2016b), while in SSA’s developing countries it was 62% of GDP (ibid). Some reasons for the 
smallness of this contribution are the country’s lack of credit information or its low saving 
rates, as well as long distances and low population density19 (Pedrosa-Garcia, Do 2011).20 
Food insecurity is a grave concern. Agriculture is mostly subsistence and labour intensive 
– an indicator of which is that in 1998, there were only 130 tractors in the entire country (World
Bank 2016b). In 2012 Niger ranked 91st in the global food security index, and deteriorated to 
the 99th position in 2015 (EIU 2015). Major crops and products are millet, sorghum, peanuts, 
onions, rice, cattle, sheep, goats and camels, which have adapted to the country’s conditions.  
Mining is the most important activity in the industrial sector, and uranium is the main 
natural resource although gold is also extracted and there are prospects for the exploitation of 
oil. The importance of natural resources is rising; in 2013, they contributed to 12.3% of GDP, 
which is projected to double in 2020 (IMF 2015). Government revenue from natural resources 
is expected to increase by 2 percent of GDP in 2020 (IMF 2015). Other industrial activities in 
Niger are cement, brick, soap, textiles and livestock slaughter. 
Niger is ranked the 160th country least business friendly in the world in 2016 – out of 189 
(World Bank 2016a). As such, Niger’s investment climate is not very conducive to private 
sector development. Some indicators are poor even in the context of SSA. For instance, 
insolvency proceedings take 5 years on average, while on average in SSA they need 3 years 
(ibid). Nevertheless, the country has seen some improvement in recent years, and now some 
indicators are above SSA standards, notably in the number of procedures to start a business or 
get electricity (ibid). In 2009, the five major constraints identified by firms were: competition 
from the informal sector, access to finance, political instability, corruption and high tax rates 
(World Bank, IFC 2010).  
18 Defined as people who are 15 years old or older and hold an account at a registered financial institution. This 
figure is calculated by dividing the number of accounts (based on ECOWAS’ Banking Commission official data 
for 2009), by the country’s population in the relevant age band (according to World Bank demographic data). The 
calculation is available on www.afribf.com/archives/2010/12/25/19962697.html as of May 24th, 2012. 
Admittedly, such figure may overestimate the banking penetration since it assumes one account per holder. 
However, since the figure is given to show that the financial sector in Niger is very little developed, the existence 
of such bias would reinforce the point noted. 
19 Although in Niger long distances and low population density hamper credit provided by the financial system, 
this need not be interpreted as environmental determinism, because it is not the case in others such as Botswana. 
20  Based on extensive consultations, the influence of Islamic rules on interest as a factor precluding the 
development of the country’s financial sector (Niger is predominantly Muslim) is highly questioned. 
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Niger’s poor infrastructure hampers competitiveness. In terms of physical capital, the 
country has significant deficiencies, e.g. the road network of about 19,000 kilometres 
represents 1 Km of road per 100 square kilometres of land area (World Bank 2013). 
Furthermore, much of this is undeveloped or poorly maintained: with only 20.7% of all roads 
paved (ibid), most of the road network requires upgrading. Other communication indicators are 
in poor state as well. For instance, the number of telephone lines was 0.57 per 100 people in 
2014, while the number of cellular subscribers was 44.4 per 100 people (World Bank 2016b).  
The share of government expenditure on education increased from 16.9% in 2006, to 21.7% 
in 2014 (UNESCO 2016), which favoured some improvements in education. For instance, the 
net primary school enrolment rate in 2014 was 61% in 2014, from 42.5% in 2006 (World Bank 
2016b). However, investments in human capital have not seen the progress necessary to catch 
up with the dramatically low starting points, and the situation remains grave. In 2015, only 
19.1% of all people aged 15 and above could read and write (UNESCO 2016). Accordingly, 
the workforce still has very low education levels. In 2009-2010, only 541 students graduated 
from the University of Niamey (INS Niger 2014). Information technologies are not entrenched 
either; in 2014, there were a mere 1.95 internet users per 100 people (World Bank 2016b). 
The low labour productivity is further explained by poor public health. Despite a HIV 
prevalence rate of only 0.5 cases per 100 people, in 2014 life expectancy was only 61.5 years 
– similar to SSA’s 58.6 years (World Bank 2016b). Several factors contribute to the precarious
public health situation. Most of the agricultural sector is based on subsistence farming, which 
added to the country’s water dependence, makes food security a constant challenge and 
explains why famines are so recurrent. Furthermore, flooding during the rainy season, together 
with the lack of water and sanitation infrastructures, tend to aggravate diseases such as malaria, 
which is commonplace. Accordingly, indicators of under-five, infant and maternal mortality 
are amongst the highest in Africa (World Bank 2011a). Niger is in the heart of the meningitis 
belt which stretches from Senegal to Djibouti (IFRC 2008). Under such conditions, families 
tend to prefer many children and fertility rates are very high, reaching 7.6 births per woman 
(INS Niger 2014), which led to an astonishing population growth rate of 3.9% per annum 
between 2001 and 2012 – the highest in the world (ibid). The population in 2012 was estimated 
at 17.1 million, of which 83% lived in rural areas (ibid). 
In these conditions, people are very vulnerable and the State provides little protection, 
although spending in social sectors has been increasing in recent years and is in line with that 
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in comparable countries (IMF 2015).21 Employment is scarce, as the ratio employment-to-
population for adults in 2014 was 61.4% (World Bank 2016b). For those who have it, work is 
often informal and unpredictable in time: only 5.5% of all those employed in 2012 were salaried 
workers (INS Niger 2013). Working conditions are rough: 84.8% of all employment in 2005 
was considered vulnerable (World Bank 2016b), and 85.4% of all those employed declared to 
be self-employed (ibid). Most of the population (56.9%) was employed in the agricultural 
sector (ibid), with subsistence farming and herding being the main occupations. The services 
sector employed 31.1% of the population (ibid) and only 11.1% of the population worked in 
industrial activities (ibid), despite it providing the most internal resources for the country 
(thanks to mining). 
Public sector accounts for a rather small share of GDP. In 2014 the general government’s 
final consumption expenditure represented 13.5% of GDP (World Bank 2016b). Such meagre 
weight in the country’s economy is favoured by little capacity to mobilize, and subsequently 
spend, internal resources: tax revenue represented 15.5% of GDP in 2014 (INS Niger 2016). 
Fiscal revenue has been heavily dependent on uranium exports for decades, which has long 
encouraged economists to propose reforms of the tax system to extend taxation into the 
informal sector (Barlow, Snyder 1993). The country’s large shadow economy contributes to 
this situation, as formal enterprises bear a heavier burden; 65.2% of firms in Niger were not 
registered in 2012, a rate higher than in comparable countries (INS Niger 2013). 
In terms of the external sector, Niger is a member of the World Trade Organization since 
1996, and has accordingly been pursuing trade liberalization. The tariff rate applied on a 
weighted mean of all products decreased from 13.7% in 2001 to 9.1% in 2010, and has 
stabilized since then (World Bank 2016b). Furthermore, net inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) increased from 1.1% of GDP in 2006 to 16.7% of GDP in 2011, although 
they shrank thereafter due to the political instability, and since 2013 have stabilized around 9% 
(ibid). Such an impressive increase was facilitated by Chinese and French investments for oil 
and uranium in some parts of the country (IMF 2015). FDI net outflows, however, have never 
exceeded 1.5% of GDP (World Bank 2016b), a record attained in 1986 (during the uranium 
boom of the mid-1980’s). FDI net outflows in 2014 were 0.26% of GDP (ibid). 
Trade liberalization has exacerbated the country’s negative current account balance, 
especially since 2005 (World Bank 2016b). The export value index in 2014 (with base 100 in 
21 Including HIPC resources; without them, the public spending on social safety nets represent 0.85% of the 
national budget and 0.19% of GDP.  
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2000) was 530, while the import value index (also with base 100 in 2000) attained 569 (ibid). 
In 2014, exports and imports represented 17.8% and 36.7% of GDP, respectively (ibid). 
Exports are concentrated in a few products. The top 5 export products in 2015 accounted for 
83.3% of all exports (Trade Map 2016). In 2015, those 5 export commodities were uranium 
ore, oil, precious stones, motor vehicles for the transport of goods and animal fats (ibid). The 
main export markets were France, USA, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali (ibid). On the other 
hand, the top 5 imports in 2015 were aircraft parts, machinery, cars, rice and electrical 
equipment (ibid). The main import markets were France, China, USA, India and Nigeria (ibid). 
2.4. Institutions 
A decade ago Niger’s institutions were described as ‘informal-fragmented’ – indicating a 
situation in which the State is not very effective and has little presence in economic life (Meisel, 
Ould Aoudia 2007). Solidarity plays an active role, because it represents a form of security that 
partly compensates for the State’s deficiencies. Political, economic and social rights are not 
guaranteed, but dynamic citizens can benefit from specific opportunities (ibid). Little has 
changed since 2007, and the importance of social networks is vital for basic aspects of 
economic life, such as job opportunities. 
After gaining independence from France, Niger experienced decades of political instability, 
although the 1990s were the worst period. In total, the country has seen three successful 
military coups (plus two attempted, three plotted and one alleged plot), seven constitutions 
(1960, 1989, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2009 and 2010) and many major crises that lead to a serious 
slowing down of the State’s operations (details in annex table 2.1).  
Politically, the country is structured as a semi-presidential republic with a President and a 
Prime Minister. In terms of administrative governance, the country is considered very 
centralized. The first elections at subnational level were only held in 1999, while in 2002 
decentralization laws were adopted –their implementation is still not complete– and all 
subdivisions redefined (de Sardan 2004). Mamadou Tandja was elected in 1999 as President 
of the Republic and re-elected in 2004. In 2009, Tandja introduced a new constitution to be 
able to stay in office, but he was overthrown in 2010 by a military coup. Major Salou Djibo 
was named head of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, while the 
international community called for the reestablishment of constitutional order. New elections 
were held in 2011, out of which Mahamadou Issoufou became President; he was re-elected in 
March 2016 and is still in office. 
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Adding up to its long-standing political turmoil, two foci of instability have recently arisen. 
First, a Touareg rebellion emerged in February 2007, the Nigerien Movement for Justice 
(NMJ), with the main demands of a more even sharing of natural resources revenue and making 
progress in the decentralization process – initially agreed in 1996. The NMJ attacked several 
military targets in northern Niger throughout 2007 and 2008, but successful government 
offensives in 2009 limited the rebels' operational capabilities. There have been no armed 
attacks since June 2008. Secondly, civil insecurity and violence have been on the rise since 
2008, linked to Islamist terrorist groups –most notably al Qaeda and Boko Haram- and continue 
to be active at present (BBC 2016). 
In terms of democratic quality, only 50% of Nigeriens in 2012 had confidence in the 
honesty of elections (Gallup 2012). This may not come as a surprise. In 2015 Niger’s 
democratic system was ranked in the category of ‘Authoritarian Regimes’, 121st out of 167 
countries (The Economist 2015) – although slightly improving from 2010 when it was 128th 
out of 167 countries (The Economist 2010). Citizens seem to trust the country’s media: 70% 
of Niger’s population believe in their quality and integrity, one of the highest levels in SSA. 
The country’s governance ratings are weak, though. For instance, Niger’s State Fragility Index 
in 2014 had the same rating as it had in 1996 (Centre for Systemic Peace 2014). Figure 2.3 in 
the annex shows the 6 dimensions included in the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and in 
most of the indicators Niger is situated in the lowest percentiles globally. The evolution since 
1996 can be appreciated in the charts. Three groups can be distinguished. Voice and 
accountability started extremely low in 1996 and has improved over the years, although 
decreasing from 2004 onwards. On the other hand, political stability (the highest ranked 
dimension at the baseline) has shown a clearly deteriorating trend. The other 4 dimensions 
(government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) have 
exhibited slightly positive trends, most of them reaching their peak somewhere around 2010. 
Control of corruption is the only dimension that has slightly improved since 2010. 
The data described so far relate to formal institutions. Informal institutions are difficult to 
measure (or even define), but have been identified in the literature as potentially affecting 
economic performance through two main channels: social divisions and people’s values.22 The 
22 While the importance of institutions is widely agreed upon by economists, their definition itself is subject of a 
large body of literature, with significant disagreements – especially on informal institutions. A key figure in the 
literature, Douglass North defines them as the informal rules derived from culture that regulate societal behaviour, 
and proposes to include informal constraints, conventions and codes of conduct (North 1990). Other authors 
defend that the term is so blurry that the dichotomy formal-informal should not be used, and propose written vs 
unwritten (Hodgson, Calatrava 2006). Given this challenge, not everything relating to societal codes of conduct 
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first channel may lead to internal conflict. Among others, social divisions could be ethnic or 
religious, and may support interest-group polarization and rent-seeking. This would undermine 
the consensus for public goods, thereby leading to policies that are not conducive to growth 
(Easterly, Levine 1997). From the ethnic viewpoint, Niger is quite varied and therefore would 
be eligible for social divisions. The ethnic structure of its population is as follows: Arab (0.3%), 
Djerma Sonrai (21.2%), Gourmantché (0.3%), Haoussa (53%), Kanouri Manga (4.4%), Peulh 
(9.9%), Touareg (10.4%), Toubou (0.4%) and others (0.2%) (INS 2011). An example of social 
division based on ethnic differences could be the Touaregs’ armed rebellion in Northern Niger, 
although the reasons of that rebellion are very complex and intertwined (Rosenbaum 2007). 
Based on informal discussions with many Nigeriens between 2008 and 2010, I adhere to the 
view that ethnic fragmentation is unlikely to lead to social division in Niger. 
One argument for social fragmentation is that it could have been derived from the mistrust 
in the recruitment of slaves (Nunn 2008). Based on this argument, countries that exported more 
slaves are more likely to have remained underdeveloped: the internal warfare, raiding, and 
kidnapping would have resulted in state collapse and ethnic fractionalization. Niger exported 
an estimated 19,912 people as slaves between 1400 and 1900, which is a very low number 
relative to many other countries (Nunn 2008). Arguably, these figures would lend little support 
to the argument of slavery-inherited fragmentation of ethnic groups. 
The second channel through which informal institutions could influence economic 
performance is people’s values, often linked to religion (Weber 1958). For instance, specific 
religious beliefs and/or church attendance may influence types of behaviour that are more (or 
less) productive (Barro, McCleary 2003). In this regard, 99% of the Nigerien population is 
Sunni Muslim (INS 2010), which is likely to preclude social conflicts due to religion. While 
recognizing the importance of Islam in the country, the Government of Niger has traditionally 
adopted a quite secular approach. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Niger has serious developmental challenges. Environmental conditions are rough and meeting 
basic needs such as food or water is challenging for a large portion of the population. Clearly 
this setting would have made it very difficult, in the past, for Nigeriens to develop before those 
in more benign conditions. 
in Niger could be described. Hence, I focus on the key aspects relating to social conduct that have been identified 
in the literature as potential obstacles to economic performance, and for which there are data available in Niger. 
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Niger may qualify as being in a ‘poverty trap’. High poverty and demographic growth limit 
savings; deficient infrastructures, unskilled human resources, corruption and little access to 
capital burden private sector development and investment, which in turn contributes to little 
employment and precarious working conditions. The country’s economy is based on basic 
products and natural resources. The main sector is agriculture, which is vulnerable to climatic 
variations. Economic relations are mostly informal, which makes it difficult for the State to 
have a deep involvement in the economy. As it is difficult to mobilize internal resources, the 
country has little margin for public spending. There are hopes for other resources in the future 
but so far, the country depends mostly on uranium for fiscal revenue, which exposes it to 
volatility in the price of that mineral. 
Political instability has been a noteworthy feature of the country for decades, and despite 
recent modest improvements in some governance dimensions the quality of institutions remains 
weak, e.g. some areas of the country do not meet basic conditions of safety and security due to 
terrorist groups. To make up for the lack of basic services provided by the State, people depend 
on their networks, which strengthens civil society. Despite high ethnic diversity, social 
fragmentation seems unlikely. 
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2.6. Annexes 
Table 2.1. Main socio-political events since its independence 
Year Event 
1960 Niger’s independence from France. 
Hamani Diori is elected President of the Republic by the National Assembly. 
1965 Hamani Diori is re-elected President of the Republic by universal suffrage. 
1974 Coup d’état (successful) by General Seyni Kountché. 
1975 Coup d’état (plot) by Majors Souna Sido, Dilbo Bakary and Maitourane Gadjio 
1976 Coup d’état (attempt) by Majeur Basere Moussa and Captains Sidi Mohamed and Ahmed Mouddour 
1983 Coup d’état (attempt) by Lieutenant Mahamane Sidikou, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Oumarou and Captain Seybou Mahamane 
Ousseini 
1987 After General Kountché’s death due to delicate health, General Ali Saibou is designated as head of the Supreme Military Council 
(CMS) to carry out the functions of Chief of State. 
1989 Referendum and adoption of a new Constitution. 
1992 Referendum and adoption of a new Constitution. 
1993 Mahamane Ousmane is elected President of the Republic.  
Mahamadou Issoufou is appointed as Prime Minister.  
1994 The incumbent Prime Minister Mahamadou Issoufou resigns. 
1995 New elections take place and Hama Hamadou becomes Prime Minister. 
1996 Coup d’état (successful) by Colonel Ibrahim Barré Mainassara. 
A new Constitution is adopted by referendum in 1996. 
After controversial presidential elections in which Colonel Mainassara participated as an independent candidate, a period of serious 
socio-political and legal instability follows. 
1998 Coup d’état (alleged plot) by Hama Amadou, Issoufou Assoumane and Mohamed Bazoum 
1999 First local elections in the country’s history take place, to later be contested and annulled. 
Mainassara’s regime comes to an end and he is assassinated through another coup. Major Daouda Malam Wanké becomes Chief of 
State and head of the National Reconciliation Council (CRN). 
A new Constitution is approved in Referendum. 
Mamadou Tandja is elected as President of the Republic. Hama Amadou is appointed as Prime Minister. 
1998 Decentralization laws are adopted. 
2004 Mamadou Tandja is re-elected as President. 
2009 Against the Constitutional Court’s opposite ruling, Tandja dissolves the National Assembly and calls for a Referendum to change the 
Constitution and be able to remain in office. 
A new major political crisis ensues, creating great division and tension between political leaders and civil society in general. 
2010 Coup d’état (successful) by Lieutenant General Salou Djibo, who becomes Chairman of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of 
Democracy. 
2010 Referendum and adoption of a new Constitution. 
2010 Coup d’état (Plot) by Colonels Abdoulaye Badie, Abdou Sidikou and two others 
2011 New elections take place. Mahamadou Issoufou is elected as President of the Republic in April. A planned assassination of Issoufou 
is uncovered in July, and a group of senior military officers are arrested. 
2016 Mahamadou Issoufou is re-elected as President in March, in a second tour against Hama Amadou, who was detained during the 
electoral campaign. The opposition calls for a boycott to the election result. 
Source: Sambo (2009) combined with Polity IV database (www.systemicpeace.org) 
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Figure 2.3. Evolution of Governance Dimensions in Niger23 
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Chapter 3. Niger’s Aid Market 
“It is a sad reflection on the aid establishment that knowing where the money goes is still so difficult, and 
that the picture available from partial knowledge remains so disturbing.” 
(Easterly, Pfutze 2008) 
3.1. Introduction 
Aid can be viewed as a market (Harford, Klein 2005b), having both supply (donors) and 
demand (beneficiary countries).24  This chapter aims to provide a macro understanding of 
Niger’s aid market, before the thesis delves into its microeconomic aspects (in next chapters).  
3.2. Overview of the market 
From 1960 to 2014 Niger received a total of net Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
disbursements of 24,922.5 million in 2014 constant USD, which is equivalent to 453.1 million 
per year (OECD Stat 2016).25 Overall, ODA in Niger has had an upward trend since the 
country’s independence (Figure 3.1), but three periods can be clearly distinguished: an increase 
till it peaked in 1985, the decrease thereafter during the country’s troubled 1990s, and a 
24 Some authors argue that aid can have a dose of ‘impure altruism’, because the donor derives utility from the 
very fact of giving – also known as the warm glow (Andreoni 1990). Based on this rationale, to the extent that the 
donor gives aid out of self-interest, the exchange would lose importance. Other authors such as Marcel Mauss 
emphasize, based on anthropological analyses, the difference between market and gift (Mauss 2002). Nonetheless, 
Mauss does acknowledge that gifts supply individuals with personal incentives for collaborating in the pattern of 
exchanges, which supports the idea of exchange (ibid). Despite these views, the idea of aid as a market is 
increasingly being accepted. After Harford and Klein (2005b), more authors have used it. The market for aid has 
also been referred to as market for policy advice (Custer et al. 2015) or market of ideas for policy change (Parks, 
Rice & Custer 2015). 
25 As defined by the OECD, ODA are those flows provided by official agencies under the following two criteria: 
i) they are administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as
their main objective, and ii) they are concessional in character and convey a grant element of at least 25 per cent
(OECD Stat 2016).
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recovery since 1999 which culminated in a new peak in 2014, when it reached an all-time 
record with 917.8 Million in 2014 constant USD (ibid). 
Figure 3.1. Niger’s ODA (2014 constant USD) 
Source: OECD Stat (2016) 
Debt relief started to be part of the aid received from 1989 onwards, reaching noteworthy levels 
between 2002 and –especially– 2005. During those four years there was a large scaling up of 
debt relief initiatives such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program, of which 
Niger benefited because its debt had reached unsustainable levels (IMF External Relations 
Department 2004). Debt relief was the consequence of debt accumulation after decades 
receiving aid. This debt accumulation over time is visible looking at the evolution of gross 
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Figure 3.2. ODA Gross Loans (Constant 2014 USD, Millions) 
Source: Own calculation based on OECD Stat (2016) 
Considering ODA volumes relative to the country’s economy, aid grew until 1994 and has 
thereafter had a slightly decreasing trend (Figure 3.3). For most of the period considered, aid 
has been substantial and hovered between 10-20%. However, it never attained the levels (40-
50%) which, according to Lensink and White (1999), would lead to negative returns. At 
present, the level of aid relative to Niger’s GNI is similar to that in the mid-1970s.26 
Figure 3.3. Net ODA received, as a percentage of GNI 
Source: OECD Stat (2016) 
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In per capita terms, the picture is roughly similar (Figure 3.4). ODA rose rapidly until the mid-
1980s, to decrease thereafter – particularly during the 1990s, a decade of substantial turmoil in 
Niger. With the political stability of the 2000s, aid quickly recovered, but decreased again in 
2009-2010 due to renewed political instability. From 2011 onwards, however, it has gained 
remarkable momentum. At present, levels of ODA per capita are equivalent to those in the late-
1980s. 
Figure 3.4. Total ODA net disbursed per person (2014 constant USD) 
Source: OECD Stat (2016) 
The number of donors that disbursed ODA increased from only one at independence in 1960 
to 43 in 2014, while those who committed aid increased from zero in 1960 to 34 in 2014 (Figure 
3.5). The number of donors committing ODA to Niger is consistently lower than those who 
disburse it, which means that some donors who do not commit aid do disburse it later on. The 
pattern may seem counterintuitive, as it may be expected that donors plan ahead and if 
anything, of those who commit some may fail to meet their promises. Failure to deliver 
commitments may indeed occur, but the phenomenon can also be interpreted as flexibility by 
donor countries to adapt to the recipient’s situation, which is useful in situations of recurrent 
natural disasters and droughts. Another option may relate to donors’ flexibility to supply aid 
for other reasons. This would be consistent with the fact that during Niger’s 2009-2010 crisis, 
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a military junta after a coup) but disbursements did not (Figure 3.5). Donors that did not 
disburse aid in 2014 include the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece and the Netherlands. 
Figure 3.5. Number of donors 
Source: OECD Stat (2016) 
The OECD/DAC considers four types of donors: DAC 27 , multilateral28 , non-DAC 29  and 
private.30 DAC countries and multilateral organizations provided 97% of all the aid that Niger 
received from 1960 to 2014, with the rest being non-DAC donors – private aid is negligible 
(Figure 3.6).31 The pattern is consistent over time (Figure 3.7). Since 1960, non-DAC countries 
only represented a relatively significant share of Niger’s aid between 1981 and 1984, when 
they surpassed multilateral donors. That short period coincided with the early-mid 1980s’ 
uranium boom, and the increase is explained by Kuwait. After the mid-1980s, non-DAC donors 
became insignificant compared to the other types. DAC donors became the main source of 
27 Development Assistance Committee. DAC is composed of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
28 AfDB, AfDF, AFESD, AsDB Special Fund, BADEA, CarDB, EBRD, EU Institutions, GAVI, GEF, Global 
Fund, IAEA, IBRD, IDA, IDB Special Fund, IFAD, IMF (Concessional Trust Funds), Islamic Dev. Bank, 
Montreal Protocol, Nordic Dev. Fund, OFID, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECE, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNPBF, 
UNRWA, UNTA, WFP. 
29 Chinese Taipei, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Kuwait, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Other donor countries. 
30 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 
31 Data available from the OECD/DAC show that that non-DAC donors are less likely to report their data flows 
















ODA until the end of the 1990s, but converged with multilateral donors in the 2000s (in 2013 
and 2014 they diverged again). 
Figure 3.6. Total share of ODA by donor type, for the period 1960-2014 
Source: OECD Stat (2016) 
Figure 3.7. Evolution of Niger’s ODA disbursed aid by type of donor 
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Aid disbursements by sector are shown in the annex following OECD’s classification (Table 
3.4). Debt relief (section 600) has represented a very significant share of ODA’s use (22.1% of 
all aid), although sector-allocable aid (section 450) consumed the greatest portion (48.9%). 
Commodity aid (section 500, which includes food aid) received 15.2% of all funds and 
humanitarian aid (section 700), 12.1%. 
Within sector-allocable aid, the main use has been social infrastructure and services 
(section 100, with 29.7%), with health, government & civil society, and education receiving 
the highest shares of social aid. Within health and education, basic services have been the main 
beneficiaries, while in government & civil society, public finance management received 
significant resources. The second area receiving aid has been production (section 300, with 
7.3%), where most of the support went to agriculture. Mining, a strategic sector led by private 
sector companies in partnership with government, also received support – although 
considerably less than agriculture. Economic infrastructure (section 200) has been the third 
most important area (6.1%), overwhelmingly focused on transport and storage, and specifically 
on roads: 90.6% of all transport and storage aid went into roads. The fourth most important 
sector was multi-sectoral and cross-cutting (section 400, with 5.7%), which includes such 
objectives as environment or gender equality.  
Within commodity aid, general budget support was the main use (10% of all aid), while the 
other important purpose was food aid (5.1% of all aid). Humanitarian aid was used primarily 
for emergency responses, with little shares being destined to reconstruction relief and disaster 
prevention. Based on table 3.4, the high-level sector distribution of ODA disbursed from 2002 
to 2014 is shown in annex Figure 3.12. 
The annual evolution of aid’s sector allocation since 2002 shows the huge effort on debt 
relief (Figure 3.13). Figure 3.14 shows the same graph without debt-relief. Social infrastructure 
has had a slightly positive trend over the years, especially from 2011 onward, which is 
explained by Mahamadou Issoufou’s ‘Renaissance programme’ (Cabinet du Premier Ministre 
2014). Within social infrastructure, basic aspects of health, education, and water and sanitation 
have shown a positive trend, while others such as post-secondary education remain 
insignificant (Figure 3.15). In economic infrastructure, most of the uses of aid have shown 
volatile trends (Figure 3.16), although since 2006 transport and storage (mostly road works) 
have become important. The evolution of aid towards productive sectors has mostly been 
driven by agriculture (Figure 3.17). This trend started with the 2004-05 famine, and was 
boosted by Niger’s access to the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2011 (Millennium 
Challenge Corporation 2014), and the ‘Renaissance Programme’ (Cabinet du Premier Ministre 
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2014). Conversely, other productive sectors such as forestry, fishing or tourism receive 
virtually no aid (Figure 3.17). Finally, aid non-allocable to sectors is marked by the growth of 
humanitarian purposes (especially emergency response and food security), which start with the 
famine in 2004-05 (Figure 3.18). 
3.3. Donors 
In 2014 aid in Niger was disbursed by 43 donors, so the analysis will focus on the ten main 
donors. In aggregate terms since 1960, the main DAC donors for Niger are France, the USA, 
Germany, Canada and Japan, which account for 77.9% of all bilateral ODA (Figure 3.8). The 
main multilateral donors were the European Union, IDA (World Bank, WB), the African 
Development Bank Fund, the UNDP and the World Food Programme (WFP), which account 
for 84.6% of all multilateral aid (Figure 3.9).32  
Figure 3.8. DAC donors’ share of cumulative disbursements (1960-2014) 
Source: OECD/DAC 
The pattern has been fairly consistent over decades: the most important donor has been France, 
although French disbursements were relatively volatile compared to the other donors’ (Figure 
3.21). The USA and Germany matched France’s aid levels in some years during the mid-1980’s 
32 The ten donors selected remain relevant in Niger at present, although their ranking has slightly changed. Figure 
3.19 in the Annex shows the same graph for bilateral donors since 2010 to 2014, while Figure 3.20 does so for 
multilateral donors. As these changes in the ranking could be due to the recent conjuncture, the choice remains to 













uranium boom. From the early 1990s, when turmoil in the country started and bilateral aid 
decreased, most donors’ disbursements began to decline. The great exception was France, 
which continued supplying substantial aid (although it also reduced it). France was also the 
country that made the greatest –unparalleled– effort during the 2004-2005 famine, although 
since 2010 it has been surpassed by the USA. Both countries may have geostrategic 
considerations, as they import considerable amounts of uranium ore from Niger (Trade Map 
2016). 
Figure 3.9. Multilateral donors’ share of cumulative disbursements (1960-2014) 
Source: OECD/DAC 
In the multilateral arena, the European Union has always been the most important donor, 
followed –and sometimes surpassed– by the World Bank (Figure 3.22). During the 1980s the 
UN agencies increased their funding, but the 1990s brought a general decrease in donors’ 
disbursements due to the country’s turmoil. As the country regained political and institutional 
stability in the 2000s, however, some donors increased their funding again. The 2010 crisis led 
to aid reductions again, but regaining democratic stability paved the way to new unprecedented 
levels of multilateral aid. 
Donors have different modi operandi. In terms of the distribution channel used, two profiles 
can be identified (Table 3.1): the first delivers aid mainly through the public sector, allocating 
marginal amounts to civil society and through multilateral organizations (most donors operate 


















Table 3.1. Channels used to deliver aid by donors33 
Canada France Germany Japan USA EU 
  Public Sector 3.5% 89.2% 78.6% 60.2% 3.2% 69.4% 
  NGOs & Civil Society 16.3% 4.8% 15.3% 2.1% 41.6% 14.7% 
  Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  Multilateral Organisations 63.9% 5.7% 5.5% 36.7% 53.8% 14.6% 
  Other 16.2% 0.4% 0.5% 1.0% 1.4% 1.3% 
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat (2016) 
The second type, characterised by Canada and the USA, does not rely so heavily on Niger’s 
public sector and distributes aid much more evenly across channels. They use civil society 
more heavily and channel a higher share of their aid through multilateral organizations. Despite 
these differences, none of the donors used Public-Private Partnerships (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.5 in the annex shows the importance of donors in each of the sectors in which they 
operate. In most sectors, the majority of the aid is provided by 2-4 donors. The main ten donors 
account for a very high share in most of the sectors. The exceptions are ‘Administrative cost 
of donors’, ‘Assistance to refugees in donor countries’34 and ‘Unallocated / Unspecified’. As 
donors self-select to report their aid, it is plausible that donors are less likely to report their aid 
on these less ‘glamorous’ sectors.35 
Table 3.5 can be summarized by the mean and standard deviation of donor’s importance 
across sectors (Table 3.2). The mean is an indicator of a donor’s relative contribution, while 
higher standard deviation would be associated to more concentrated efforts, i.e. in some sectors 
the donor would be very important but in others insignificant. 
Table 3.2. Donor disbursements’ importance across sectors (Summary of Annex table 3.5) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Canada 1.3% 1.5% 
France 13.1% 10.7% 
Germany 3.1% 3.8% 
Japan 2.0% 1.8% 
USA 5.8% 9.9% 
AfDF 5.3% 5.1% 
EU 16.5% 16.3% 
IDA 14.0% 17.4% 
UNDP 0.7% 1.0% 
WFP 0.9% 2.3% 
Source: Own calculation based on Table 3.5 in the annex 
33 Calculated by donor on different timeframes based on OECD data: Germany and the EU (2006-2014), Japan 
and USA (2006-2014), Canada (2009-2014) and France (2010-2014). 
34 With very few refugees fleeing Niger this sector is driven by very few funds reported, and the exception is 
explained by a Norwegian initiative of 2 Million USD in 2002 which represents about 47.3% of all the aid received 
by Niger between 2002 and 2014 for that purpose. 
35 Missing observations are more likely in these sectors. 
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Based on these indicators the EU, the World Bank and France are the most important donors 
in Niger, and their efforts are very focused in a few number of sectors. At the other extreme, 
the UNDP, WFP and Canada are the least important of the ten main donors, and they tend to 
spread their efforts in many sectors – WFP is the most focused, given its mandate on food. The 
other donors are somewhere in between. 
To shed light on donors’ efficiency, data are available on how much of the aid committed 
by donors was disbursed, which is often referred to as the ‘implementation’ or ‘delivery’ rate. 
Three measures are considered (Table 3.3): the ratio of disbursements to commitments in 
aggregate terms for the entire period, the average annual implementation rate, and the 
correlation coefficient between commitments and disbursements of aid. They allow us to know 
if donors have delivered all the aid they committed, if they have done so on a regular basis, and 
if movements in their commitments were associated with movements in their disbursements. 
Table 3.3. Selected indicators of ODA Delivery, by donor and donor groupings (1960 – 2014) 
Total Aggregate Delivery 
Annual Delivery rate 
Correlation  
commitments – net disbursements 
Average Std. Dev. Coefficient Obs. 
All Donors, Total 119.4% 173.2% 3.44 0.816*** 49 
DAC Countries, Total 101.8% 151.6% 3.27 0.795*** 49 
Multilateral, Total 149.8% 196.4% 1.30 0.555*** 46 
Non-DAC Countries 259.4% 4,392.9% 117.33 0.164 24 
Canada 95.6% 305.8% 6.15 0.104 49 
France 115.9% 120.1% 0.35 0.779*** 48 
Germany 89.2% 163.4% 1.96 0.681*** 49 
Japan 99.8% 178.4% 3.41 0.331** 40 
USA 96.0% 115.6% 0.59 0.836*** 48 
AfDF 2,009.5% 74.2% 0.00 - - 
EU 95.4% 199.0% 2.19 0.306** 46 
IDA 493.9% 1445.0% 19.67 0.195 11 
UNDP 569.4% 97.5% 0.03 0.975*** 11 
* Statistically significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% level
Source: Own calculations based on OECD/DAC data 
The results show donors delivering more aid than they had previously committed. While there 
is great disparity in the results, the most consistent donors are France and the USA. On the 
other hand, the African Development Bank, the World Bank and Canada are less likely to 
materialize their commitments in a smooth manner. 
By type of donor there are also differences. Multilateral donors have the smallest variance, 
which suggests that they are the most ‘reliable’ vis-à-vis Niger. DAC donors are the second, 
while non-DAC donors are clearly the most volatile. These findings may be rooted in the 
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institutional structure in which donors operate: multilateral donors may have a ‘last resort’ 
character. However, DAC donors only report to their national governments so they may be 
more flexible, i.e. better able to concentrate disbursements in some time periods. Non-DAC 
donors’ aid is much less predictable, and they may disburse much more than committed. Non-
DAC countries are less likely to be full democracies36, so it may plausible to assume that they 
are less accountable to large taxpayers’ bases. Hence, their reasons for providing aid to Niger 
could more easily include non-developmental reasons, e.g. availability of natural resources. 
3.4. Non-governmental organizations 
This section provides a description of the main characteristics of NGOs in Niger, with a focus 
–when data are available– on international NGOs. Although NGOs are believed to mobilize
substantial resources, there is no exact information on how much funding they channel. The 
functions of supporting and monitoring NGOs lie with the Direction des ONG et des 
Associations de Développement (DONGAD), based in the Ministère du Plan et de 
l’Aménagement du Territoire. However, the capacity to track external financing going to civil 
society and NGOs is weak (African Development Bank 2011). An estimate can be obtained by 
considering how much ODA is channelled through NGOs and civil society, although this is 
likely an underestimation of the funds they distribute (national resource mobilization would 
not be taken into account). Keeping in mind such potential bias, from 2004 to 2014, 14.1% of 
all aid was committed and 10.3% disbursed through NGOs and civil society, equivalent to 
900.3 and 952.8 million USD, respectively (OECD Stat 2016). The pattern is opposite to that 
of overall aid spending, which indicates difficulties in spending the aid committed. Only 0.7 % 
of all aid was committed to support NGOs and civil society, although 0.72% was disbursed.  
In 2009 there were 871 NGOs in the country, of which 766 were national and 105 from 
other countries (DONGAD 2009). Most of them were created during the late 1990s and early 
2000s, although the peak of NGO creations was attained during the 2004-05 famine (Figure 
3.10). Consequently, the average age in 2009 was 7.9 years (DONGAD 2009). The mean age 
for international NGOs was 8.1 years old, while that of national NGOs was 7.9 years (ibid). 
The difference in means is not statistically significant (t=0.2387, p-value=0.8118). 
36 The percentage distribution of democracy categories for non-DAC countries is as follows: ‘full democracy’ 
(14.3%), ‘flawed democracy’ (57.1%), ‘hybrid regime’ (7.1%) and ‘authoritarian regime’ (21.4%) (The 
Economist 2010). On the other hand, 87% of DAC economies were categorized as ‘full democracy’, while the 
remaining 13% were ‘flawed democracies’ (Ibid). 
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Most NGOs work in integrated development activities which means that they work in many 
sectors (Figure 3.11). According to field interviews, such a multidisciplinary approach gives 
them great flexibility to raise funds from several sources. 
Figure 3.10. Number of NGOs created in Niger, by year 
Source: DONGAD (2009) 
Figure 3.11. Number of NGOs in Niger by sector 
Source: DONGAD (2009) 
With regards to NGOs’ professional skills, available data in the annex shows the average 
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of origin (Table 3.6). There is an obvious difference between Niger’s, which depend vastly on 
volunteers, and international NGOs. In terms of their geographical structure, a clear majority 
of all NGOs had sub-regional offices (DONGAD 2009). For Niger’s NGOs this figure is 98%, 
which suggests that the profile of Niger’s NGOs is decentralized and as noted, based on 
volunteering.37 
3.5. National authorities 
Since its independence Niger has been keen on development planning, which translated in 
regular development plans ranging from three to ten years (Table 3.7). Until the early 1980s, 
the main axes of Niger’s development plans were growth in the primary sector, higher-added 
value products through industrialization and human capital accumulation, which would be 
achieved through higher savings (Sambo 2009). Those plans failed in their implementation, 
however, and from 1983 onwards the country started to adopt the IMF-WB Structural 
Adjustment Programmes, thus losing sovereignty in the development planning process (ibid). 
Designed in the 1980s and dismantled due to the crises of the 1990s, Niger’s aid management 
system was revived in the 2000s thanks to the country’s regained stability (Sambo 2009). Three 
major development plans were designed in that decade: two poverty reduction strategies and a 
rural development strategy.  
In 2005 the aid management system was confirmed through the establishment of the 
following structures (République du Niger 2013): 
At national level: 
37 The overall global rise of the aid sector has led to more competition to raise funds, an effect arguably stronger 
in the non-profit sector. Strategies to mobilize resources have been redesigned and professionalized by non-profit 
marketing experts to consistently involve donors in the philanthropic world, i.e. apart from donations given during 
devastating tragedies (McLeish 2007). Given the low level of professionalization in Niger’s NGOs and 
considering their competition from advanced countries (Table 3.6), there seems to be large room for improvement. 
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• A National Steering Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister;
• A National Committee Government-Donors, chaired by the Minister of Economy and
Finance (MEF);
• A National Committee of Dialogue and Coordination, chaired by the Minister of
Community development;
• Sectoral structures coordinated by focal points designated in those ministries
composing each sector;
• The Permanent Secretariat of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), under the direction
of a coordinator nominated by the Prime Minister.
At regional level: 
• A Regional Committee of Dialogue and Coordination, chaired by the Governors;
• Sub-regional Committees of Dialogue and Coordination, chaired by the Prefets.
This institutional framework was designed to respond to a high need of coordination, as there 
are many donors and resource mobilization is often seen by government as insufficient (Sambo 
2009). However, too many structures at the MEF participate in the aid management process, 
which complicates coordination. The structure of the MEF is shown in Figure 3.23. The central 
entities at the MEF are (Sambo 2009): 
• The Commissariat Chargé de l’Economie (CCE) is the main focal point of donors to
negotiate access to development funds, covering ODA and Budget Support. It has three
directions, two of which are actively involved in the management of foreign aid (Figure
3.24). The Direction General de l’Economie (DGE) prepares the macroeconomic
framework and is in charge of managing the Budget Support programs of the IMF, EU
and France. The Direction Générale des Etudes et la Prévision (DGEP) is in charge of
preparing the financial and monetary indicators required by donors. This department
forecasts budget requirements and manages Budget Support from the AfDB. The CCE
lacks the human resources required to respond to donors’ requests, e.g. several
directions that were expected according to Decree 2005/116 are still not operational.
• The Commissariat Chargé du Développement (CCD) manages sectoral programs and
projects, and is also in charge of the design and formulation of development initiatives
(Figure 3.25). It is composed of three Directions Générales:
o The Direction Générale des Programmes Sectoriels (DGPS) has two main
functions: to support the sector ministries in the formulation of sector
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development strategies, and to manage all sector projects from design to 
evaluation. 
o The Direction Générale du Financement (DGF). The DGF has 3 directions, out
of which only two are operational: the Direction of Multilateral Financing, the
Direction of Bilateral Financing and the Direction du Financement Interne. The
third one is the Service des Etudes et de Synthèse. Those three directions cover
four types of financing are possible: external non-refundable, loans, HIPC and
Treasury (national financing).
o La Direction Générale de l’Evaluation des Programmes de Développement
(DGEPD) is in charge of analysing the impact of development policies and
strengthening monitoring/evaluation capacity of public officials. As the CCE,
this structure has a huge need in terms of quantity and quality of human
resources.
o The Cellule de Coordination de l’Aide (CCA) also has a serious lack of means
to undertake its coordination role. To support the CCA, the UNDP provided an
aid management platform tailored to Niger and installed at the MEF in 2010
(Development Gateway 2011). Despite it costing 2.5 million USD, the software
has not been fully functional due to lack of regular updating of the data (African
Development Bank 2011).
• The Direction Générale du Budget (DGB). The DGB has six Directions: the Direction
du Budget (DB), the Direction de l’Ordonnancement (DO), the Direction de la
Comptabilité Publique (DCP), the Direction de la Dette Publique (DDP), and the
Direction de la Solde (DS).
• The Trésor is active raising resources in the West African money market through the
ECOWAS Central Bank, especially issuing short-term Treasury bonds. It is composed
of the following Directions: The Direction de la Comptabilité (DC), the Direction de
la Dépense (DD), the Direction des Recettes (DR), the Direction des Comptables
Secondaires (DCS), the Direction des Correspondants du Trésor (DCT) and the
Direction des Etudes (DE).
• The Direction Générale des Marchés Publics (DGMP), a new structure that was created
in 2005 to ensure transparency over the country’s procurement processes. By 2009 it
was still not operational.
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• The Direction Générale du Contrôle Financier (DGF), which used to be under the DGB
(now is under the Premier Minister’s office) and supports the DGB in its function of
controlling the budget’s execution.
• The Institut National de la Statistique (INS), which was created to collect and publish
statistical data from all the sectors in the economy.
Informal discussions held from 2008 to 2010 with representatives from Government and the 
donor community, revealed that in the aid management process there are two types of frictions: 
a) within the MEF, and b) between the MEF and sector ministries. The first arises because there
are too many different departments participating in the management of aid, all with serious 
limitations in terms of human capital (number of staff and their skills) and of equipment, which 
leads to serious inefficiencies. The second type of frictions arises because given their scarce 
resources, sector ministries compete for being the focal point of new programs vis-à-vis donors 
(i.e. managing their aid). Such competition is explained by blurry mandate distinctions between 
sector ministries, which a high number of ministries aggravates. In the current government 
there are 35 ministries (Table 3.8). Such high number of aid actors competing for aid is likely 
to hamper coordination of efforts. 
The capacity to manage aid and implement policies conducive to growth is weak. Based on 
field visits and interviews, these deficiencies are visible in a range of issues such as poor 
management practices, run-down facilities or inadequate equipment. Some donors undertake 
regular assessments of Niger’s institutional capacity. Table 3.9 shows the ratings of Niger on 
the World Banks’ Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA). The World Bank’s 
CPIA assesses the quality of a country’s policy and institutional framework, meaning “how 
conducive that framework is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the 
effective use of development assistance” (World Bank 2012). According to the CPIA, in 2015 
Niger had rating of 3.5 on a scale from 1 to 6, which has remained almost constant since 2005 
- when it was 3.3. Of the four groups of components measured, Niger’s macroeconomic
management (largely led by WAEMU’s Central Bank) is the domain where the country has a 
highest grade. On the other hand, indicators relating to public sector management and 
institutions (which deal with aid) is the lowest-rated.  
In 2011 Niger underwent a Public Expenditure Management and Accountability Review 
(PEMFAR). Its resulting five key messages were (World Bank 2011c): 
• “Strong political commitment at the highest level and adequate technical assistance are
key prerequisites for effective public-sector reform. Limited implementation of the
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PEMFAR I recommendations reflects an ineffective political support for implementing 
sensitive policy reforms.” 
• “Strengthening domestic revenue management and transparency is crucial as the
country prepares to mobilize important oil and mining revenues.”
• “Budget credibility and execution need to be improved as well as public investment
management.”
• “Integrity and accountability of public financial management remain a challenge.”
• “Serious weaknesses affect the transparency and efficiency of the public procurement
system.”
Despite the significant weaknesses, compared to the rest of SSA Niger is above average, and 
the World Bank view is similar to that of other donors. According to the AfDB’s CPIA, in 2015 
Niger ranked 14th out of 38 countries – the first one was Rwanda (4.85) and the last one Somalia 
(1.09). Figure 3.26 shows the evolution of Niger’s CPIA compared to similar countries. 
3.6. Conclusion 
The level of aid Niger receives is not high. Despite constant growth in the number of donors, 
aid as a share of GNP has never attained those levels at which economists such as Lensink and 
White predict negative returns. In 2010, the levels of aid per capita were comparable to those 
in the 1960s. Very significant shares of aid are destined to basic services. 
The number of donors who disburse aid to Niger is higher than those committing it, which 
may be due to flexibility or other political economy reasons. While most donors rely on 
government systems to deliver their aid, Canada and the USA give higher importance to civil 
society. Some donors intervene in many sectors and have little weight in most of them (e.g. 
UNDP, Canada), while others have a narrower focus (e.g. EU, World Bank). In terms of 
disbursing their commitments, the most reliable donors are France and the USA. 
Considering a different segment of the aid supply, it is difficult to know how much aid 
NGOs channel. Niger’s NGOs are young, atomistic and able to work in many sectors. This 
structure favours flexibility to mobilize resources, although it might come at the cost of 
professionalism. In terms of professional skills, there is a great divide between international 
and national NGOs. International NGOs have higher ratios employees-to-volunteers, which is 
likely associated to financial stability and higher professionalism. 
Although in line with other SSA countries, Nigerien authorities have little capacity to 
transform aid into results due to the weakness in their national institutions. The country’s policy 
48 
and institutional ratings have not improved since 2005. Governmental structures in charge of 
managing aid are overwhelmed by the number of initiatives and actors in the country, which 
makes the very collection of data extremely difficult. There is also a multitude of overlapping 
national actors trying to channel donors’ aid, which added to the high number of donors 
disbursing it, suggests the costs of coordinating aid are high. 
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3.7. Annexes 
Table 3.4. Sectoral decomposition of aid disbursed38 
Total from 2002 to2014 (in 2014 constant USD) 
million)
Share of 
total  450: Total Sector Allocable 5,018.9 48.9% 
    100: I. Social Infrastructure & Services, Total 3,053.8 29.7% 
      110: I.1. Education, Total 551.1 5.4% 
 111: I.1.a. Education, Level Unspecified, Total 161.9 1.6% 
 112: I.1.b. Basic Education, Total 238.0 2.3% 
 113: I.1.c. Secondary Education, Total 52.0 0.5% 
 114: I.1.d. Post-Secondary Education, Total 99.2 1.0% 
      120: I.2. Health, Total 747.3 7.3% 
 121: I.2.a. Health, General, Total 210.9 2.1% 
   122: I.2.b. Basic Health, Total 536.4 5.2% 
      130: I.3. Population Policies/Programs & Reproductive Health, 
Total 
249.9 2.4% 
      140: I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation, Total 488.2 4.8% 
 14020: Water supply and sanitation - large systems 108.1 1.1% 
 14030: Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation 207.6 2.0% 
      150: I.5. Government & Civil Society, Total 775.0 7.6% 
 151: I.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general, Total 687.9 6.7% 
 15110: Public sector policy and administrative management 200.0 1.9% 
 15111: Public finance management 218.4 2.1% 
 152: I.5.b. Conflict, Peace & Security, Total 87.1 0.8% 
      160: I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services, Total 242.2 2.4% 
    200: II. Economic Infrastructure & Services, Total 627.8 6.1% 
      210: II.1. Transport & Storage, Total 458.9 4.5% 
      220: II.2. Communications, Total 13.8 0.1% 
      230: II.3. Energy, Total 30.5 0.3% 
      240: II.4. Banking & Financial Services, Total 65.3 0.6% 
   250: II.5. Business & Other Services, Total 59.3 0.6% 
    300: III. Production Sectors, Total 749.9 7.3% 
      310: III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Total 650.8 6.3% 
 311: III.1.a. Agriculture, Total 645.8 6.3% 
 312: III.1.b. Forestry, Total 2.4 0.0% 
 313: III.1.c. Fishing, Total 2.6 0.0% 
      320: III.2. Industry, Mining, Construction, Total 92.0 0.9% 
 321: III.2.a. Industry, Total 31.9 0.3% 
 322: III.2.b. Mineral Resources & Mining, Total 59.5 0.6% 
 323: III.2.c. Construction, Total 0.6 0.0% 
      331: III.3.a. Trade Policies & Regulations, Total 6.3 0.1% 
      332: III.3.b. Tourism, Total 0.8 0.0% 
    400: IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting, Total 587.4 5.7% 
      410: IV.1. General Environment Protection, Total 101.5 1.0% 
      430: IV.2. Other Multisector, Total 485.9 4.7% 
  500: VI. Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance, 
Total
1,557.2 15.2% 
    510: VI.1. General Budget Support, Total 1,026.6 10.0% 
      51010: General budget support-related aid 1,026.6 10.0% 
    520: VI.2. Developmental Food Aid/Food Security Assistance, 
Total 
527.1 5.1% 
      52010: Food aid/Food security programs 527.1 5.1% 
  600: VII. Action Relating to Debt, Total 2,272.4 22.1% 
    60020: Debt forgiveness 1,923.9 18.7% 
    60030: Relief of multilateral debt 346.5 3.4% 
  700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid, Total 1,239.8 12.1% 
    720: VIII.1. Emergency Response, Total 1,188.1 11.6% 
    730: VIII.2. Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation, Total 17.0 0.2% 
    740: VIII.3. Disaster Prevention & Preparedness, Total 34.7 0.3% 
  910: Administrative Costs of Donors, Total 42.3 0.4% 
  930: Refugees in Donor Countries, Total 4.2 0.0% 
  998: IX. Unallocated / Unspecified, Total 130.3 1.3% 
1000: Total All Sectors 10,265.1 100.0% 
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat (2016) 
38 At the fourth level of disaggregation, only categories with a noteworthy contribution are included. 
Figure 3.12. Sectoral decomposition of ODA disbursed in the period 2002-2014 
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat (2016) 
Figure 3.13. Evolution of ODA composition 2002–2014 (2014 constant USD million)39 
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat (2016) 
39 The disaggregation of Niger’s ODA by sector is only available since 2002. 
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Figure 3.14. ODA composition 2002–2014 without actions related to debt (2014 constant USD million) 
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat (2016) 
Figure 3.15. ODA composition 2002–2014 in Social Infrastructure (2014 constant USD million) 












2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Unallocated/Unspecified
Refugees in donor countries
















2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Other social infrastructure & services
Government & civil society
Water and sanitation








Figure 3.16. ODA composition 2002–2014 in Economic Infrastructure (2014 constant USD million) 
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat (2016) 
Figure 3.17. Evolution of ODA composition 2002–2014 in Production Sectors (2014 constant USD million) 






































Figure 3.18. Evolution of ODA composition 2002–2014 in Non-Allocable (2014 constant USD million) 
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat (2016) 
Figure 3.19. DAC donors’ share of cumulative disbursements (2010-2014) 
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Figure 3.20. Multilateral donors’ share of cumulative disbursements (2010-2014) 
Source: OECD Stat (2016) 
Figure 3.21. Evolution of ODA disbursement of main DAC donors 
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Figure 3.22. Evolution of ODA disbursement of main multilateral donors 
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat (2016) 
Table 3.5. Donors’ share of cumulative disbursements by sector category, during the period 2002-2014 
Donor Share 
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Source: Own elaboration based on OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (2016) 
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Table 3.6. NGO’s average staff by employment status and NGOs’ country of origin 
Country Salaried Interns Volunteers 
Germany 17.5 1.5 25.5 
Saudi Arabia 23.5 3.0 0.0 
Austria 76.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 7.3 0.8 1.0 
Canada 7.0 1.5 6.0 
Egypt 6.0 0.0 0.0 
Spain 31.5 0.0 0.0 
France 13.9 0.4 4.1 
United Kingdom 36.0 0.0 96.5 
Holland 29.0 0.0 0.0 
International 26.0 0.5 6.5 
Ireland 153.0 0.0 0.0 
Italy 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Kuwait 96.0 0.0 0.0 
Libya 9.0 0.0 0.0 
Niger 5.0 1.1 55.8 
Qatar 14.0 3.0 0.0 
Switzerland 5.8 1.5 3.7 
Senegal 7.0 0.0 0.0 
USA 37.9 0.6 188.9 
Source: DONGAD (2009) 
Table 3.7. Main development Programs and Accords 
Date Program 
1961 – 1963 Plan Triennal Intérimaire de Développement  
1965 – 1974 Perspectives Décennales de Développement 
1976 – 1978 Plan Triennal de Développement 
1979 – 1983 Plan Quinquennal de Développement 
1983 - Structural Adjustment Facility (with IMF and World Bank) 
1987 – 1991 Plan de Développement Economique et Social 
1994 Confirmation Agreement with the IMF 
1996 Accord triennal 1996-1998 
1997 En appui au programme triennal : 
Crédit d’ajustement structurel du secteur public
Crédit de réforme des finances publiques de la Banque mondiale
2000 Programme financier d’urgence du Go vernement de la 5ème république 
2000 Accord triennal (2000-2003) Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility with IMF 
3-year Adjustment loan for Public Expenditures (World Bank)2002 Stratégie de Réducti n de la Pauvreté (SRP) 2002-2005 
2003 Stratégie de Développement Rural (SDR) 2002-2005 
2007 Stratégie de Développement Accéléré et de Réduction de la Pauvreté (SDRP) 2008–2012 
2012 Plan de Développement Economique et Social 2012-2015 
Source: Sambo (2009) and own elaboration 
Figure 3.23. Organogram of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Décret N° 2005-116 du 17 Mai 2005). Source: Sambo (2009) 
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Commissariat chargé de l’Economie:
Direction Générale de l’Economie (DGE)
Direction Générale de l’Epargne, du 
Crédit et du Contrôle des Assurances 
(DGECA)
Direction Générale des Etudes et de la 
Prévision (DGPEP)
Economy Commissariat :
General Directorate of Economy
General Directorate of Savings, Credit 
and Insurance
General Directorate of Studies and 
Forecasting
Direction des Etudes et de la 
Programmation (DEP)
Direction des Affaires Administratives et 
Financières (DAAF)
Direction de la Législation(DL)
Direction des Archives, de l’Information, 
de la Documentation et des Relations 
publiques (DAIRDP)
Directorate of Studies & Programming
Directorates of Administrative & 
Financial Affairs
Directorate of Legislation
Directorate of Archives, Information, 
Documentation and Public Relations
Commissariat chargé du Développement:
Direction Générale des Programmes 
Sectoriels (DGPS)
Direction Générale du Financement 
(DGF)
Direction Générale de l’Evaluation des 
Programmes de Développement 
(DGEPD)
Cellule de Coordination des Aides 
Extérieures (CCAE)
Development Commissariat :
General Directorate of Sector Programs
General Directorate of Financing 
General Directorate of Development 
Program Evaluation
External Aid Coordination Unit
Commissariat chargé des Resources 
Internes:
Direction Générale des Impôts (DGI)
Direction Générale des Douanes (DGD)
Direction Générale du Patrimoine de l’Etat 
(DGPE)
Direction Générale de l’Encadrement 
Fiscal des Collectivités locales et du 
Secteur Informel (DGIEFCL/SI)
Internal Resources Commissariat :
General Directorate of Taxes
General Directorate of Tolls
General Directorate of the State’s Assets
General Directorate of Fiscal Affairs for 
Local Entities and Informal Sector
Trésor National :
Direction de la Comptabilité (DC)
Direction de la Dépense (DD)
Direction des Recettes (DR)
Direction des Comptables Secondaires (DCS)
Direction des Correspondants du Trésor (DCT)









Figure 3.24. Organogram of the Economy Commissariat. Source: Sambo (2009) 
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Figure 3.25. Organogram of the Development Commissariat. Source: Sambo (2009) 
Commissariat Chargé du Développement (CCD)
Development Commissariat
Direction Générale du Financement (DGF)
General Directorate of Financing
Direction Générale des Programmes 
Sectoriels (DGPS)
General Directorate of Sector Programs
Direction Générale de l’Evaluation des 
Programmes de Developpement (DGPD)

























des programmes de 
développement
Directorate of 




Direction de l’analyse de 
l’impact économique et 



























Table 3.8. List of Ministries in Niger’s current Government 
1  Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération, de l’Intégration Africaine et des Nigériens à l’Extérieur 
2  Ministère du Plan 
3  Ministère de l’Agriculture 
4  Ministère des Mines et du Développement Industriel 
5  Ministère du Commerce et de la Promotion du Secteur Privé  
6  Ministère de l’Energie et du Pétrole 
7  Ministère de l’Urbanisme et du Logement 
8  Ministère de l’Intérieur, de la Sécurité publique, de la Décentralisation et des Affaires Coutumières et Religieuses 
9  Ministère de la Justice, Garde des Sceaux, Porte-parole du Gouvernement 
10  Ministère de l’Hydraulique et de l’Assainissement 
11  Ministère des Transports 
12  Ministère de la Défense Nationale 
13  Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur, de la Recherche et de l’Innovation 
14  Ministère des Finances 
15  Ministère de la Population, de la Promotion de la Femme, de la Protection de l’Enfant 
16  Ministère de l’Enseignement Primaire, l’Alphabétisation, la Promotion des Langues Nationales, et l’Education Civique 
17  Ministère de l’Elevage 
18  Ministère de la Santé Publique 
19  Ministère de la Fonction Publique et de la Réforme Administrative  
20  Ministère des Enseignements Professionnels et Techniques 
21  Ministère des Enseignements Secondaires 
22  Ministère de l’Environnement, de la Salubrité Urbaine et du Développement Durable 
23  Ministère de l’Equipement 
24  Ministère des Postes, des Télécommunications et de l’Économie Numérique 
25  Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire e du Développement Communautaire 
26  Ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports 
27  Ministère du Tourisme et de l’artisanat 
28  Ministère de l’Emploi, du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale 
29  Ministère de la Culture, des Arts et des Loisirs 
30  Ministère de la Communication et des Relations avec les Institutions 
31  Ministère Délégué au Développement Industriel 
32  Ministère Délégué au Budget 
33  Ministère Délégué à l’Intégration Africaine 
34  Ministère Délégué à la Décentralisation et aux Affaires Coutumières et Religieuses 
35  Ministère Délégué chargé de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de Développement Communautaire 
Source: Government of Niger’s website (2016): http://www.gouv.ne/index.php/les-ministeres/liste-des-ministeres 
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Table 3.9. World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments for Niger (CPIA) 2005-2015 (1=low, 6=high) 
Domain Indicator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
A. Economic
Management
Monetary & exchange rate policy 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Fiscal Policy 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 
Debt Policy 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Average 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 
B. Structural
Policies
Trade  4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Financial Sector 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Business Regulatory Environ. 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 
Average 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.5 
C. Policies for
Social Inclusion/Equity
Gender Equality 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Equity of Public Resource Use 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Building Human Resources 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Social Protection & Labour 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Policy & Institutions for 
Environmental Sustainability 
3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 




Property Rights & Rule-based 
Governance 
3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Quality of Budgeting & Financial 
Management 
3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Efficiency of Revenue 
Mobilization 
3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Quality of Public Administration 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Transparency, Accountability & 
Corruption in Public Sector 
3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Average 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
IDA resource allocation index 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 
Source:  World Bank CPIA Database 2016 
Figure 3.26. Evolution of Niger’s CPIA ratings by the African Development Bank 
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Chapter 4. Aid and Moral Hazard 
“We don’t compete for money or profit; we compete for relevance and our very existence: in the 
current context of budget cuts we cannot guarantee that in 10 years ESCWA will continue to exist, so 
we need to show that we are useful” 
(Al Dardari 2014) 
4.1. Introduction 
In a principal-agent framework, moral hazard can follow if an agent’s behaviour changes as a 
result of shifts in incentives after a contract has been signed with the principal. A common 
example relates to insurance: when an insurance company insures a person in exchange for a 
premium, that person has a reduced incentive to guard against risk (because now s/he is 
protected from the consequences of risky behaviour), and may therefore behave in a riskier-
than-usual way. The risk of moral hazard rises the less information the principal has on the 
actions of the agent, e.g. if an employer cannot verify how hard the employees work, slacking 
can become more common. 
In the realm of aid, moral hazard can arise in the form of the ‘Samaritan’s dilemma’: aid 
reduces the recipients’ incentives to change their current behaviour. For instance, moral hazard 
may affect the efforts that a beneficiary country makes to mobilize national resources: if aid is 
supplied, the beneficiary country may reduce the effort put into tax collection (Brautigam 
2000). 
The Samaritan’s dilemma affects the donor-beneficiary relationship. The following is an 
illustration in the African (Kenyan) context: “For years, relations between the government of 
President Daniel Arap Moi and those who gave it aid resembled a complicated dance in which 
the Kenyans promised reform, the donors lent money, the Kenyans would break the promises, 
the dance paused, the donors threatened and the government would make new promises. The 
dance would then resume.” (The Economist 2000). 
To avoid moral hazard, the donor often specifies certain conditions (conditionalities), with 
which the country must comply. Although such requirements vary, they are typically linked to 
the undertaking of some key reforms.40 For the country to have a real incentive to implement 
40 Tying aid is another type of conditionality, and restricts the ways in which aid can be spent by the beneficiary 
country. As a form protectionism, the most criticized form of tying aid required that it be spent purchasing 
products or contracting private sector companies from the donor state (Jepma 1991). Since the Paris Declaration 
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those reforms, however, the conditionalities must be credible, i.e. the recipient should have 
reason to believe that, if the reforms are not carried out, there will be consequences in the 
delivery of the aid agreed. If the conditionalities are not credible, i.e. there is a belief that the 
aid will continue to flow regardless, then (assuming the conditionalities were appropriate in the 
first place) the aid resources will be wasted to some extent. 
The existence of moral hazard in the interaction between beneficiary and donor is key in 
assessing whether aid leads to policy changes (e.g. a structural reform).41 This is recognized in 
the aid literature, where the risk of moral hazard determines whether aid should be offered 
unconditionally or conditionally (Isopi, Mattesini 2009). Other works have also delved on the 
relationship between donors’ incentives and corruption, ownership or sustainability (Gibson et 
al. 2005). 
The objective of this chapter is to assess whether, in Niger’s relationship with the IMF, aid 
has led to reforms. To answer it, two complementary aspects are explored: the existence of 
moral hazard on the recipient’s part, and the donors’ reactions to it. To my knowledge no such 
examination has been done for Niger despite its importance: clear evidence on this may 
facilitate the design of more ‘results-oriented’ aid programs for Niger. 
When assessing the existence of moral hazard in the allocation of aid a key challenge is 
often the unavailability of detailed data on the interaction between a country and its donors. 
The general lack of transparent aid data makes aid assessments difficult; a point lamented by 
economists (Easterly, Pfutze 2008). One of the exceptions is the IMF, which publishes all the 
documentation of its collaboration with its member countries.42 
Moral hazard is difficult to quantify, but qualitative analysis techniques such as case studies 
can be used (Amusa, Monkam & Viegi 2016). To ensure their validity three major elements 
must be established: a theoretical framework (already addressed), the definition of a “case”, 
and the design of the case study (Yin 2012). Those elements are defined in this analysis as 
follows:  
in 2005 significant efforts have been exerted to reduce this practice, especially by the OECD, and today it is 
arguably marginal (Clay, Geddes & Natali 2009). However, new donors are bringing new challenges. For 
example, China does provide finance that meets the definition of ODA but this share is relatively small. Export 
credits, non-concessional state loans or aid used to foster Chinese investment do not fall into the category of ODA 
(Brautigam 2011). 
41 Assessing the adequacy of those policy reforms goes beyond the scope of this chapter. 
42 The IMF is not the only donor that shares potentially-sensitive information about its operations. For example, 
the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group makes available information about the Implementation 
Completion and Results Report Review of its member countries – including Niger 
(https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/ieg-search-icrr). Nevertheless, the nature of those reports is different and they 
still do not have information from a dynamic interaction perspective (i.e. who gives what for what and then what 
happens), so it could not be used it to undertake the same kind of analysis. 
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The case definition is normally determined by the data available and its theoretical 
relevance. The IMF is one of Niger’s primary macroeconomic donors. Its relevance for a case 
study is therefore easily justified.43  
The design of the case study relates to the units of analysis. The investigation here focuses 
on the beneficiary (Government) and the donor (IMF), without differentiating between Niger’s 
individual ministries or different IMF offices (headquarters/their Niger office). This form of 
case study, which analyses the stylized facts of a situation, has been referred to as a “holistic 
single-case study” (Yin 2012). Again, data availability provides the main reason for this 
methodological approach. 
The structure of the case study is determined by the nature of the research question. After 
introducing the IMF, the strategy is to show empirically the dynamic interaction between Niger 
and the IMF as a transaction that is repeated over time (i.e. who supplies what in exchange for 
what, and what happens next). In section 4.5 the nature and incentives of the parties are used 
to interpret the pattern. 
4.2. Data and limitations 
The main source of information is the IMF e-Library Data and the main IMF website, where 
the IMF has posted the official documents relating to its interaction with Niger.44 There were 
links to 158 documents at the time of writing; the first document was posted on May 10th 1995 
and the last on October 11th, 2014. The available files vary in nature and importance; while all 
were perused, the focus here is on those that show the ex-post assessments of ex-ante agreed 
conditionalities. 
To minimize the potential effect of other confounding factors, the study only takes 
individual consideration of the relations between Niger and the IMF. To the extent that the IMF 
made its decisions based on what other stakeholders do, the situation would reflect others’ 
decision making towards Niger.45 (If anything, other donors often made their decisions after 
considering the IMF actions). 
43 Globally, the IMF is the main development partner in the area of macroeconomic management, as measured by 
frequency of communication with governments (Custer et al. 2015). 
44 http://elibrary-data.imf.org/ and http://www.imf.org/external/country/NER/index.htm?pn=0  
45 An example is the case of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), a debt-relief initiative whereby donors 
forgave poor countries’ debt (not only Niger’s). Thus, including HIPC in the analysis would introduce aspects 
such as civil society demands for debt relief, poor countries’ debt sustainability levels (not only Niger’s), or 
donors’ capacity to make political pledges and reach agreements. The effect of a high number of donors on the 
existence of moral hazard is unclear, as it depends on their coordination. If donors are not coordinated, Niger may 
care less about its promises if there is a large pool of other donors to go to. However, if donors collude and take a 
unified approach, the government would have less leeway. This has been confirmed at a global level: “a potential 
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The study has at least three potential limitations. First, it could be argued that since the 
available documentation is provided by the IMF, it constitutes a positively-biased sample of 
the Niger-IMF interaction. Although this is plausible, the IMF website does have documents 
that provide clearly negative feedback about the IMF’s interventions in Niger. While this does 
not rule out the existence of a bias, it is a clear sign of transparency. 
Secondly, some of the data for specific years are not available, which precludes a complete 
analysis for each of the different IMF programs (called arrangements). The data available are 
therefore only a sample of the data of interest. As the study shows, the years where data are 
missing were marked by socio-political turmoil. As a result, Niger’s performance in this sample 
is likely to be positively biased. Hence, the fact of showing negative results –in terms of 
complying with the IMF conditionalities– suggests that Niger’s performance would be poorer 
if the complete data set was available. To give a more accurate image, the data are reported on 
a quarterly basis, which also allows us to assess how many observations on IMF compliance 
are missing. 
Finally, the analysis allocates equal weight to all the reforms agreed between the IMF and 
Niger. Admittedly this may be a limitation, but weighting them based on unclear criteria would 
likely introduce a bias. Hence, the option adopted is to analyse them all combined, and by 
category. 
4.3. The IMF: What it is and how it operates 
The IMF is a multilateral financial organization that promotes international financial stability. 
It is composed of 188 countries and the primary source of its financial resources is its members’ 
subscriptions. Each member country has a quota which determines its subscription, its voting 
weight, its access to IMF financing and its share in the allocation of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR).46 
Countries pay their subscription and can then apply for funding from the organization in 
case of need. Funding to members usually takes the form of soft loans, e.g. repayable over 10 
years with an annual interest rate of 0.5 percent and a 5 ½ year grace period on principal 
payments. Funding is done in the framework of multi-year programs called ‘financial 
source of bargaining power is choice and competition. Fragmentation among development partners provides 
partner countries with more choice with regard to which agencies they work with and listen to, thereby endowing 
the domestic authorities with increased leverage.” (Custer et al. 2015). 
46 “SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries' official 
reserves. Its value is based on a basket of four key international currencies, and SDRs can be exchanged for freely 
usable currencies.” (Available on: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm) 
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arrangements’. These have a duration of 3 years and tend to focus on specific objectives such 
as macroeconomic stability or poverty reduction. The first of these programs, called the Trust 
Fund (1977-1981), disbursed SDR 3.0 billion (about $3.8 billion). Beginning March 1986, the 
new arrangement was the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), which disbursed SDR 1.8 
billion (about $2.4 billion). From December 1987, the SAF led to the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which gained in importance during the 1990s: between 1987 and 
1999 SDR 7.6 billion (about $10.7 billion) were disbursed to 52 countries under 90 
arrangements. 
In 1999 the ESAF was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 
This change was motivated by the view that aid had thus far been ‘supply-driven’ and that, in 
consequence, beneficiary countries did not ‘own’ the reforms meant to reduce their poverty. 
The new approach emphasized inclusive and participatory processes, intended to promote a 
sense of country ownership and to widen support for poverty reduction initiatives. The key 
instrument became countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), national plans that 
assessed poverty and described the actions needed to reduce it, including estimates of how 
much it would cost to do so. 
Eligibility for multiyear framework programs is based on per capita income, lack of durable 
and substantial access to international financial markets, and absence of serious short-term 
vulnerabilities.47 Eligible countries can borrow up to 140 percent of the quota under a three-
year arrangement, although exceptionally it could be as high as 185 percent of quota. 
For a country wishing to access multiyear frameworks the procedure is as follows: first the 
government of the country presents the IMF with the macroeconomic policies it intends to 
implement. The IMF then assesses the request and gives a response – which is typically positive 
as the request is normally prepared jointly with IMF staff. Once the country’s financial 
arrangements have been approved, the IMF begins the disbursement of the loan, which 
normally takes place in several tranches. This disbursement process allows the IMF to make 
quarterly assessments of compliance using objective criteria (the term conditionality is rarely 
used by the IMF).  
The criteria for assessing the extent to which Niger complies with the program fall into two 
groups: quantitative (performance criteria and benchmarks) and structural (performance and 
benchmarks). Table 4.3 in the annex shows examples from the 2000-2003 PRGF. The 
47 Specific details available on: 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/Imported/external/np/pp/eng/2015/_062415pdf.ashx 
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quantitative group contains indicators that reflect sound macroeconomic and/or public finances 
management (e.g. reduction in the government’s domestic payment arrears). The structural 
group contains actions government must undertake, either as reforms (e.g. adopt a new pricing 
system for petroleum products) or as specific activities (e.g. a financial audit of the civil service 
wage bill).  
Each of the four criteria has specific targets that are agreed ex-ante, and which can be 
revised (as happened often with Niger) or dropped (as happened once, in 2007). Beyond these 
criteria, the IMF also specifies the frequency and reporting requirement of the data to be 
submitted, which include information pertaining to the real sector, public finances, monetary 
and financial data, external debt and the balance of payments. 
4.4. Dynamics of the Niger – IMF relationship 
The 1990s were a convoluted decade for Niger. The Second Republic was initiated in 1989, 
when Major Ali Saibou was elected in a one-party election. The country’s first democratically-
elected President, Mahamane Ousmane, was voted in during 1993, but was deposed in a coup 
d’état in 1996. The coup leader and new ruler, Ibrahim Baré Mainassara, was deposed (and 
killed) in another coup three years later. After a military transition of roughly one year, 
Mamadou Tandja was elected as President in December 1999. Under his rule, Niger would see 
a decade of relative democratic stability that would end with yet another coup, in February 
2010. 
Table 4.2 in the annex shows the country’s financial arrangements with the IMF since the 
mid-1990s (Niger joined the IMF in 1963 but no information is publicly available before the 
mid-1990s). In 1994, under Ousmane, there was a Stand-by Agreement that lasted only one 
year. The country then benefited from an ESAF’s structural adjustment under the rule of 
Colonel Mainassara. When political stability returned with President Tandja, relations 
normalized. Most documents analysed here became available since 2000 onwards, so the 
analysis covers that period. 
a. How much aid did Niger demand, and how much did the IMF supply?
Niger has not had problems in accessing the IMF financial arrangements as all its requests were 
approved at the amount requested –which may not be surprising, given that IMF staff support 
the country’s applications when they are submitted for funding (Table 4.2). It is more relevant 
to consider the financing granted as a share of the country’s quota. The country’s actual use of 
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funding varied substantially, although most of the time it was within the IMF standard policy 
range of up to 140 percent (Figure 4.1).48 Notably, in the early 1990s the IMF seems to have 
been flexible with Niger, but with the country’s turmoil, its support dropped to around 80%. 
When Niger’s application to the HIPC was accepted, its debt was wiped out and consequently, 
its balance decreased dramatically in 2005. In the following years, it would start to go up again. 
Figure 4.1. Use of IMF credit and loans as percentage of quota (1990 – 2013) 
Source: IMF e-Library Data 
High proportions of the total funds agreed upon were generally disbursed (Table 4.2). The 
exceptions are the 1994-1995 Stand-by Agreement, the 1996-1999 ESAF and the 2008-2011 
PRGF/ECF. Payments data on the first two are not available. In the third, although the 
PRGF/ECF officially ended in June 2011, the last disbursement made to Niger was on January 
2010 (a month before the coup). This suggests that when there is a coup d’état, the IMF (as 
most other donors) suspends payments, and therefore is sensitive to the political situation.  
At times, the access to funding initially-granted can be deemed insufficient and a higher 
limit can be granted, as was the case of late 2005 when it increased from 6.6% to 30% of quota 
(Table 4.2). 
48 There may be differences between the amount requested as Niger’s share of its quota, and the actual funding 



















b. What did the IMF expect in return from Niger’s Government?
The overall goal of the IMF is to support member countries achieve macroeconomic stability 
that will lead to growth and poverty reduction. In exchange for its support to Niger, the IMF 
requested compliance with a number of conditions, compiled in the annex for each of the 
different arrangements: PRGF 1 (Table 4.3), PRGF 2 (Table 4.4), PRGF/ECF (Table 4.5) and 
ECF (Table 4.6). The nature of those conditions varied. Quantitative performance criteria and 
quantitative benchmarks are ‘results’ in nature (i.e. they reflect fiscal discipline) and are 
consistent over time. On the other hand, structural performance and benchmarks tended to be 
one-time activities for Niger to implement, either as specific reforms intended to enhance long-
run growth, or as part of the democratic checks and balances to which any government should 
be subject. 
The number of requirements is not constant and has varied over time. Considering available 
data per arrangement, the average number of requirements by the IMF was 11.5 per quarter 
from 2000 to 2004. It increased to a high 13.6 in the PRGF 2, decreased to 9.7 in the PRGF/ECF 
and increased again (to 12) under the ECF (Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1). 
Figure 4.2. Estimated average number of IMF quarterly conditions required of Niger 
Source: Own compilation from the IMF website 
A review of the arrangements’ requirements shows that when the number increased (especially 
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became much more specific, generally going beyond ‘operational’ issues (e.g. closing dormant 
bank accounts) to –arguably– meddling in the government’s legislative processes (e.g. to have 
a specific decree adopted by Government). Again, making a judgment on the appropriateness 
of these measures goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
c. What did Niger actually deliver?
Tables 4.3 to 4.6 in the annex show Niger’s ex-post compliance with the requirements to which 
Niger and the IMF had agreed ex-ante. Assuming equal weights across requirements, a 




Where mq is the rate of missed requirements in quarter q over the total requirements for that 
given quarter, rq. The same rate can be calculated for all combined, and disaggregating into the 
two groups of indicators previously mentioned (quantitative and structural): see Table 4.1. Data 
are not available for all quarters, but as each program had a duration of 12 quarters (3 years), 
it is quite comprehensive (38 observation out of 48 possible). 









Total (Number of quarters with data; total possible is 12) 11 12 8 7 
Quantitative clauses to comply with 82 93 50 56 
Quantitative clauses not complied with 23 13 10 29 
Structural clauses to comply with 44 70 27 28 
Structural clauses not complied with 21 31.5 15 18.5 
Clauses to comply with – Quantitative & Structural combined 126 163 77 84 
Clauses not complied with – Quantitative & Structural combined 44 45 25 47.5 
Average per quarter 
Quantitative clauses to comply with 7.5 7.8 6.3 8 
Quantitative clauses not complied with 2.1 1.1 1.3 4.1 
Structural clauses to comply with 4 5.8 3.4 4 
Structural clauses not complied with 1.9 2.6 1.9 2.6 
Clauses to comply with – Quantitative & Structural combined 11.5 13.6 9.6 12 
Clauses not complied with – Quantitative & Structural combined 4 3.7 3.1 6.8 
Ratios of non-compliance 
Quantitative clauses 28% 14% 20% 51.8% 
Structural clauses 47.7% 45% 55.6% 66.1% 
All clauses 34.9% 27.3% 32.5% 56.5% 
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The trend over time shows that non-compliance (i.e. relative to the number of objectives) is 
increasing. Structural requirements have higher non-compliance (i.e. tend to be more difficult 
to attain), while quantitative requirements tend to be easier. Figure 4.3 shows non-compliance 
results for each of the quarters with available data, including linear trend lines.49 Since the last 
quarter of 2000, Niger has had a slightly rising tendency to miss IMF requirements, a trend that 
is clear in both structural and quantitative requirements. 
Figure 4.3. Quarterly non-compliance rate with conditionalities (0: All met, 1: All missed) 
Source: Own compilation from the IMF website 
The overall trend for the three groups is heavily influenced by the performance of early 2012, 
when five of the nine requirements were missed (Table 4.6). There was only one structural 
requirement (Quarterly budget reports on a commitment, payment order, and payment basis to 
be submitted to the IMF within a period of 6 weeks), but it proved to be of significant difficulty, 
and would subsequently be missed for the next three quarters as well (Table 4.6). 
The positive trend in non-compliance for structural requirements is also strongly influenced 
by the performance of 2008. There was only one benchmark for most of the year, the adoption 
by the Council of Ministers of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for the 
infrastructure and transport sectors (Table 4.5). However, even this would prove difficult to 
implement. 
49 The interpretation does not vary when considering logarithmic and polynomial fitted lines. (If anything, under 
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d. How did the IMF react?
Niger’s compliance with the IMF’s requirements has been sub-optimal, i.e. in exchange for the 
funds the country received, it delivered fewer reforms than it had promised. As in any 
relationship between a lender and a borrower, the organization can respond with measures 
within the current program or out of the current program (in the future). Measures within the 
current program could be to stop the program and cancel its disbursements, suspend them until 
the country’s performance improves, or provide the country with less funds than were initially 
approved. These three options are assessed next.  
Regarding the first, like most other donors the IMF suspended its aid on the occurrence of 
Niger’s coup d’état (despite the fact that coup leaders may have sought the IMF’s support, as 
they did in 2010).50 However, it has never cancelled its collaboration with Niger on the basis 
of poor compliance with the programs’ requirements.  
In terms of the second, available data suggests that payments were not suspended pending 
improvement in Niger’s compliance. Table 4.7 shows all the requests addressed to the IMF and 
their corresponding response: on no occasion was the request denied. 
Figure 4.4. Quarterly non-compliance (left axis) and IMF disbursements (right), 2001-2014 
Source: Compilation from the IMF website (data are shown in annex tables) 
50 In this instance, assistance was suspended from January 2010 till the new programme started (February 2012). 
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In respect of the third, no clear relationship can be established between non-performance and 
loan disbursements (their structure and amounts are negotiated before the program starts), 
which indicates that underperformance did not affect disbursement. Figure 4.4 plots Niger’s 
quarterly non-compliance data with data from the disbursements corresponding to that point in 
time. All the disbursements were made according to the initial schedule, which yields a positive 
correlation between non-compliance and disbursements. 
With regard to “out of program” responses to underperformance, the IMF has two 
possibilities: it could lend less in the future, or (taking that option to the extreme) it could stop 
lending money altogether, i.e. no more arrangements. It has become clear that the IMF has not 
stopped lending money to Niger. The question is whether future lending will be affected by 
present performance. Available data on non-compliance rates, and access to IMF funding (in 
terms of the country’s percentage of quota) is plotted (Figure 4.5). The graph can be interpreted 
as follows: during the first PRGF Niger’s performance was deemed poor, so access to funding 
granted decreased steeply in PRGF2. In PRGF2 Niger still underperformed, which led to less 
funding in the PRGF/ECF. However, in PRGF2 the country improved its performance (i.e. 
non-compliance decreased), so the reduction was less steep. 
A rationale for the imposition of such pressures a belief that poor performance is indicative 
of inadequate political commitment. Indeed, the second exercise of Public Expenditure 
Management and Accountability Reviews (PEMFAR II), undertaken by international donors, 
highlighted as a key takeaway that “strong political commitment at the highest level and 
adequate technical assistance are key prerequisites for effective public-sector reform. Limited 
implementation of the PEMFAR I recommendations reflects an ineffective political support 
for implementing sensitive policy reforms” (World Bank 2011c).  
The PRGF/ECF program saw a deterioration of Niger’s performance (i.e. non-compliance 
increased), but the program actually only ran in 2008 and 2009. In 2009 there was a mounting 
socio-political crisis that included a referendum for Tandja to extend his mandate. The resulting 
impasse ended with the coup of February 2010, and in 2010 and 2011 there was virtually no 
IMF assistance to Niger. Significant efforts were made to put the country back on an IMF 
programme after Mahamadou Issoufou was elected president in April 2011. Those efforts 
involved the negotiation of a new IMF arrangement and culminated in a visit of the IMF 
managing director, Christine Lagarde, in December 2011. In February 2012, a formal request 
by Niger was sent to the IMF, and the new arrangement (ECF) was announced in March. 
Despite the country’s poor performance in the previous arrangement, its difficult situation 
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during 2010 and 2011 together with all the efforts undertaken, facilitated access to IMF 
financing in the new ECF. 
Figure 4.5. Relationship between Niger's non-compliance and IMF disbursements 
Source: Own compilation from the IMF website 
4.5. Reasons underlying the Niger - IMF dynamics 
Besides the financial cost (i.e. interest payable on loans), IMF loans entail a political cost: a 
country can pay a price in terms of reduced decision-making sovereignty. In the case of Niger 
this was formally stipulated in the clause: “During the period of the arrangement, the 
government of Niger, on its own initiative or at the Managing Director's request, will consult 
with the International Monetary Fund on the adoption of any measure deemed necessary. 
Furthermore, at the end of the period covered (…) and as long as Niger continues to have 
financial obligations toward the Fund resulting from loans obtained under this arrangement, 
the government will consult periodically with the International Monetary Fund on Niger's 
economic and financial policies, on the government's initiative or as requested by the Managing 
Director.” (Government of Niger 2000).  
To Niger’s authorities this cost has apparently been dear. While its policymakers have 
never complained about the financial cost of IMF funds, they have repeatedly –and openly– 
complained about the conditionalities attached. For example, on Sept 25th 2005 the Minister of 
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African Finance Ministers: “Although encouraging progress has been made with the IMF in 
rationalization and program conditionality, it is still below our countries' expectation. In fact, 
systematic recourse to these programs (…) continues to prevail. We have observed the 
tendency to impose politically delicate measures which are also slow to apply, legally speaking, 
and this is all rather difficult. (...) The Bretton Woods Institutions are therefore called upon to 
rationalize the process, rationalize conditionality, to bring about a greater degree of 
harmonization and to limit themselves to policy measures which have a direct effect on the 
macroeconomic and structural results that they are trying to achieve” (IMF 2005). 
Niger’s statements have followed an unsurprising pattern: complaints were more common 
within an arrangement, or after disbursements were made, whereas praises were more likely to 
accompany the ongoing consultations and preparatory work ahead of a new arrangement. 
The implementation of reforms is costly for Niger’s government due to resistance to those 
reforms, which has also been publicly recognized. In April 2007 Ali Lamine Zeine (the 
Minister of Economy and Finance) stated, “There has also been some resistance towards these 
reforms, and one of our strategies, of course, was to sensitize our partners to the benefit of these 
reforms, and to enable us to improve the situation on the ground.” An example of such 
resistance had been particularly visible two years earlier in early 2005 when, in the midst of a 
severe famine, the IMF pushed for parliament to extend VAT to include basic products.51 This 
measure induced harsh criticism of Government and of the organization (Dearden 2012) and 
had to be reversed by parliament two months later. 
From the perspective of the IMF, two effects are at play. On the one hand, it cares about 
helping Niger, a member country which needs support but naturally tries to minimize the price 
paid for it (e.g. in the number of reforms to undertake). At the same time, the organization tries 
to perpetuate its relevance. This is by no means unique to the IMF, although the period 
described above (2005-2007) may have been a particularly difficult one, due to “the threat of 
irrelevance creeping up on the Fund in the mid-2000s” (Sandbu 2015). To be relevant, the Fund 
has to provide utility, both to its member countries and to its executive board. It seems certain 
that the IMF’s board wants the organization to fulfil its mission: it wants development. But as 
development is not visible ex-ante, it has to accept inputs for development as a proxy instead. 
Such inputs include development loans, and sound macroeconomic management and reforms, 
i.e. the requirements with which Niger must comply.
51 Three measures were included: (i) extension of the VAT to processed food products (milk, sugar, wheat flour); 
(ii) reduction of VAT exemptions on water and electricity consumption; and (iii) application of the excise tax to
soft drinks and sodas
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To show its relevance the IMF has used several strategies. The most obvious was extending 
loans, which explains why all the requests from Niger have been accepted (provided there was 
not coup d’état). But the IMF has also expanded its assistance by incorporating new products 
to its portfolio. An example is its Regional Technical Assistance Centre for West Africa 
(AFRITAC), an office inaugurated in 2008 to bring services closer to governments. In April 
2013 a press release noted, “AFRITAC has remained on track throughout an eventful year and 
foresees a significant increase in its activities for the financial year starting May 1st 2013. 
Meanwhile, an external evaluation has underlined the relevance and effectiveness of the 
technical assistance delivered.” 
The usefulness of the IMF in Niger has also been asserted explicitly. In 2011 the IMF 
undertook an ex-post assessment of its engagement with Niger. The first three points in the 
conclusion were:  
“i) Underlying progress was steady until late-2009, 
ii) Niger is at a critical turning point, and
iii) There is a strong case for continued Fund engagement under an ECF
arrangement”.  
The first point was justified as follows: 
“Until the political crisis in 2009–10, Niger’s performance under Fund-supported 
programs had been quite good, particularly given the significant capacity constraints. 
It performed well on quantitative performance criteria and met most structural 
benchmarks, though some with delay. Despite recurrent shocks, Niger was able to 
maintain prudent fiscal policies while steadily improving priority spending. It is also 
instructive that reform implementation and fiscal performance deteriorated (along 
with the levels of donor support) when Fund relations were on hold.” (IMF 2011). 
The data in this chapter has shown that the assessment quoted above was not based on an 
objective measurement of data on Niger’s compliance, and that delays in the implementation 
of reforms were the norm rather than the exception. Admittedly, reforms did deteriorate when 
the IMF and other donors suspended operations, but since these suspensions were associated 
with coups d’état (linked to high instability and serious economic deterioration), the results are 
unsurprising and it cannot be inferred that the reason for the decline in reforms was the lack of 
donor support. 
The IMF shareholders want a framework of assistance aligned with the governance systems 
they preach. Therefore, giving aid to countries ruled by the military (especially after a coup 
d’état) is typically avoided. Following the 2010 coup, discussions regarding the IMF’s fourth 
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review were put on hold pending clarification as to whether the organization’s members 
recognized the transitional regime as the de jure government of Niger. To that effect, a 
members’ poll was organized and it was decided that, “if the results of the poll clearly show 
that Niger’s transitional government is recognized by the international community, the Fund 
would recognize such a regime as the government of Niger and policy discussions for the fourth 
program review would commence within a short period of time” (IMF 2010). Once the return 
to democracy is secured, or the international community recognizes the transitional regime as 
‘de jure’, donors quickly resume their aid and justify calls for more aid – based on the lack of 
progress due to the political situation. 
Donors can be criticized, and the IMF’s work in Niger has sometimes been condemned. 
During the 2005 famine, it was argued that conditionalities imposed by the IMF aggravated the 
country’s calamities (amidst fiscal consolidation there was no room for food for Nigériens). 
Media from the UK and Germany criticized the IMF’s intervention, arguing that it worsened 
the response to the country’s devastating famine. In all cases the Fund’s external relations 
department reacted quickly to defend its image. The Independent published the headlines "IMF 
and EU are blamed for starvation in Niger" on August 1st 2005, and on August 5th the IMF 
posted a reply.52 On August 3rd the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published the article "Von 
einer Hungerkatastrophe in Niger kann derzeit aber noch keine Rede sein" and on August 9th 
the IMF posted a reply.53 Similarly, The Observer published on August 7th the letter "This is 
not just another act of God – this is ingrained poverty”, including the assertion that, “the IMF 
stood in the way of free food distribution in Niger”. The IMF denied it on August 9th.54 
The episode of the 2005 crisis had far-reaching repercussions, in terms of the IMF 
advertising its assistance to Niger. Thereafter, the IMF started to publicize its activities in the 
country very actively. The IMF’s monthly review IMF Survey had started in January 1997, and 
in the ensuing eight years had given no attention to Niger. However, in August 2005 the country 
made the headlines with an article entitled “IMF focuses on Niger relief”.55 Later, in January 
2008, an article entitled “Debt Relief Yields Results in Niger” was published on the IMF 
website56, and re-published weeks later on IMF Survey’s February issue.57 Since then, there 
have been references to Niger in the IMF Survey, typically linked to the country’s natural 
52 Available on http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2005/080505.htm  
53 “It cannot be said that at present Niger suffers a famine”. Available on 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2005/080905a.htm  
54 Available on http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2005/080905abc.htm  
55 Available on http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2005/081505.pdf  
56 Available on http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/CAR012508A.htm 
57 Available on http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2008/022808.pdf  
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resources. And even at present, the IMF website shows statements by its staff at the end of all 
their missions to the country, in which IMF officials usually praise Niger’s authorities for their 
hospitality and good disposition to cooperate (to my knowledge, this is not done at similar 
organizations such as the World Bank or the United Nations). 
In the interaction between Niger and the IMF, the key elements identified in the 
documentary review –as resulting in continuous aid disbursements– can be presented as: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 (𝑎) 
+𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 (𝑏)
+𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 ∪  𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡 (𝑐)
+ 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑑) =
𝐴𝑖𝑑 
The first element (a) is the country’s formal request. This may seem obvious, but given Niger’s 
context of poor institutional, technical and human skills’ capacity, it is not. Based on informal 
consultations, it is common to hear donors say that extra resources could be mobilized for the 
country if official requests were submitted to them.58 Instead, those slack funds often have to 
either be reallocated elsewhere by donors, or spent on non-planned activities before the end of 
the budget period. Otherwise, donors may be subject to budget cuts in the future. Often, to fulfil 
this requirement and avoid a potential loss of funds, donors may take the initiative and draft 
the communications which they then have signed by government officials. This suggests that 
trying to ensure their relevance, donors may fuel moral hazard by allocating funds even when 
they are not (actively) requested. This approach has been referred to by Easterly (2002) as 
‘supply-driven’ development, and fuels lack of national ownership (widely recognized as a 
problem in the Paris Declaration). 
The second element is the context (b), which relates to the country’s socioeconomic 
situation. Niger’s development indicators are so meagre that they would justify assistance to 
the country by any donor whose reasons for giving aid were the existence of poverty or lack of 
development.59 The justification for a country’s precarious context may also include future 
prospects, be they negative (e.g. insufficient rains that lead to a famine), or even positive (e.g. 
oil prospecting that may lead to a governance deterioration). 60 Hence, almost any contextual 
situation can be valid (the only exception is when there is a coup d’état). 
58 This is consistent with the fact that disbursements are higher than commitments, as seen in Chapter 3. 
59 Niger’s development indicators were described in Chapter 3 
60 Accounting for 12.3% of GDP in 2013 (IMF 2015), natural resources mining is important for Niger, which may 
raise the possibility of a “mineral curse”. Given the magnitude of revenues collected so far, however, that 
possibility would seem unlikely. Niger’s government reported to have collected USD 341 Million in 2012 (EITI 
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The third element (c) is a union of two sets: progress made or justification for the lack of 
it. The efforts the country makes to comply with the arrangement requirements contribute to 
progress. At the same time, since the quantitative requirements are also influenced by positive 
events independent of government efforts (e.g. high rainfall leading to a good harvest), progress 
is often influenced by factors exogenous to government efforts. The reverse is not true, 
however. When exogenous negative events hit, the government receives (understandably) an 
empathetic reaction from the IMF. Hence, the situation can be characterized as: when good 
things happen it results in aid, and when bad things happen it results in aid as well. 
Finally, future commitment (d) relates to national authorities’ will to undertake the 
necessary activities to achieve the program objectives. As this is not observable ex-ante and 
difficult to assess ex-post, the country ‘shows’ a lot of this through statements of commitment 
that are omnipresent in the exchange of correspondence. In turn, the IMF also uses this 
component as an argument to justify its disbursements. 
4.6. Can the actual outcomes be appraised? 
It is difficult to assess quantitatively whether aid in a specific sector has yielded positive 
outcomes (especially in macroeconomic policy).61 This section instead does it qualitatively, 
considering two elements: a direct measurement of Niger’s financial systems (the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability, PEFA), and a key development input on which 
much emphasis has been placed (the PRSP). The first is of interest because, all things equal, it 
should be expected that the reforms undertaken by Niger in response to the IMF requirements 
would yield results. The second is grounded on a basic principle of economics – that people 
react to incentives (Mankiw 2001). If valid, then, should the incentive structure in the Niger-
IMF relationship reward development inputs instead of outputs, efforts to deliver those inputs 
should proliferate over time.  
The PEFA program is a multi-donor initiative which aims at assessing country public 
expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems based on objective assessments. 
The PEFA assessments are relevant for several reasons: i) they offer measurable results, ii) 
they are directly linked to the IMF’s domain, and iii) they “build on the principles of the 
2014). This was the second highest year on record; from 2005 to 2012 the yearly revenue collected on mining was 
USD 164.6 Million (EITI 2014). 
61 This is particularly problematic in a principal-agent relationship as it means that moral hazard can hardly be 
resolved; if the principal cannot assess quantitatively the outcome of interest, how can a contract be written? In 
other sectors/interventions with a clearer causality link and more quantifiable results, however, a quantitative 
assessment may be easier (e.g. number of children vaccinated). 
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Strengthened Approach to Supporting Public Financial Management Reform which is 
embodied in three components and closely aligned with the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness” (PEFA 2016). Table 4.8 shows the results of two PEFA assessments undertaken 
in Niger for 2008 and 2012, using the same methodology. No improvement is visible, and in 
the 2012 assessment the IMF notes that “progress has been insignificant. Of the 31 indicators, 
21 were ranked the same or lower than their 2008 level. Only ten indicators improved slightly.” 
(IMF 2013)62  
Nevertheless, the IMF points out that the betterment was obtained “mainly in areas that 
received foreign technical assistance, namely public policy-based budgeting owing to the 
introduction of the medium-term expenditure frameworks and the preparation of a government 
debt strategy, and the improvements of the revamped procurement system” (ibid, p.9).  
Progress is expected for the future as well, albeit cautiously: “Reform programs in progress 
in the area of oversight and external auditing are moving ahead; as this trend continues, the 
progress will be reflected in the scores of subsequent assessments. However, the progress of 
the external audit will continue to depend on positive trends in the area of accounting, 
information recording and financial reporting. The persistent weaknesses observed in the area 
of accounting also limit the extent of progress in policy-based budgeting. The budgetary and 
financial information required for analysis and decisions is incomplete, unreliable and 
irrelevant.” (ibid, p.9). 
With regards to the PRSPs, the first one (interim) was 82 pages, the second (2005-2007) 
was 187 pages, the third (2008-2012) was again 187 pages, and the fourth (2012-2015) was 
280 pages. While no claim is made about their quality, it can be said that over time Niger 
produced more complete poverty reduction strategies - in fact, the pattern has been dubbed as 
an ‘expertise’ to develop development framework documents (Sambo 2009). 
4.7. Conclusion 
It might seem that the collaboration between the IMF and Niger is based on objective programs 
with strict conditionalities which must be met lest the disbursements be suspended or cancelled. 
In reality, the relationship is best understood in terms of the incentives at stake. Niger’s 
Government gets aid flowing in, whilst avoiding the implementation of those political reforms 
which would create most resistance. As a counterpoint, the IMF gets that number of actions 
62 It may be reminded that in 2010 there was a coup. However, I see no clear argument to link such event and the 
PEFA assessments. 
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necessary required for its continued support of the country, support which it needs to provide 
if it is to demonstrate its relevance and thereby provide utility to its shareholders. The 
consequence is important: it is in the interests of both parties that the reforms are those easiest 
to undertake. Thus, the outcome reforms implemented are unlikely to be the structural ones 
which may be clearly needed. 
It could be argued that the evaluation of the country’s performance considers aspects other 
than the agreed ex-ante criteria, i.e. moral hazard understood as socio-political rationality, 
because the government would not want to risk implementing conditionalities which may lead 
to political or social instability. However, in the case of Niger that seems to have been an 
exception. Niger’s performance is poor and shows a declining trend over time. The coexistence 
of this underperformance with ongoing aid from the Fund supports the existence of moral 
hazard. Faced with broken promises, the IMF has not reacted by disrupting its arrangements or 
even disbursements. This behaviour, on a repeated basis, has certainly fed moral hazard. 
An important caveat must now be added. This chapter is not arguing that the Fund has been 
totally passive. The data analysed are consistent with the possibility that current performance 
(along with political factors) may influence access to quota in future arrangements. However, 
it seems clear that what is promoted are development inputs (e.g. PRSPs) instead of 
development results. Given the dynamics of the relationship and its incentives, there is no 
strong basis for arguing that the overall outcome is suboptimal. The key lesson is that the 
incentives system should altered, e.g. disbursing aid only upon delivery of results, or 
identifying stakeholders who will lose with the planned reforms and therefore have a strong 
incentive to block those reforms (Mosley, Harrigan & Toye 1991). The timing of reforms may 
also be crucial, as the 2005 crisis showed: pushing for a VAT rise at a different moment might 
have succeeded; done in the middle of a famine it was destined to failure and criticism. 
Finally, while it may be easy to criticize the IMF based on these results, there is no other 
organization to compare it with at this level of detail. Few donors make available information 
about their interaction with their beneficiaries. In this regard, the IMF’s approach to 
transparency is a rare merit that should be emulated by other donors. 
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4.8. Annexes 
Table 4.2. Key data of Niger’s financial arrangements with the IMF since the mid-1990s 








Stand-by Agreement 04/03/1994 03/03/1995 - 18.6 - 11.1 59.7 
ESAF 12/06/1996 27/08/1999 - 58.0 83 48.3 83.3 
PRGF 22/12/2000 30/06/2004 59.2 59.2 76 59.2 100 
PRGF 31/01/2005 31/05/2008 6.6 6.6* 6.6 26.3 100 
PRGF/ECF63 02/06/2008 01/06/2011 23.0 23.0 37.5 13.2 57 
ECF 16/03/2012 15/03/2015 79.0 79.0 121.0 45.1 57.1 
* Raised to 26.32 on 28/10/2005
63 On February 12th 2010, the IMF announced that “The Extended Credit Facility (ECF) replaced the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) “as the Fund’s main tool for medium-term 
financial support to low-income countries by providing a higher level of access to financing, more concessional terms, enhanced flexibility in program design features, and more focused 
streamlined conditionality. Financing under the ECF currently carries a zero-interest rate, with a grace period of 5½ years, and a final maturity of 10 years. The Fund reviews the level of interest 
rates for all concessional facilities every two years.” 
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Table 4.3. Niger’s ex-post compliance with the IMF ex-ante agreed conditionalities (PRGF) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quantitative Performance Criteria 
- Net bank credit to government √ √ √ √ √ √ X √ X √ X X - 
- Reduction in government domestic payments arrears X X X √ X X X √ √ √ √ - - 
- Accumulation of government external payment arrears √ X √ X √ X √ X √ √ √ - - 
- Non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by government
with maturities < 1 year
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ - - 
- Non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by government
with maturities > 1 year
√ X √ √ √ X √ √ √ √ √ - - 
Quantitative benchmarks 
- Budgetary revenue √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ X √ X - - 
- Wage bill X √ √ √ X X X X X √ √ - - 
- Basic budget deficit (commitment basis, excl. grants) √ X √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ -
Structural Performance 
- Implementation of an automatic, transparent and flexible pricing system
for petroleum products
X X √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ -
Structural Benchmarks 
- Clearing of external payments arrears accumulated at end June 2001 vis-à-
vis Paris Club creditors
X √ 
- Establishment of the opening balances for the 2001 accounts on the
treasury books
X - √
- Preparation and use of a new public accounting nomenclature that
improves the recording of government operations and ensures consistency
between the budget law and public accounting
X √ √ √ √ √
- Computerization of the budgetary expenditure processes of the
government at the central level 
X √ 
- Preparation of a final budget law (Loi de Règlement) for 2000 to be
submitted to the National Assembly and transmittal of the 2000 budgetary 
accounts to the Audit Court 
X √ 
- Submission of a report on (i) the execution of the presidential program to
reduce poverty and (ii) the use of resources freed by the HIPC Initiative in 
2001 
X √ 
- Introduction of the new budget nomenclature and the new public accounts
charger, and their use in preparing the 2003 Budget Law. 
√ 
- Strengthening of the external debt service unit through the introduction of
a new debt-management software and training of staff 
X X X X X √ 
- Transmittal to the IMF staff of a draft final budget law for 2001, together
with the declaration of conformity established by the Audit Court, and
transmittal of the fiscal-year 2001 accounts to the audit court.
X X X √ 
- Selection of a consultant to prepare a study on the medium-term financial
projections of the National Retirement Pension Fund (FNR)
X - - - - 
- Transmittal to the government of a study prepared by an independent
consulting firm on the remuneration of the petroleum sector operators 
included in the pricing formula of the petroleum products. 
X X X √
- Completion of an actuarial audit of the National Retirement Pension Fund X - 
- Completion of a financial audit of the wage bill √ -
- Preparation of a medium-term expenditure framework for two key social
sectors 
-
- Computerization of 2 regional treasury offices for the implementation of 
the government's new charter of public accounts 
-
Missed (X) 2 5 4 3 3 5 4 3 7 3 5 2 - 
Total with Available Data (T) 8 9 11 13 12 12 12 12 13 12 12 8 -
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Table 4.4. Niger’s ex-post compliance with the IMF ex-ante agreed conditionalities (2005-2007 PRGF) 
2005 2006 2007 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quantitative Performance Criteria 
- Domestic financing of the budget √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
- Basic budget balance (commitment basis, excl. grants) X X √ √ X √ √ - √ √ √ √ 
- Reduction in government domestic payments arrears X X X √ X X X √ √ √ √ X
Quantitative benchmarks 
- Accumulation of government external payment arrears √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ - √ √ √ 
- Non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by government with
maturities < 1 year
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
- Non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by government with
maturities > 1 year
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Indicative targets
- Total revenue X X √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
- Wage bill √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ - - - - 
Structural performance criteria 
- Apply the pricing system for petroleum products adopted on August 1st, 2001 √ √ √ √ √ √ X X X X X X 
- Adopt monthly performance indicators for the main customs offices and
consistently track compliance with these indicators by producing monthly
implementation reports for submission to the IMF
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
- Institute joint pre-shipment company-customs imports verification teams at Dan
Issa, Gaya, Konni, Maradi, Matamey, Torodi, Zinder
√ 
- Set up the issue-oriented audit unit (brigade de controle pronctuel) in the
medium-size taxpayer office (DPME) and audit 30 percent taxpayer of the
concerned taxpayers
X - - 
- Raising the turnover threshold from CFAF 50 million to CFAF 100 million so
that the large taxpayer unit (LTU)’s activities are refocused on the 300- 400 largest
taxpayers
X - - 
- Use of a pre-shipment inspection company’s imports valuation lists for imports
taxation purposes
- 
- Reduce the number of VAT non-filers at the large taxpayers’ office (LTO) to 
maximum of 5 percent 
√ 
- Audit a minimum of 60 large enterprises under the control of the LTO by
September 2006.
√ 
- Set up, in the three largest regional customs offices, the units for ex-post control
of imports valuations and exemptions.
√ 
- Establish the overall balance of the consolidated government accounts including
the interim balances from 1997 to December 2002
√ 
- Adopt a decree defining the modalities for reimbursing the frozen postal savings
accounts of the former National Postal Saving Office over a two-year period (para.
15 of MEFP of December 2006)
D 
- Introduce a simplified tax regime with quarterly filing for the small and medium
scale enterprises, to replace monthly declarations
√ 
Structural benchmarks 
- Prepare a list of customs exemptions and a credible plan to reduce them √ 
- Prepare a report clarifying the status of the government’s domestic arrears and
adopt a timetable for their elimination
X X X X X 
- Computerize the financial operations of five provincial pay offices - √ - - - 
- Implement the bidirectional Treasury-Budget computer link - √ - - - 
- Establish a master list of expenditure directly related to poverty reduction and a
monthly mechanism to track their execution 
√ - - - 
- Prepare and adopt an operating strategy and detailed plan of action to enhance the 
mobilization of tax revenues 
X - - √ 
- Present revenue mobilization measures to parliament, including (i) extension of
the VAT to processed food products (milk, sugar, wheat flour); (ii) reduction of
VAT exemptions on water and electricity consumption; and (iii) application of the
excise tax to soft drinks and sodas
√ X
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- Design a time schedule to audit entities that benefit from tax and customs duty
exemptions, with the objective of auditing 30 percent of revenue foregone in each
year
√ √ 
- Reduce the number of non-filers at the medium sized taxpayer office (MTO) to a
maximum of 10 percent (later redefined to 25)
√ 
- Computerize the management of customs transit between Torodi and Niamey,
including electronic exchange of messages
√ 
- Pay the government’s capital contribution to FinaPoste √ 
- Establish an action plan to clear domestic arrears outstanding at end-1999 X X √ 
- Adopt the decree establishing a supervisory agency for the microfinance sector X X √ 
- Disbursement of the annual government subsidy to NigerPoste X √ 
- Launch tender process for privatization of Credit to Niger to shortlisted investors X √ 
- Update the list of Large Taxpayers Unit, according to the 100 billion CFAF
turnover threshold
√ 
- Publish 2006 data on national budget execution and expenditure execution under
the unified list of priority expenditures on a payment order basis
priority unified list
X X X X* 
- Regularize Treasury depositors’ accounts that are in overdraft, and close accounts
of inactive depositors.
X X X X 
- Provide for the adoption of the decree on the organization and mandate of the
Directorate General for Control of Public Procurement by the Council of Ministers
√ 
- Finalize compensation arrangements between the Treasury, NIGELEC, and
SONATEL
X 
- Finalize agreements for the settlement of Treasury arrears with banks X 
- Reduce the threshold for contracts requiring approval by the General Directorate
for Control of Public Procurement from CFAF 300 to CFAF 100 million
X 
Missed (X) 3 5 3 1 5 2 2 4 5 4 4 6.5 
Total with Available Data (T) 12 12 15 11 14 13 13 15 14 15 13 16 
D: Not met and dropped 
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Table 4.5. Niger’s ex-post compliance with the IMF ex-ante agreed conditionalities (2008-2009 PRGF/ECF) 
2008 2009 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quantitative Performance Criteria 
- Domestic financing of the budget √ √ √ √ X √ √ 
- Reduction in government domestic payments arrears X X X X √ X X 
Quantitative benchmarks 
- Accumulation of government external payment arrears √ √ √ √ √ √ √
- Non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by government with maturities < 1 year √ √ √ √ √ √ √
- Non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by government with maturities > 1 year √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Indicative targets 
- Total revenue X √ √ √ X √ √ 
- Basic budget balance (commitment basis, excl. grants) √ √ √ √ √ √ √
- Wage bill
Structural performance criteria 
- Adoption of the decree specifying the terms for repayment of the savings deposits frozen by the
former ONPE.
X 
- Adopt a law or decree establishing a principle for, and defining the modalities of, the full
reimbursement of VAT credits to all exporting enterprises. 
M 
- Elimination of the ceiling for reimbursement of VAT credits to all exporters.
√ 
- Reduction of the rate of profit tax from 35 to 30 percent, applicable to profits reported for FY 2009
and for following years.
√ 
Structural benchmarks 
- Adoption by the Council of Ministers of the MTEF for the infrastructure and transport sectors.
X X X X X X X X 
- Presentation in the budget law for 2009 of the investment programs for the priority sectors of the
PRSP for 2009-2012.
X X X X X 
- The Budget Law for 2010 will include a production of the main budget aggregates (revenue and
expenditure) for the period 2010-12.
X 
- Production by the Ministry of Finance of semi-annual reports on the foreign debt contracted and its
terms, and on the borrowing program for the next six months and the terms specified.
√ √ √ √ √
- Publish (or issue) data on budget outturn for 2008, including for the unified list of priority
expenditures and the President’s Special Program. 
√ √ √ √ 
- Reduction of the fees for registering a new business in the Register of Commerce at the courts. √ 
Missed (X) 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 
Total with Available Data (T) 9 8 8 12 12 11 11 6 
D: Not met and dropped 
M: Not met and modified 
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Table 4.6. Niger’s ex-post compliance with the IMF ex-ante agreed conditionalities (2012-2015 ECF) 
2012 2013 2014 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quantitative Performance Criteria 
- Net domestic financing of the budget X √ X X X X X 
- Reduction in government domestic payments arrears of government obligations √ √ X X √ √ √
Quantitative benchmarks 
- Accumulation of government external payment arrears √ √ √ √ √ √ √
- Non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by government with
maturities < 1 year
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
- Non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by government with
maturities > 1 year
√ √ X X X X X 
Indicative targets 
- Basic budget balance (commitment basis, excl. grants) X X X X X √ √ 
- Total revenue X X X X X X √ 
- Spending on poverty reduction X X √ √ X X X 
Structural performance criteria 
- Adoption by the Council of Ministers of an action plan discussed with IMF staff
to provide a sound financial footing for the refinery, including a decision to set ex-
refinery prices of petroleum products and crude oil input prices at levels that
ensure the profitability of the refinery and the petroleum sector.
√ 
Structural benchmarks 
- Compile comprehensive quarterly budget reports on a commitment, payment
order, and payment basis, to be submitted to Fund staff within a period of 6 weeks.
X X X X √ √ √
- Limit expenditure not authorized in advance to a maximum of 5 percent of
committed expenditure, with the exception of debt-service payments and fiscal
expenditure related to exemptions.
X X √ √ √
- Complete an inventory of bank accounts held by government entities and
agencies.
X √ 
- Give all known importers a tax identification number (TIN) and reserve the code
for operators without a tax identification number exclusively for occasional
operators, and submit a report on the implementation of this measure.
X X √ 
- Adoption by the Council of Ministers of a revision of the Investment Code to
exclude the possibility of granting exemptions to already-established
telecommunication companies when they introduce new technologies.
D 
- Close irregular and dormant bank accounts. X 
- Complete the interface between the Directorate General of the Budget and the
Directorate General of the Treasury and Government Accounting to improve
monitoring of the expenditure chain.
X X* 
- Establish a Treasury single account. X 
- Quarterly budget allocations will be released no later than four weeks after
January 1, 2013 for the first quarter and within two weeks after the start of other
quarters.
X X X 
- Prepare quarterly cash management and commitment plans that take account of
spending ministries' plans for contract awards; the plans will be aligned with one
another and updated monthly.
X X X 
- Finalize the study to select the path of the pipeline √ 
Ratio (X) 5 6 10 8.5 7 6 5 0 
Total with Available Data (T) 9 11 14 14 12 12 12 1 
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Table 4.7. Official requests from Niger to the IMF and corresponding response 





19/07/2001 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 1st review Granted 11 
16/01/2002 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 2nd review Granted 11 
08/08/2002 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 3rd review Granted 11 
28/03/2003 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 4th review Granted 16 
21/10/2003 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 5th review Granted 7.3 
15/06/2004 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 5th review Granted 12.4 
28/10/2005 Waiver for non-observance and completion of new PRGF 1st review, and 
augmentation of access to PRGF of 30% of quota 
Granted 15.4 
05/06/2006 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 2nd review Granted 8.7 
06/12/2006 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 3rd review Granted 8.9 
16/05/2007 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 4th review Granted 1.4 
08/11/2007 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 5th review, 
modification of criteria and 5-month extension to complete the 6th review 
Granted 1.5 
12/05/2008 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 6th review, and a new 3-
year PRGF arrangement 
Granted 5.4 
03/12/2008 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 1st review Granted 5 
27/04/2009 Waiver for non-observance and completion of PRGF 2nd review Granted 5 
21/01/2010 Waiver for non-observance and completion of ECF 3rd review Granted 5 
28/02/2013 Waiver for non-observance and completion of ECF 1st review Granted 16.9 
13/03/2014 Waiver for non-observance and completion of ECF 2nd and 3rd review Granted 34.9 
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Credibility of the budget 
PI-1 Aggregate expenditure outturn compared to original approved budget C D 
PI-2 Composition of expenditure outturn compared to original approved budget A C+ 
PI-3 Aggregate revenue outturn compared to original approved budget D D 
PI-4 Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears D+ D+ 
KEY CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES: Comprehensiveness and Transparency 
PI-5 Classification of the budget C C 
PI-6 Comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation D C 
PI-7 Extent of unreported government operations B+ B+ 
PI-8 Transparency of inter-governmental fiscal relations D+ D 
PI-9 Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public-sector entities C+ C+ 
PI-10 Public access to key fiscal information C C 
C. BUDGET CYCLE
C(i) Policy-based budgeting 
PI-11 Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process C+ C+ 
PI-12 Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting C B 
C (ii) Predictability and Control in Budget Execution 
PI-13 Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities C+ C+ 
PI-14 Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax, fee, and customs duties assessment C C 
PI-15 Effectiveness in collection of tax and customs payments D+ D+ 
PI-16 Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures C+ B 
PI-17 Recording and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees D+ C 
PI-18 Effectiveness of payroll controls D+ C 
PI-19 Competition, value for money, controls in procurement and mechanisms for filing complaints B B+ 
PI-20 Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure C+ C+ 
PI-21 Effectiveness of internal audit C C 
C (iii) Accounting, Recording and Reporting 
PI-22 Regularity and timeliness of accounts reconciliation D D 
PI-23 Availability of information on resources received by primary services delivery units D C 
PI-24 Quality and timeliness of in-year budget execution reports D+ C+ 
PI-25 Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements C+ D+ 
C (iv) External Scrutiny and Audit 
PI-26 Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit D D+ 
PI-27 Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law C+ B+ 
PI-28 Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports C+ D+ 
DONOR PRACTICES 
D-1 Predictability of direct budget support D+ D 
D-2 Financial information provided by donors for budgeting and reporting on project and program aid C+ D+ 
D-3 Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures D D 
Source: Niger’s PEFA 2012 Assessment (IMF, 2013) 
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Chapter 5. Does Aid Reduce Poverty? 
“Yes, we can eradicate extreme poverty, but do we want to...” 
(Ravallion 2013) 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter attempts to explore the relationship between aid and poverty in Niger at the 
community level. Analysing the impact of aid is arguably the most important aspect in the aid 
debate. This has been explored through aid-growth regressions, an approach that assesses the 
statistical relationship between aid and economic growth and was used as early as the 1970s 
(e.g. Papanek 1973). Using such methodology, it has been stated that in Niger, ODA has a 
positive effect on growth (Nafiou 2009), a necessary condition for poverty reduction. This 
macroeconomic relationship has been quantified –for Niger– as follows: “If foreign aid as a 
share of GDP were to be permanently increased from the equivalent of 10 percent of GDP in 
2007 to 15 percent in 2008, annual economic growth would accelerate by more than 1 
percentage point, without generating significant risks for macroeconomic stability” (Farah, 
Sacerdoti & Salinas 2009, p.3). 
A different possibility is to relate aid to an objective other than growth, such as poverty or 
human development. This methodological approach, which is more ‘micro’ in nature, has 
tended to gain favour over the years thanks to the increased availability of data. Poverty may 
be the variable of highest interest, but due to a lack of reliable internationally comparable 
poverty data, studies have often used health and education indicators (e.g. infant mortality and 
illiteracy rates) as proxies for poverty (Alvi, Senbeta 2012). It has been contended that globally, 
aid has no significant impact on infant mortality, primary schooling ratio or life expectancy 
(Boone 1996). At the same time, more recently it has been noted that health aid has a 
statistically significant effect on infant mortality: doubling per capita health aid is associated 
with a 2 percent reduction in the infant mortality rate (Mishra, Newhouse 2007). It has also 
been asserted that while NGO aid reduces infant mortality, there is no evidence that bilateral 
aid reduces infant mortality and illiteracy rates (Yontcheva, Masud 2005). Kosack finds that 
foreign aid does not itself affect the Human Development Index (HDI), although, when 
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combined with democracy, aid is positively associated with improvements in HDI (Kosack 
2003). This finding, that the impact of aid is influenced by the political regime, is common 
(e.g. Boone 1996), although not universally accepted. After conditioning on the state of 
democracy, Arvin and Barillas indicate that in some cases aid disbursement and poverty 
reduction are not linked (Arvin, Barillas 2002).  
The studies identified relate to global samples over large periods of time, e.g. 97 developing 
countries from 1971 to 1990 (Boone 1996), 79 countries from 1981 to 2004 (Alvi, Senbeta 
2012) or 58 countries from 1990 to 2001 (Yontcheva, Masud 2005). Under such a structure the 
use of average income, health and education indicators neglects within-country distributional 
aspects, i.e. even if there is an increase in per capita income or reduction in infant mortality 
due to aid, it remains unclear whether the poor are the beneficiaries of development assistance 
(Alvi, Senbeta 2012). To address this, Alvi and Senbeta assess the role of aid in poverty 
reduction after controlling for average income, redistribution components of changes in 
poverty and a set of covariates identified as growth-enhancing policies and institutions. Their 
results suggest that foreign aid is associated with declines in poverty as measured by poverty 
rate, poverty gap index and squared poverty gap index (Alvi, Senbeta 2012). 
Case studies on individual countries have also been suggested as a way to capture 
idiosyncratic characteristics that may affect the relationship between aid and poverty (Arvin, 
Barillas 2002). For instance, economists often neglect the fact that people benefit from 
development projects from sources other than aid (e.g. Government, civil society, etc.). This 
neglect may be rooted in lack of data on development projects’ funding, but its consequences 
are important: coordination is one of the five pillars of the Paris Declaration for Aid 
Effectiveness (OECD 2006) and its lack leads to fragmentation, which is linked to duplication 
of efforts and wasting of resources (OECD 2012). In Niger, the monitoring of the Paris 
Declaration shows that progress has been elusive: only one of 13 targets were achieved between 
2005 (baseline) and 2010, and some indicators actually deteriorated (Table 5.1 in annex).  
Some Sub-Saharan countries have been the object of much research with regard to the aid 
they receive. For example, the impact of aid in Uganda has been analysed under several lenses: 
its political economy (Oloka-Onyango, Barya 1997, the effects of its environmental programs 
(Kateregga 2013), its ability to lead to democracy relative to other countries (Hearn 1999), or 
its capacity to reach the final beneficiaries, e.g. an evaluation of a grants-transfer program to 
schools found that between 1991 and 1995, on average the schools received only 13 percent of 
the grants (Reinikka, Svensson 2004). Generally, however, studies linking aid and poverty at a 
country level are scarce. A survey of all work done shows that Niger has been conspicuously 
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under-researched at a micro level, considering either aid’s effect on poverty or any other 
dimension. The few exceptions consist in qualitative studies (Sambo 2009) and field project 
descriptions (Rossi 2006). This lack of attention is rather surprising given that it is one of the 
poorest countries in the world. As an attempt to reduce this void, this chapter explores the 
relationship between aid and poverty in Niger. 
5.2. Data and Methodology 
This section describes available data, research hypotheses and the methodological approach 
adopted. Data are from a National Survey on Household Living Conditions (ENCVM)64 
undertaken in 2005 by Niger’s National Statistics Institute (INS) 65 . The objective of the 
ENCVM was to evaluate poverty. Its methodology was that of Core Welfare Indicators Surveys 
(INS Niger 2007). 66  The survey targeted ordinary Nigerien households except those of 
diplomatic personnel. It covered the entire national territory with the exception of the 
department of Bilma due to cost–accessibility reasons (INS Niger 2007): Bilma is situated in 
the North-East of the country, in the Sahara desert, and hosts only 0.2% of the population, 
mostly nomads (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1. Coverage of Niger’s ENCVM 2005 (in orange), with Bilma uncoloured 
The ENCVM’s sampling methodology was stratified at 2 levels. First, each of the 7 regions 
was divided in 2 sub-regions (urban and rural), which led to 14 strata plus the capital, or 15 
64 Enquête Nationale sur les Conditions de Vie du Ménage 2005 (ENCVM) 
65 Institut National de la Statistique (INS) 
66 Questionnaire des Indicateurs de Bien Etre de base (QUIBB) 
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strata in total.67 Next, primary sampling units (zones de dénombrement, ZD) were selected from 
each stratum, proportional to their size in number of households. In total 335 ZDs were selected 
and 20 households were sampled per ZD, which led to a sample of 6,700 households. Of those, 
ten households could not be surveyed because they were nomadic, which led to the final sample 
of 6,690 households. The equivalence between households and individuals is given by survey 
weights (INS Niger, Banque Mondiale 2006). According to this sample, the country’s 
population was estimated at 12,627,063 people.  The ENCVM questionnaire contained four 
modules: general household characteristics such as general education or health; income and 
expenditures; savings and credit; and community perception and activities.  
The community module collected data on the development projects which households saw 
implemented in their community between 2000 and 2005. Key selected questions are shown in 
the annex (Figure 5.3). Households were asked if any development project had taken place in 
their community; if so, what it consisted of, who funded it, and how much the household’s 
living conditions improved as a result. Data were also collected on the change in access to 
education, health, water, electricity and justice during the period of reference. Poverty was 
explored in the ENCVM objectively and subjectively. Objectively, households were asked to 
quantify their expenditures, which allowed the estimation of the country’s national poverty 
level: a person was considered poor if his/her annual expenditures were equal to or lower than 
144,750 FCFA (275 USD) in an urban environment, and 105,827 FCFA (201 USD) in a rural 
setting (INS Niger, Banque Mondiale 2006).68  
Based on this poverty line, 62.1% of the country’s population was estimated to be poor 
(INS Niger, Banque Mondiale 2006). Subjectively, households were asked to self-evaluate 
their poverty level in 2000 and in 2005, on a Likert scale from 0 (wealthiest) to 9 (poorest). 
This allows for a calculation of the change in their self-assessed poverty. The frequency 
distribution of poverty for both years is shown in the annex (Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5). The 
relationship between objective and subjective poverty in 2005 is robust despite the existence 
of outliers (Figure 5.6).69 Households’ expenditures and their self-assessed poverty in 2005 are 
significantly correlated, with the cut-off of 6 in the Likert scale being the best match, i.e. 
objectively-poor households tend to self-evaluate their poverty between 6 and 9 (INS Niger, 
Banque Mondiale 2006). 
67 Niger’s capital is administered separately, referred to as the “Communauté Urbaine de Niamey” 
68 Exchange rate used is 1 USD = 526.3 FCFA (as of 16 December 2014) 
69 Few wealthy households stated that they are poor (no poor households claimed to be wealthy). 
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Impact evaluation is performed by comparing a group or subject that has been exposed to 
a specific intervention (treatment group) with one that hasn’t (control group). In this setting, 
the structure of the groups is depicted in Figure 5.2. The treatment group is composed of 
households who benefited from at least one aid-funded development project (G1a), while the 
main control group is composed of those households who did not (G2+G1o). The control group 
thus defined comprises two sub-groups: households who did not benefit from any project at all 
(G2), and those who benefited from projects by sources other than aid (G1o). 
Figure 5.2. Overall scheme of this research (n denotes number of households with available data) 
The objective is to assess if households who benefit from aid projects (G1a) show significant 
changes in poverty relative to i) those who do not benefit from aid (G2+G1o), ii) those who 
benefit from no project at all (G2), and ii) those who benefit from ‘non-aid’ development 
projects i.e. those provided by other sources such as Government, civil society, etc. (G1o). 
Formally, the null and alternate versions of the research hypothesis are stated in equations (5-
1) to (5-2):
H0: PCA − PCC = 0 (5-1) 
H1: PCA − PCC ≠ 0 (5-2) 
Where: 
PCA: Poverty change of households that benefited from aid projects (group G1a) 




G1: Households that benefited 
from at least one project in 
their community between 2000 
and 2005 (n=5,377) 
G2: Households that did not 
benefit from any project in their 
community between 2000 and 
2005 (n=1,313) 
G1a: Projects were funded 
(partially or totally) by aid 
(n=1,937) 
G1o: Projects were funded 
by other sources (n=3,440) 
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This research setting and available data offer several key advantages. First, it is possible to 
discriminate between development projects in general (i.e. regardless of funding source70) and 
those development projects funded by aid. 71 Furthermore, the sample of households is large 
and appears representative of the country’s population. Third, although the ENCVM data is 
mainly cross-sectional, there are variables with information about changes in time, so in 
addition to cross-sectional analysis it is possible to estimate differences-in-differences. 
Similarly, consistency checks between objective and subjective poverty indicators are possible. 
Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between aid projects funded solely by aid or co-funded 
with other donor types, which is useful when exploring any differences induced by 
coordination between donors. Finally, although the number of projects was not explicitly 
requested, it can be calculated from the data. Consequently, while the hypothesis is formulated 
under a discrete approach (project – no project), the same framework can be used to assess 
whether the number of projects is associated with changes in poverty. 
There are some underlying assumptions to bear in mind. It is assumed that all aid projects 
are equal (i.e. their alleged effect on poverty is uniform), an assumption that will be relaxed in 
the next chapter.72 It is also assumed that when a community benefits from a project, all the 
households therein do so equally (there is no obvious justification to think otherwise). Third, 
the effect of projects is assumed to be somewhere between immediate and within 5 years, which 
is plausible, especially with a subjective poverty measurement, because people tend to forget 
the very long run; e.g. the effect of a project undertaken 20 years ago would be zero. Finally, 
the definition of what a community is was not explicitly given in the survey; as several 
households may benefit from a given project, the inclusion of primary sampling units (ZD) as 
clusters is appropriate. 
From the perspective of relative deprivation, it may be argued that a household’s self-
perception of poverty can be influenced by the poverty in the community where that household 
resides. The analysis also takes this possibility into account. 
In terms of methodology the available data offer several options. Considering only its cross-
sectional nature, a simple OLS regression may be used to express the poverty of households as 
70  Besides aid the options in the ENCVM were government, Special Program of the Republic’s President, 
community, private investor, religious community, other. Differences between them are analysed in Chapter 6. 
71  Throughout the chapter, projects are consistently referred to as falling into the following categories: 
development projects (all projects regardless of funding source), projects from other sources, aid projects (those 
implemented by an aid donor, and which may be co-funded or not), and aid-only projects (aid projects funded 
only by aid).  
72 Admittedly this may be a limitation, but the available dataset does not include data on the size of the projects. 
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a linear function of a number of variables (e.g. education, being in a rural setting, etc.) denoting 
these variables by a vector Xji as follows: 
pi = α + βjXji + ei      (5-3) 
Where pi is the poverty level of household i, α is an intercept, Xji is the vector of explanatory 
variables j relating to household i, and ei is the error term for household i. Adding a dummy 
variable for aid that would take a value of 1 (treatment group) or 0 (control group) yields an 
OLS equation for impact evaluation (5-4): 
pi = α + β1aidi + βjXji + ei     (5-4) 
In this case, households that benefited from aid projects (i.e. aid=1) are compared with those 
in the control group, keeping other factors (Xij) constant. More interestingly, it is also possible 
to add a continuous variable instead, with the number of aid projects household i benefited 
from (aid projects), which would take a value of zero if household i does not belong in the 
group G1a: 
pi = α + β1aidprojectsi + βjXji + ei  (5-5) 
For OLS to be valid two key assumptions are: that the right-hand side variables excluded from 
the model (which by being excluded would fall into ei) not be correlated with the explanatory 
variables included; and that they do not differ between program participants (aid=1) and non-
participants (aid=0). These two conditions may prove unrealistic when dealing with 
interventions to tackle poverty. First, because as poverty is multidimensional it may be difficult 
to include all the control variables, which would cause omitted variable bias. And second, given 
the potential purposive targeting of aid projects, treatment and control households are not 
expected to be comparable ex-ante, so endogeneity may arise due to reverse causality (i.e. 
projects may influence poverty but poverty may also influence projects).  
One way of dealing with such endogeneity is to use an instrumental variable (IV). This 
technique recognizes that at least one explanatory variable, x, may be correlated with the error 
term, or cov(x,e) ≠ 0. The solution is to find an additional variable, or instrument z, which is 
not an explanatory variable by itself and is correlated (as highly as possible) with x but 
uncorrelated with the error term, so that cov(z,x) ≠ 0 and cov(z,e) = 0. An IV may reduce the 
problem, but at the cost of efficiency because IV estimators show higher standard errors. In 
some cases the trade-off is such (e.g. if the instrument is very weak) that it may still be 
preferable to use OLS. The instrument chosen here is “Is anybody in the household a member 
of a community development association? (1: yes, 0: no)”, which is assumed to be uncorrelated 
98 
with the error term and is not an explanatory variable itself. If members of development 
associations have any influence in attracting aid projects, the proposed IV would be statistically 
associated with benefiting from aid, and there is no obvious reason to believe that households 
in which any of the family members is a member of a development association are different 
from regular households in terms of aid impact. This IV is statistically associated with the main 
key variable, i.e. having benefited from an aid project, as will be shown in the section on results. 
The panel character of the ENCVM data is particularly useful in exploring whether poverty 
change is related to aid projects. Using the subjective poverty measurements, we can calculate 
the poverty change of household i as the difference between its poverty level in 2005 and in 
2000:73 
pci(05−00) = pi(2005) − pi(2000)  (5-6) 
In the new variable, a higher positive value means more poverty while higher negative 
values indicate less poverty. Values range from -9 (a household is self-assessed as among the 
wealthiest in 2005, while in 2000 it was among the poorest) to 9 (a household is self-assessed 
as among the poorest in 2005 while it was among the wealthiest in 2000). The frequency 
distribution of the variable thus calculated is shown in the annex (Figure 5.7). 
In an ideal experimental setting, treatments would be randomly assigned (which would 
allow us to make causal inferences) and so would the experimental units (which would ensure 
the results are generalizable to the population). Thus, selection bias would be assumed to be 
zero because subjects in the treatment and control groups are statistically equal; if the two 
groups are statistically identical ex-ante but after the intervention they differ in some 
characteristic that can be linked to the intervention, the difference ex-post is expected to be 
caused by the intervention. In such a setting, the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) can be 
estimated as the difference-in-differences (Wooldridge 2012): 
ATE = (p̅05,aid − p̅05,c) − (p̅00,aid − p̅00,c)   (5-7) 
Where p̅ denotes the mean poverty level, the subscripts 05 and 00 refer to years 2005 and 
2000, aid refers to the group of households that benefited from aid and c is the control group(s). 
Equation (5-6) is valid when all other factors are expected to be similar, however. As noted, in 
the current setting that is not plausible owing to the purposive nature of aid projects, which 
means that control variables must be included. To have a clear understanding of a model 
73 The subjective measure of poverty must be used, as data on objective poverty in 2000 were not available. 
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specified in differences, and which includes control variables, we can re-write the model that 
explains the poverty level, equation (5-4), indexing it with time as: 
pit = α + β1aidit + βjXjit + eit     (5-8) 
Taking the same equation (5-8) one time period earlier yields: 
pi(t−1) = α





The parameters in equation (5-9) are indicated by an apostrophe to show that they are a 
sample of the same process (poverty) one period earlier. Subtracting equation (5-9) from 
equation (5-8) and renaming α − α′ =   and eit − e
′
i(t−1) = i, yields equation (5-10):
pcit(t−1) =  + [β1aidit − β
′
1aidi(t−1)] + [βjXjit − β
′
jXji(t−1)] + 𝑖  (5-10)
This equation explains the change in poverty on the change in two groups of explanatory 
variables: one relating to aid and the other composed by controls. With regard to the first, taking 
a 5-year period (a lustrum) as the difference between t and t-1, the change in poverty is 
explained by having benefited from an aid project undertaken between 2000 and 2005. 
Regarding the control variables, there are several options: 
First, if all Xjit = Xji(t−1), this would be the case of Fixed Effects (FE); Xji is constant over 
time and therefore would disappear taking first differences. Then, all the variance of the 
dependent variable would be accounted for by , aid, and the error term. 
Secondly, if βj = β
′
j
 and Xjit ≠ Xji(t−1) , then the effect of control variables becomes
βj[Xjit − Xji(t−1)]. In this case, the model is estimated using ∆Xjit, or difference-in-differences. 
Finally, it is possible that βj ≠ β
′
j
 and Xjit ≠ Xji(t−1) . The estimation requires data on
Xji(t−1), so if variables pertaining to the true model are not available (i.e. equation is estimated 
only with Xjit), the information of Xji(t−1) will be included in i, this would be problematic 
because Xjit is likely to be correlated with  Xji(t−1) and therefore would lead to endogeneity. In 
this research, this would be equivalent to including as control variables the values of Xji in 
2005, effectively assuming Xji(2000) = 0 when Xji(2000) ≠ 0. 
It is not possible to determine exactly which scenario is most applicable, for that requires 
knowing Xji(2000) and β
′
j
. However, it is likely that in a 5-year framework a combination of
the three cases is given, as in equation (5-11): some control variables are likely to change (e.g. 
education) and therefore first differences, ∆Xji(05−00), would be adequate; other variables are 
more likely to remain constant, e.g. whether a household lives in a rural setting; finally, it is 
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also possible that for some variables Xki, the value in 2000 was zero, so it would be correct to 
include their value in 2005 in the model. 
pci(05−00) =  + β1aidi(05−00) + βj∆Xji(05−00) + βkXki05 + i   (5-11) 
5.3.Results 
Selected statistics of interest are shown in the annex (Table 5.2), which includes variables 
already identified as being associated with poverty in Niger (INS Niger, Banque Mondiale 
2006). In 2005, 62.1 percent of the country’s population was poor, most lived in rural areas 
(only 16.8 percent of households were urban), and the mean annual expenditure per capita was 
124,740 FCFA or approximately 237 USD. With regard to development projects, 82.1 percent 
of the population were reached by at least one between 2000 and 2005, while aid projects 
reached 31.7 percent of the total population. The average Nigerien household saw 2.6 
development projects in its community, compared to 3.6 projects for households reached by 
aid. This means that aid projects complement projects from other sources; indeed, of all aid 
projects, only 27.8 percent were funded by aid alone, the other 72.2 percent were co-funded.74 
Results of t-tests for a comparison of means between the G1a and (G2+G1b) groups show that 
households benefitting from aid tended to be rural, to have lower household expenditures per 
capita and more often to be objectively poor (64.9 percent vs. 60.8 percent).  
Table 5.2 also shows that in 2005, aid-receiving households self-assessed themselves as 
poorer on a scale from 0 to 9 (means of 6.208 vs. 6.074). However, in 2000 they were wealthier 
(means of 5.19 vs. 5.295), which implies a deterioration of their economic situation over time 
(Poverty Change = 1.018 vs. 0.779). In terms of the change in poverty across groups, an 
equality of variance test shows a p-value of 0.0294 (the null hypothesis of equal variances can 
be rejected at 5% significance). Considering unequal variances, the difference in their means 
is statistically significant. Furthermore, in 2005 treatment households consider their 
communities to be wealthier than households who did not benefit from aid (5.814 vs 5.960). 
Between treatment and control groups there are no statistically significant differences in terms 
of the gender of the household head or the household size. Most of the variables, however, 
show differences that are statistically significant. This is the case for education, where 
differences are large at the level of secondary education, professional/technical qualification 
and university (Table 5.4). Regarding the marital status of the household head, the most 
74 Conversely, if households that benefited from aid saw fewer projects on average than the general Nigerien 
household, it would suggest that aid projects substitute projects from other sources. 
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remarkable difference is that aid beneficiaries have higher rates of polygamous marriages 
(Table 5.5). 
The differences identified across groups might be interpreted as evidence of poverty 
targeting. However, these differences relate to 2005. Incidence of aid projects and poverty 
levels in 2000 show correlation coefficients implying that, if anything, households that were 
wealthier in 2000 benefited from projects more often (Table 5.3). This applies to all 
development projects, aid projects, aid compared to no project and aid compared to other 
projects (Table 5.3). The only case in which households that were poorer in 2000 seem to have 
benefited more from aid is when aid was the only source of funding, which may imply that aid-
only projects are more likely to target the poor (Table 5.3).  
The distribution of aid projects’ incidence is very positively skewed (Figure 5.8), and strong 
differences across the country’s regions are clear (Figure 5.9). In terms of the number of 
projects, the relationship between number of aid projects and poverty change may fit a non-
linear plot (Figure 5.10). 
Table 5.6 in the annex shows an OLS regression of households’ subjective poverty level in 
2005. Explanatory variables include having benefited from at least one aid project and other 
controls (columns 1-4). Again, the main result is that households that are poorer in 2005 are 
positively associated with aid projects. Households in poorer communities and those who self-
assess themselves as poorer in 2000 consider themselves poorer in 2005, which is consistent 
with the common perception that poverty is sticky. Education of household heads is negatively 
associated with poverty, although not at all levels: it starts being statistically significant with a 
high school degree and the coefficients rise progressively to reach the highest coefficient for 
those who hold a university degree. This is consistent with the extreme scarcity of human 
capital in Niger.75 It is also worth noting that households in Zinder are less poor than those in 
Agadez. Indeed, the Zinder region has a number of benefits; it enjoys less harsh climatic 
conditions, is located in an important peanut producing region and is at the crossroads of the 
East-West road through Niger to Chad, and North-South route from Agadez to Kano (Nigeria). 
The specification in columns (5-8) compares households that benefitted from aid (G1a) 
with the sub-group households who saw no project at all during the period 2000-2005 (G2). In 
this case, aid projects do not increase or reduce households’ poverty. Depending on the 
specification, households who were consulted about the projects to be undertaken in their 
community showed lower levels of poverty (columns 6-7). Other results are similar to those in 
75 For more details see Chapter 2. 
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columns (1-4), although now older household heads are poorer, and urban households do not 
show higher levels of poverty than rural households. 
A third group of interest is composed of households who benefited from development 
projects funded by other sources (G1b). The estimation is shown in columns (9-12) of Table 
5.7. Remarkably, households benefiting from aid are poorer than those households who have 
benefited from other projects. In this instance, consulting households is not significant at all, 
which may suggest that the key feature is not so much what donor the project came from, but 
the information on the necessary interventions to carry out: projects coming from sources other 
than aid are national, and therefore they allegedly understand local realities better, which has 
been noted in the implementation of projects in Niger at the grassroots level (Rossi 2006). The 
geographical dimension becomes important, and households in all regions are consistently less 
poor than those in Agadez, a vast poor region in the Sahara Desert where only 67 of the total 
1,937 aid projects were implemented. 
Aid-only projects are compared to those that were co-funded in columns (13-16) of Table 
5.7, and there are no differences between them. This suggests that with regard to households’ 
poverty in 2005, aid donors who undertake projects on their own are not more or less efficient 
than those co-funding. 
Table 5.8 shows the initial model of columns (1-4), but now an instrumental variable (IV) 
is chosen instead of the aid project dummy. The IV is “Is anybody in the household a member 
of a community development association? (1: yes, 0: no)”, which as noted earlier is not an 
explanatory variable itself and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term. The IV shows 
a correlation coefficient with having benefited from an aid project (group G1a) vs the opposite 
(G2+G1b) of 0.14, significant at 99 percent confidence. The first-stage estimation in columns 
(21-24) confirms that the relationship is robust to the inclusion of control variables (Table 5.8). 
The 2SLS results show that the association between aid and poverty level is insignificant 
(columns 17-20), with a p-value of 0.539. To compare the IV and OLS estimates, results of the 
Hausman test are shown (Table 5.9). The null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients 
(between IV and OLS estimators) is not systematic cannot be rejected, therefore OLS is 
preferred because it is more efficient. 
The relationship between poverty level and the number of aid projects, instead of the 
discrete approach, is also estimated (columns 25-28 in Table 5.10). Visibly, the relationship is 
non-linear: the number of aid projects is associated with higher poverty levels but at a 
decreasing return. The other results are broadly similar: education is negatively associated with 
poverty, and poorer households in 2000, those in urban areas and those in poorer communities 
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consider themselves to be poorer. Columns (29-32) show that with regard to aid projects, aid-
only projects are not associated with poverty in 2005 compared with co-funded projects (Table 
5.10). 
Next, change in poverty is regressed under the discrete approach on having benefited from 
aid (G1a vs G2+G1b), control variables in change, and other control variables that are less 
susceptible to change in 5 years, which are progressively added in the 2005 level (Table 5.11). 
Benefiting from aid is associated with an increase in poverty (columns 33-36). Considering 
change in explanatory variables, those households who state that access to justice has improved 
are significantly less poor than those who say it has deteriorated (the reference group), although 
access to water also statistically significant—is not required to have changed. Households who 
live in poorer communities and urban areas have become poorer, while more education in 2005 
is a factor strongly associated with greater reductions in poverty. The coefficient of households’ 
poverty in 2000 shows that the poorer a household was in the past, the less its poverty has 
increased, i.e. given a very bad baseline, things do not get much worse. 
Disaggregating the main control group, we can see that with regard to the second control 
group (no project at all, G2), there is no association between aid and poverty change (columns 
37-40). Again, this means that the overall association between aid and poverty change must be
driven by the comparison between aid projects and other funders’ projects. Results for other 
control variables are similar, although specific characteristics of household heads denote the 
possibility of social exclusion (e.g. being older or widowed divorced or separated).  
Considering the third control group (G1b), households who benefited from aid were left 
relatively worse off than those who benefited from a project from a different source (columns 
41-44 in Table 5.12). Benefiting from projects that are funded by aid only (vs co-funding)
shows no significant statistical relationship to poverty change (columns 45-48). 
Finally, poverty change is regressed on the number of aid projects and explanatory 
variables in differences and level (Table 5.13). Once again, the number of aid projects suggests 
a non-linear relationship with a change in poverty (columns 49-52). And again, households 
who consider access to justice has improved see negative increases in poverty. The other results 
are similar to the other models and specifications (e.g. household’s poverty in 2000, 
community’s poverty, etc.). As in previous models, relative to co-funding, aid-funding alone 
is not associated with improvements or deteriorations in poverty (columns 53-56). 
Fitting the four models estimated with poverty to the number of aid projects (Table 5.10 
and Table 5.13) allows for a graphic interpretation of the results (Figure 5.11): considering all 
aid projects, poverty stays stable (and if anything increases slightly) up to around 10 projects. 
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At that level, it starts decreasing as households benefit from more aid initiatives. The 
‘breakeven’ is reached at about 18 projects, i.e. at that moment households self-assess as having 
improved relative to their initial situation. Interestingly, however, the pattern of the graphs is 
positively-sloped when aid-only projects are considered. Although the slope is very close to 
zero, this may suggest that collaborating with national partners plays a critical role, i.e. it is not 
guaranteed that an aid donor adding more projects on its own will ever reach the threshold at 
which poverty starts to decline. The residuals of the models estimated with number of projects 
are normally distributed around zero (Figure 5.12). 
5.4. Conclusion 
Given the evidence presented, the null hypothesis that aid projects are associated with 
reductions in households’ poverty, is rejected. If anything, the findings suggest the opposite. 
In 2005, households who benefited from aid between 2000 and 2005 are poorer. This is not 
due to the purposive poverty targeting of aid, but because households who benefited from aid 
have become poorer. Disaggregating the control group in two sub-groups is vital to shed light 
on this: relative to households who received no project, aid projects are not significantly 
associated with changes in households’ poverty. The overall result is driven by the second 
group instead, which means that households benefiting from aid are poorer relative to 
households who benefit from other donors’ projects. 
What could explain such a result? Projects that are funded by aid alone are not associated 
with improvements or deteriorations in poverty relative to co-funded projects (which may be 
surprising given that donor coordination in Niger was poor in 2005). However, the pattern of 
poverty reduction as a function of the number of aid projects becomes slightly positively-sloped 
when aid-only projects are considered, which suggests that collaborating with national partners 
may enhance the impact of aid projects. Given the significance of consulting households in 
some cases, the key may lie in information and knowledge about local conditions: projects 
coming from sources other than aid are national, and therefore understand local realities better, 
which is in line with the (scarce) descriptions of Niger’s aid interventions (Rossi 2006). 
To reduce poverty (or at least its self-perception), it is necessary to go beyond the threshold 
at which cross-sector synergies appear. Keeping the quality of projects constant, that threshold 
is estimated at 10 projects; 18 for households to be better off than 5 years earlier. Such a high 
number is insightful: poverty is sticky and multidimensional, as it can be determined by such 
factors as governance, family background, distance to public services or trade corridors, 
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education or bad luck. Given this complexity, aid projects must reach a critical mass to create 
synergies across different dimensions and reduce poverty: for someone in a rural context such 
as Niger’s brousse, just a few projects such as fixing the nearby school, a new well or a 
veterinary service will not be enough; not when that person still has so many other challenges, 
e.g. has to feed a family of 10, cannot find a qualified job due to illiteracy, is often sick, has no
access to financial services, no access to fertile land, etc. 
The findings support the idea that there is a minimum number of home-grown interventions 
required to achieve the economies of scale that lead to poverty reduction. For aid donors, this 
may arguably entail a different role, e.g. more in line with budget support than with the 
traditional aid parallel structures for project implementation. 
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5.5. Annexes 
Table 5.1. Monitoring indicators of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness for Niger76 
Indicator 2005 2007 2010 Target 2010 
Operational development strategies C C C > C
Reliable Public Financial Management (PFM) systems  3.5 3.5 3.5 4 
Reliable Procurement systems  N/A B N/A No target 
Aid flows are aligned on national priorities  99% 91% 85% 100% 
Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support  15% 50% 55% 50% 
Use of country Public Financial Management systems  27% 26% 29% 51% 
Use of country procurement systems  49% 37% 23% No target 
Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel Project Implementation Units (PIU) 52 47 53 17 
Aid is more predictable  73% 78% 72% 87% 
Aid is untied  85% 76% 84% > 85%
Use of common arrangements or procedures  31% 49% 41% 66%
Joint missions to the field  21% 15% 3% 40%
Joint country analytic work  40% 32% 34% 66%
Results-oriented frameworks  D D C > C
Mutual accountability NO NO NO YES 
Source: (OECD 2012) 
Figure 5.3. Key questions of interest in the ENCVM 200577 
t=2005
Poverty (2000)
Did any of the following projects or 
changes take place in your community 
between 2000 and 2005?
(Extensive list of dummy variables: 1 
yes, 0 no)








Special Program of the Republic
(Dummy variables: 1 yes, 0 no)
How much did those changes improve 
your live?






poverty level on a Likert 
scale from 0 (wealthiest) 
to 9 (poorest)
Subjective: Household 
poverty level on a Likert 





76 No data are available after 2010. 
77 t denotes when the questions were asked, while the year to which the information relates is in parenthesis. 
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Figure 5.4. Frequency distribution of subjective poverty in 2000, with normal density plot 
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Figure 5.6. Fitted linear relationship between self-assessed poverty and expenditures per capita (FCFA) 
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Table 5.2. Summary statistics of key variables for all households (a), those benefited from a development project (b) and those who did not (c)78 
All households (G0) Aid-project households= Yes (G1a) Aid-project households=No (G2+G1b) t-test
n mean s.d. min max n mean s.d. min max n mean s.d. min max p-value79
HH’s poverty level in 2000 (0: wealthiest to 9:poorest) 6,679 5.262 1.64 0 9 1,936 5.19 1.562 0 9 4743 5.295 1.674 0.0 9.0 0.051 
HH poverty level in 2005 (0: wealthiest to 9:poorest) 6,689 6.116 1.603 0 9 1,937 6.208 1.479 0 9 4752 6.074 1.656 0.0 9.0 0.009 
Poverty change 2000-2005 6,679 0.854 1.535 -7 9 1,936 1.018 1.515 -6 8 4,743 0.779 1.534 -7.0 9.0 0.000 
HH is objectively poor in 2005 (1:yes, 0:no) 6,690 0.621 0.485 0 1 1,937 0.649 0.477 0 1 4753 0.608 0.488 0.0 1.0 0.007 
Community’s poverty level (0: wealthiest to 9:poorest) 6,678 5.914 1.616 0 9 1,935 5.814 1.515 0 9 4743 5.960 1.658 0.0 9.0 0.006 
Urban (1:yes, 0:no) 6,690 0.168 0.374 0 1 1,937 0.118 0.322 0 1 4753 0.191 0.393 0.0 1.0 0.000 
HH head female (1:yes, 0:no) 6,690 0.046 0.209 0 1 1,937 0.042 0.2 0 1 4753 0.048 0.213 0.0 1.0 0.269 
HH head age 6,690 46.604 14.194 15 99 1,937 45.765 13.726 17 99 4753 46.993 14.390 15.0 99.0 0.008 
HH Size 6,690 8.389 4.457 1.0 31.0 1937 8.307 4.130 1.0 28.0 4753 8.427 4.600 1.0 31.0 0.514 
HH total annual expenditure per capita (thousand FCFA) 6,690 124.7 207.7 6.9 9,277.6 1,937 112.2 200.4 8.6 6,189.3 4753 130.5 210.8 6.9 9,277.6 0.000 
Benefited from at least a project during 2000-2005 (1:yes, 0:no) 6,690 0.821 0.383 0 1 1,937 1 0 1 1 4753 0.738 0.440 0.0 1.0 0.000 
Benefited from an aid project during 2000-2005 (1:yes, 0:no) 6,690 0.317 0.465 0 1 1,937 1 0 1 1 4753 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.0 0.000 
No. of projects HH benefited during 2000-2005 6,690 2.565 2.498 0 30 1,937 3.608 2.319 1 29 4753 2.081 2.430 0 30 0.000 
Table 5.3. Correlation coefficients between household poverty indicators and benefiting from projects 
Dummy: Development Project 
(1:yes, 0:no) 
Dummy: Aid project  (1:yes, 
0:no) 
Dummy: Aid project (1) vs No 
project (0) 
Dummy: Aid project (1) vs Project from 
others (0) 
Dummy: Aid-only project (1) vs Aid 
project (0) 
Household poverty level, 2000 -0.0436*** -0.0462*** -0.08*** -0.0379*** 0.0457** 
Obs. 6,679 6,679 3,248 5,367 1,936 
Household poverty level, 2005 -0.0559*** 0.0079 -0.0506*** 0.0301** 0.0228 
Obs. 6,689 6,689 3,249 5,377 1,937 
Dummy: Objectively poor, 2005 
(1:yes, 0:no) 
0.0314** 0.0459*** 0.0664*** 0.0422*** 0.1415*** 
Obs. 6,690 6,690 3,250 5,377 1,937 
Community’s poverty level, 2005 -0.0620*** -0.0440*** -0.0992*** -0.0287** -0.0092 
Obs. 6678 6678 3247 5366 1935
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
78 All data refer to 2005, unless otherwise stated in a specific variable 
79 Test of equality of means between groups (G1a) and (G2+G1b ) 
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Table 5.4. Summary statistics of the population: education of the household head in 2005 
All households (G0) Aid-project households= Yes (G1a) Aid-project households=No (G2+G1b) 
Level Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
None 3,962 59.22 788 60.02 1,147 59.22 
Islamic school 1,307 19.54 272 20.72 391 20.19 
Read & Write 123 1.84 15 1.14 55 2.84 
Primary 620 9.27 101 7.69 196 10.12 
Secondary 339 5.07 62 4.72 84 4.34 
Professional/Technical 220 3.29 46 3.5 45 2.32 
University 119 1.78 29 2.21 19 0.98 
Total 6,690 100 1,313 100 1,937 100 
Pearson Chi square for groups (b) and (c) = 37.9299 Pr = 0.000 
Table 5.5. Summary statistics of the population: marital status of household head in 2005 
All households (G0) Aid-project households= Yes (G1a) Aid-project households=No (G2+G1b) 
Status Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Single 117 1.75 29 1.5 88 1.85 
Married monogamous 4,525 67.64 1,284 66.29 3,241 68.19 
Married polygamous 1,420 21.23 456 23.54 964 20.28 
Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 628 9.39 168 8.67 460 9.68 
Total 6,690 100 1,937 100 4,753 100 
Pearson Chi square for groups (b) and (c) = 10.0918 Pr = 0.018 
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Figure 5.9. Aid projects by region 
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Table 5.6. Poverty level and benefiting from aid projects 
Poverty level of household in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dummy: Project funded by aid (G1a) vs No aid (G2+G1b) 0.147 0.246 0.25 0.251 
[0.081] [0.055]** [0.054]** [0.055]** 
Dummy: Project from aid (G1a) vs No project at all (G2) -0.047 0.136 0.137 0.115 
[0.112] [0.075] [0.075] [0.080] 
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) -0.081 -0.086 -0.095 -0.073 -0.156 -0.165 -0.188 -0.109 
[0.069] [0.047] [0.047]* [0.051] [0.095] [0.067]* [0.067]** [0.065] 
Household size -0.01 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 -0.016 -0.008 
[0.006] [0.006]* [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]* [0.008] 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.338 0.338 0.336 0.312 0.31 0.291 
[0.022]** [0.022]** [0.023]** [0.030]** [0.030]** [0.030]** 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.42 0.412 0.413 0.418 0.416 0.425 
[0.018]** [0.018]** [0.019]** [0.025]** [0.024]** [0.025]** 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.089 0.241 0.223 -0.021 0.068 0.081 
[0.057] [0.056]** [0.064]** [0.085] [0.084] [0.091] 
Age of the household head 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]** [0.002]* 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) -0.038 -0.044 -0.03 -0.07 
[0.144] [0.141] [0.180] [0.171] 
Education = Islamic 0 0 -0.038 -0.01 
[0.053] [0.053] [0.074] [0.072] 
Education = Read & Write -0.023 -0.026 0.156 0.209 
[0.149] [0.150] [0.167] [0.166] 
Education = Primary -0.069 -0.074 0.012 0.046 
[0.074] [0.075] [0.095] [0.096] 
Education = Secondary -0.525 -0.532 -0.528 -0.49 
[0.107]** [0.106]** [0.138]** [0.138]** 
Education = Professional / Technical -1.005 -0.994 -1.124 -1.075 
[0.127]** [0.127]** [0.177]** [0.174]** 
Education = University -1.247 -1.229 -1.239 -1.139 
[0.140]** [0.139]** [0.331]** [0.332]** 
Marital status = Married monogamous -0.039 -0.033 -0.024 -0.007 
[0.151] [0.151] [0.186] [0.193] 
Marital status = Married polygamous -0.037 -0.033 0.037 0.031 
[0.159] [0.160] [0.205] [0.213] 
Marital status = Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 0.21 0.225 0.237 0.302 
[0.201] [0.199] [0.243] [0.244] 
Region = Diffa -0.172 -0.014 
[0.141] [0.193] 
Region = Dosso -0.189 -0.105 
[0.121] [0.163] 
Region = Maradi -0.183 -0.032 
[0.127] [0.180] 
Region = Tahoua -0.121 0.37 
[0.127] [0.161]* 
Region = Tillaberi -0.208 0.118 
[0.121] [0.181] 
Region = Zinder -0.264 -0.085 
[0.113]* [0.160] 
Region = Niamey -0.162 0.003 
[0.120] [0.169] 
Observations 6689 6667 6667 6667 3249 3245 3245 3245 
R-squared 0.002 0.408 0.425 0.426 0.003 0.382 0.404 0.413 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Table 5.7. Poverty level and benefiting from aid projects 
Poverty level of household in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Dummy: Aid project (G1a) vs Project from others (G1b) 0.208 0.28 0.285 0.28 
[0.085]* [0.057]** [0.056]** [0.057]** 
Project funded only by aid (1:yes, 0:no) 0.081 0.035 0.003 -0.012 
[0.127] [0.098] [0.096] [0.094] 
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) 0.013 -0.032 -0.04 -0.018 0.018 -0.069 -0.09 -0.02 
[0.075] [0.052] [0.051] [0.056] [0.111] [0.087] [0.085] [0.083] 
Household size -0.01 -0.01 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.007 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.349 0.351 0.352 0.333 0.333 0.322 
[0.025]** [0.025]** [0.026]** [0.037]** [0.038]** [0.038]** 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.401 0.393 0.39 0.364 0.366 0.374 
[0.018]** [0.018]** [0.019]** [0.030]** [0.030]** [0.032]** 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.15 0.308 0.287 0.09 0.156 0.173 
[0.061]* [0.059]** [0.067]** [0.106] [0.098] [0.101] 
Age of the household head 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]* [0.003]* 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) -0.127 -0.123 -0.41 -0.399 
[0.166] [0.165] [0.208]* [0.197]* 
Education = Islamic -0.011 -0.015 -0.072 -0.049 
[0.060] [0.060] [0.106] [0.102] 
Education = Read & Write -0.1 -0.118 0.081 0.122 
[0.163] [0.163] [0.197] [0.193] 
Education = Primary -0.045 -0.054 0.089 0.125 
[0.077] [0.078] [0.112] [0.110] 
Education = Secondary -0.595 -0.612 -0.7 -0.665 
[0.121]** [0.118]** [0.181]** [0.183]** 
Education = Professional / Technical -1.029 -1.011 -1.258 -1.195 
[0.146]** [0.146]** [0.252]** [0.240]** 
Education = University -1.299 -1.275 -1.447 -1.319 
[0.156]** [0.149]** [0.531]** [0.509]* 
Marital status = Married monogamous 0.011 0.03 0.063 0.073 
[0.167] [0.166] [0.227] [0.228] 
Marital status = Married polygamous -0.019 -0.001 0.076 0.054 
[0.173] [0.172] [0.240] [0.239] 
Marital status = Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 0.368 0.387 0.723 0.733 
[0.232] [0.228] [0.286]* [0.283]* 
Region = Diffa -0.346 -0.252 
[0.142]* [0.205] 
Region = Dosso -0.284 -0.206 
[0.109]** [0.156] 
Region = Maradi -0.313 -0.184 
[0.114]** [0.164] 
Region = Tahoua -0.301 0.157 
[0.119]* [0.155] 
Region = Tillaberi -0.404 -0.318 
[0.110]** [0.177] 
Region = Zinder -0.465 -0.333 
[0.101]** [0.155]* 
Region = Niamey -0.316 -0.303 
[0.111]** [0.206] 
Observations 5377 5356 5356 5356 1937 1934 1934 1934 
R-squared 0.004 0.407 0.425 0.428 0.001 0.358 0.389 0.4 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Table 5.8. Relationship between poverty level and aid with Instrumental Variable 
2SLS: Poverty level of household in 2005 First Stage for Aid project dummy (1:yes, 0:no) 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Project funded by aid (1:yes, 0:no) -0.478 -0.336 -0.241 -0.471 
[0.706] [0.525] [0.528] [0.767] 
IV: Member in development association (1:yes, 0:no) 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.148*** 0.106*** 
[0.039] [0.038] [0.038] [0.035] 
Household consulted about project (1:yes, 0:no) 0.007 -0.011 -0.034 -0.008 0.123*** 0.115*** 0.109*** 0.080*** 
[0.104] [0.076] [0.074] [0.078] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
Household size -0.011 -0.014 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
[0.006] [0.006]* [0.007] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.331 0.333 0.335 -0.012* -0.011 -0.002 
[0.023]** [0.023]** [0.024]** [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.417 0.411 0.412 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
[0.019]** [0.018]** [0.019]** [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.049 0.203 0.215 -0.057 -0.063 -0.002 
[0.076] [0.076]** [0.084]* [0.044] [0.047] [0.056] 
Age of the household head 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) -0.008 0.017 0.055 0.080* 
[0.151] [0.162] [0.045] [0.042] 
Education = Islamic 0.007 -0.001 0.009 -0.004 
[0.058] [0.058] [0.025] [0.025] 
Education = Read & Write 0.077 0.109 0.190*** 0.178*** 
[0.170] [0.187] [0.063] [0.056] 
Education = Primary -0.031 -0.026 0.067** 0.060* 
[0.092] [0.100] [0.034] [0.031] 
Education = Secondary -0.502 -0.482 0.043 0.066* 
[0.113]** [0.124]** [0.036] [0.035] 
Education = Professional / Technical -0.989 -0.964 0.020 0.031 
[0.131]** [0.135]** [0.054] [0.050] 
Education = University -1.265 -1.217 -0.043 0.011 
[0.136]** [0.137]** [0.057] [0.051] 
Marital status = Married monogamous -0.045 -0.085 -0.019 -0.076 
[0.154] [0.164] [0.068] [0.064] 
Marital status = Married polygamous -0.025 -0.077 0.017 -0.065 
[0.164] [0.174] [0.073] [0.069] 
Marital status = Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 0.193 0.139 -0.038 -0.119** 
[0.205] [0.219] [0.075] [0.070] 
Region = Diffa 0.141 0.422*** 
[0.378] [0.072] 
Region = Dosso -0.04 0.190*** 
[0.219] [0.073] 
Region = Maradi 0.035 0.293*** 
[0.265] [0.064] 
Region = Tahoua -0.007 0.152*** 
[0.184] [0.058] 
Region = Tillaberi -0.281 -0.098** 
[0.152] [0.034] 
Region = Zinder -0.122 0.193*** 
[0.208] [0.065] 
Region = Niamey -0.213 -0.071 
[0.149] [0.048] 
Observations 6689 6667 6667 6667 6689 6667 6667 6667 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Table 5.9. Results of Hausman test comparing IV and OLS estimates 
---- Coefficients ---- 
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
IV OLS Difference S.E. 
Project funded by aid (1:yes, 0:no) -0.4708408 0.2508839 -0.7217247 0.7421739 
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) -0.0078225 -0.0727967 0.0649743 0.0564864 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.4116139 0.4128494 -0.0012355 0.0023242 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.3347056 0.3361425 -0.0014369 . 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.2154930 0.2225853 -0.0070923 0.0501034 
Household size -0.0127743 -0.0115105 -0.0012638 0.0023784 
Age of the household head 0.0023445 0.0021983 0.0001462 0.0002805 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) 0.0174895 -0.0437429 0.0612324 0.0687104 
Marital status = Married monogamous -0.0848870 -0.0326685 -0.0522185 0.0512015 
Marital status = Married polygamous -0.0767714 -0.0327229 -0.0440486 0.0535083 
Marital status = Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 0.1390868 0.2249812 -0.0858944 0.0757918 
Education = Islamic -0.0010834 0.0003501 -0.0014335 0.0201499 
Education = Read & Write 0.1091344 -0.0255747 0.1347091 0.1017301 
Education = Primary -0.0260445 -0.0744728 0.0484284 0.0617758 
Education = Secondary -0.4824491 -0.5324940 0.0500449 0.0577055 
Education = Professional / Technical -0.9643343 -0.9937054 0.029371 0.0337989 
Education = University -1.2170770 -1.2287490 0.0116718 . 
Region = Diffa 0.1408606 -0.1723101 0.3131707 0.3384032 
Region = Dosso -0.0401198 -0.1889246 0.1488048 0.1747443 
Region = Maradi 0.0345706 -0.1832695 0.2178401 0.2232767 
Region = Tahoua -0.0069322 -0.1205646 0.1136324 0.124782 
Region = Tillaberi -0.2805212 -0.2083627 -0.0721585 0.0845447 
Region = Zinder -0.1215156 -0.2640101 0.1424945 0.1666759 
Region = Niamey -0.2130217 -0.1621862 -0.0508355 0.080528 
Constant 2.2808670 2.1393310 0.1415362 0.1435971 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(25) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 =       1.36 
Prob>chi2  =        1.000 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Table 5.10. Poverty level and number of aid projects (all funding combined and aid-only funding) 
Poverty level of household in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 
(25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Number of aid projects 0.054 0.079 0.082 0.081 
[0.028] [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.022]** 
Number of aid projects, squared -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
[0.002] [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]* 
Number of projects funded only by aid 0.073 0.124 0.12 0.106 
[0.105] [0.080] [0.078] [0.080] 
Number of projects funded by aid only, squared 0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 
[0.023] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) -0.078 -0.086 -0.065 -0.064 -0.072 -0.056 
[0.047] [0.046] [0.051] [0.048] [0.048] [0.051] 
Household size -0.01 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 
[0.006] [0.006]* [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]* [0.006] 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.336 0.337 0.335 0.335 0.336 0.335 
[0.023]** [0.023]** [0.023]** [0.023]** [0.023]** [0.023]** 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.42 0.412 0.413 0.418 0.411 0.412 
[0.018]** [0.018]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.019]** 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.079 0.232 0.212 0.083 0.232 0.228 
[0.058] [0.057]** [0.066]** [0.060] [0.059]** [0.069]** 
Age of the household head 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) -0.046 -0.051 -0.018 -0.02 
[0.145] [0.142] [0.146] [0.144] 
Education = Islamic 0 0 0.004 0.001 
[0.053] [0.053] [0.054] [0.054] 
Education = Read & Write -0.039 -0.043 0.009 0.007 
[0.146] [0.147] [0.151] [0.152] 
Education = Primary -0.075 -0.081 -0.06 -0.065 
[0.075] [0.075] [0.074] [0.074] 
Education = Secondary -0.525 -0.532 -0.511 -0.513 
[0.107]** [0.106]** [0.108]** [0.107]** 
Education = Professional / Technical -1.014 -1.002 -0.992 -0.981 
[0.126]** [0.126]** [0.128]** [0.128]** 
Education = University -1.255 -1.235 -1.255 -1.226 
[0.142]** [0.141]** [0.137]** [0.137]** 
Marital status = Married monogamous -0.034 -0.031 -0.05 -0.054 
[0.152] [0.152] [0.150] [0.150] 
Marital status = Married polygamous -0.03 -0.032 -0.041 -0.052 
[0.161] [0.162] [0.160] [0.160] 
Marital status = Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 0.22 0.231 0.19 0.189 
[0.203] [0.200] [0.202] [0.199] 
Region = Diffa -0.173 -0.067 
[0.141] [0.144] 
Region = Dosso -0.192 -0.15 
[0.122] [0.127] 
Region = Maradi -0.169 -0.127 
[0.127] [0.134] 
Region = Tahoua -0.115 -0.083 
[0.128] [0.132] 
Region = Tillaberi -0.218 -0.219 
[0.121] [0.125] 
Region = Zinder -0.261 -0.212 
[0.114]* [0.120] 
Region = Niamey -0.161 -0.176 
[0.121] [0.126] 
Observations 6689 6667 6667 6667 6689 6667 6667 6667 
R-squared 0.002 0.408 0.424 0.426 0.002 0.405 0.422 0.423 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Table 5.11. Relationship between poverty change and aid projects 
Difference in poverty between 2000 and 2005 
(33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) 
Dummy: Project funded by aid (G1a) vs No aid (G2+G1b) 0.239 0.199 0.223 0.191 
[0.073]** [0.101] [0.074]** [0.081]* 
Dummy: Project funded by aid (G1a) vs No aid (G2) 0.116 0.097 0.19 0.117 
[0.099] [0.166] [0.123] [0.124] 
Change in access to education = unchanged 0.141 0.069 0.064 0.323 0.257 0.281 
[0.164] [0.126] [0.126] [0.248] [0.176] [0.180] 
Change in access to education = improved -0.017 -0.062 -0.059 0.038 -0.057 -0.06 
[0.109] [0.086] [0.085] [0.165] [0.127] [0.130] 
Change in access to electricity = unchanged -0.083 -0.168 -0.169 -0.074 -0.098 0.026 
[0.134] [0.114] [0.113] [0.206] [0.162] [0.139] 
Change in access to electricity = improved -0.166 -0.219 -0.167 -0.189 -0.244 -0.074 
[0.142] [0.121] [0.118] [0.203] [0.181] [0.165] 
Change in access to health = unchanged -0.078 0.023 -0.039 0.346 0.228 0.126 
[0.158] [0.130] [0.130] [0.237] [0.186] [0.193] 
Change in access to health = improved -0.141 -0.051 -0.09 0.102 0.068 0.022 
[0.109] [0.099] [0.098] [0.158] [0.136] [0.132] 
Change in access to justice = unchanged 0.037 0.095 0.098 -0.159 -0.121 -0.064 
[0.113] [0.084] [0.084] [0.167] [0.118] [0.118] 
Change in access to justice = improved -0.266 -0.199 -0.202 -0.591 -0.412 -0.37 
[0.106]* [0.081]* [0.078]** [0.144]** [0.111]** [0.111]** 
Change in access to water = unchanged -0.19 -0.248 -0.216 -0.337 -0.486 -0.484 
[0.121] [0.106]* [0.108]* [0.203] [0.148]** [0.154]** 
Change in access to water = improved -0.072 -0.133 -0.139 -0.174 -0.304 -0.29 
[0.097] [0.080] [0.081] [0.146] [0.108]** [0.113]* 
Age of the household head 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.009 
[0.002]* [0.003] [0.003]** [0.003]** 
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) -0.058 -0.048 -0.17 -0.171 
[0.080] [0.082] [0.100] [0.107] 
Household size -0.007 0.001 -0.021 -0.009 
[0.009] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013] 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.261 0.263 0.27 0.254 
[0.029]** [0.029]** [0.040]** [0.042]** 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) -0.551 -0.566 -0.584 -0.588 
[0.024]** [0.025]** [0.036]** [0.038]** 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.065 0.274 0.043 0.281 
[0.093] [0.101]** [0.132] [0.124]* 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) -0.208 0.059 
[0.213] [0.270] 
Education = Islamic 0.104 -0.011 
[0.083] [0.111] 
Education = Read & Write 0.129 0.264 
[0.225] [0.278] 
Education = Primary 0.091 0.16 
[0.103] [0.129] 
Education = Secondary -0.568 -0.597 
[0.151]** [0.234]* 
Education = Professional / Technical -0.854 -1.03 
[0.190]** [0.216]** 
Education = University -1.085 -1.071 
[0.169]** [0.352]** 
Marital status = Married monogamous 0.133 1.027 
[0.242] [0.367]** 
Marital status = Married polygamous -0.015 0.894 
[0.258] [0.375]* 
Marital status = Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 0.518 1.244 
[0.312] [0.434]** 
Region = Diffa 0.037 0.544 
[0.364] [0.418] 
Region = Dosso -0.024 0.526 
[0.358] [0.415] 
Region = Maradi -0.091 0.485 
[0.355] [0.417] 
Region = Tahoua 0.09 1.163 
[0.360] [0.422]** 
Region = Tillaberi -0.169 0.469 
[0.360] [0.442] 
Region = Zinder -0.125 0.469 
[0.350] [0.403] 
Region = Niamey -0.147 0.367 
[0.349] [0.401] 
Observations 6679 2659 2654 2654 3248 1321 1320 1320 
R-squared 0.005 0.018 0.346 0.371 0.001 0.04 0.377 0.413 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Table 5.12. Relationship between poverty change and aid projects 
Difference in poverty between 2000 and 2005 
(41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) 
Dummy: Project from aid (1) vs Project from others (0) 0.283 0.226 0.239 0.202 
[0.076]** [0.102]* [0.077]** [0.085]* 
Project funded only by aid (1:yes, 0:no) -0.046 -0.099 -0.046 -0.078 
[0.130] [0.188] [0.131] [0.134] 
Change in access to education = unchanged -0.084 -0.151 -0.166 -0.022 -0.047 0.003 
[0.188] [0.131] [0.132] [0.347] [0.195] [0.199] 
Change in access to education = improved -0.077 -0.082 -0.075 -0.096 -0.089 -0.09 
[0.120] [0.091] [0.090] [0.203] [0.148] [0.155] 
Change in access to electricity = unchanged -0.021 -0.088 -0.102 0.091 0.01 0.058 
[0.139] [0.124] [0.133] [0.263] [0.228] [0.216] 
Change in access to electricity = improved -0.158 -0.168 -0.109 -0.136 -0.19 -0.031 
[0.150] [0.128] [0.134] [0.266] [0.236] [0.232] 
Change in access to health = unchanged -0.138 0.068 0 0.368 0.317 0.206 
[0.167] [0.127] [0.126] [0.266] [0.207] [0.206] 
Change in access to health = improved -0.163 -0.038 -0.068 0.13 0.049 0.033 
[0.114] [0.101] [0.102] [0.190] [0.163] [0.159] 
Change in access to justice = unchanged 0.091 0.18 0.169 -0.141 -0.034 0.002 
[0.124] [0.088]* [0.087] [0.202] [0.133] [0.134] 
Change in access to justice = improved -0.203 -0.135 -0.151 -0.564 -0.359 -0.358 
[0.116] [0.089] [0.084] [0.184]** [0.131]** [0.131]** 
Change in access to water = unchanged -0.216 -0.194 -0.173 -0.466 -0.413 -0.421 
[0.128] [0.113] [0.114] [0.249] [0.175]* [0.187]* 
Change in access to water = improved -0.023 -0.053 -0.09 -0.144 -0.229 -0.281 
[0.106] [0.085] [0.084] [0.182] [0.124] [0.127]* 
Age of the household head 0.006 0.005 0.01 0.009 
[0.003]* [0.003] [0.004]** [0.004]* 
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) 0.02 0.049 -0.047 -0.003 
[0.088] [0.087] [0.111] [0.117] 
Household size -0.007 0 -0.027 -0.02 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.014]* [0.015] 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.274 0.279 0.312 0.309 
[0.031]** [0.031]** [0.041]** [0.042]** 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) -0.575 -0.597 -0.652 -0.664 
[0.024]** [0.025]** [0.036]** [0.039]** 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.157 0.296 0.207 0.289 
[0.098] [0.111]** [0.147] [0.156] 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) -0.416 -0.405 
[0.237] [0.295] 
Education = Islamic 0.121 -0.064 
[0.093] [0.141] 
Education = Read & Write 0.015 0.099 
[0.238] [0.301] 
Education = Primary 0.118 0.19 
[0.105] [0.141] 
Education = Secondary -0.614 -0.74 
[0.155]** [0.276]** 
Education = Professional / Technical -0.829 -1.125 
[0.207]** [0.276]** 
Education = University -1.158 -1.479 
[0.142]** [0.305]** 
Marital status = Married monogamous 0.044 0.884 
[0.251] [0.495] 
Marital status = Married polygamous -0.141 0.74 
[0.267] [0.501] 
Marital status = Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 0.591 1.467 
[0.338] [0.547]** 
Region = Diffa -0.417 -0.379 
[0.308] [0.369] 
Region = Dosso -0.345 -0.138 
[0.287] [0.347] 
Region = Maradi -0.515 -0.332 
[0.288] [0.346] 
Region = Tahoua -0.352 0.326 
[0.300] [0.383] 
Region = Tillaberi -0.641 -0.615 
[0.295]* [0.387] 
Region = Zinder -0.605 -0.433 
[0.283]* [0.336] 
Region = Niamey -0.464 -0.183 
[0.281] [0.409] 
Observations 5367 2262 2257 2257 1936 924 923 923 
R-squared 0.008 0.018 0.371 0.402 0 0.038 0.435 0.478 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Table 5.13. Relationship between poverty change and number of aid projects (all funding sources and aid-only projects) 
Change in poverty between 2000 and 2005 
(49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) 
Number of projects funded by aid 0.086 0.094 0.082 0.075 
[0.028]** [0.038]* [0.024]** [0.026]** 
Number of projects funded by aid, squared -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 
[0.003]* [0.003] [0.002]* [0.002]* 
Number of projects funded only by aid 0.079 -0.01 0.068 0.05 
[0.115] [0.172] [0.122] [0.125] 
Number of projects funded by aid only, squared -0.002 0.02 -0.005 -0.003 
[0.024] [0.033] [0.028] [0.028] 
Change in access to education = unchanged 0.15 0.08 0.069 0.139 0.068 0.054 
[0.166] [0.126] [0.127] [0.161] [0.125] [0.125] 
Change in access to education = improved -0.012 -0.05 -0.055 -0.014 -0.054 -0.058 
[0.108] [0.085] [0.085] [0.109] [0.087] [0.086] 
Change in access to electricity = unchanged -0.076 -0.197 -0.16 -0.071 -0.211 -0.163 
[0.136] [0.122] [0.114] [0.133] [0.122] [0.116] 
Change in access to electricity = improved -0.159 -0.205 -0.163 -0.142 -0.198 -0.154 
[0.143] [0.124] [0.118] [0.140] [0.125] [0.121] 
Change in access to health = unchanged -0.085 -0.024 -0.043 -0.086 -0.023 -0.042 
[0.156] [0.131] [0.130] [0.157] [0.134] [0.132] 
Change in access to health = improved -0.144 -0.075 -0.094 -0.124 -0.064 -0.092 
[0.109] [0.099] [0.098] [0.110] [0.099] [0.098] 
Change in access to justice = unchanged 0.031 0.088 0.095 0.043 0.102 0.105 
[0.113] [0.084] [0.084] [0.114] [0.085] [0.084] 
Change in access to justice = improved -0.267 -0.203 -0.204 -0.263 -0.197 -0.204 
[0.106]* [0.078]* [0.078]** [0.104]* [0.078]* [0.077]** 
Change in access to water = unchanged -0.181 -0.208 -0.209 -0.199 -0.225 -0.218 
[0.122] [0.107] [0.109] [0.120] [0.107]* [0.109]* 
Change in access to water = improved -0.076 -0.122 -0.141 -0.067 -0.109 -0.13 
[0.097] [0.081] [0.081] [0.097] [0.084] [0.083] 
Age of the household head 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) -0.077 -0.044 -0.052 -0.023 
[0.078] [0.082] [0.079] [0.083] 
Household size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) 0.265 0.261 0.269 0.264 
[0.029]** [0.029]** [0.028]** [0.029]** 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) -0.564 -0.565 -0.564 -0.566 
[0.025]** [0.025]** [0.025]** [0.025]** 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) -0.215 -0.217 -0.198 -0.195 
[0.212] [0.212] [0.214] [0.214] 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.254 0.268 0.242 0.273 
[0.092]** [0.101]** [0.094]* [0.103]** 
Education = Islamic 0.113 0.108 0.116 0.102 
[0.082] [0.082] [0.084] [0.084] 
Education = Read & Write 0.114 0.113 0.162 0.152 
[0.220] [0.221] [0.225] [0.225] 
Education = Primary 0.092 0.085 0.118 0.107 
[0.102] [0.103] [0.102] [0.103] 
Education = Secondary -0.568 -0.563 -0.552 -0.544 
[0.160]** [0.152]** [0.159]** [0.152]** 
Education = Professional / Technical -0.872 -0.859 -0.86 -0.839 
[0.191]** [0.190]** [0.190]** [0.190]** 
Education = University -1.131 -1.086 -1.141 -1.084 
[0.167]** [0.170]** [0.164]** [0.167]** 
Marital status = Married monogamous 0.144 0.139 0.148 0.133 
[0.243] [0.245] [0.237] [0.241] 
Marital status = Married polygamous 0.003 -0.009 0.009 -0.012 
[0.258] [0.260] [0.254] [0.257] 
Marital status = Widow(er)/Divorced/Separated 0.527 0.527 0.523 0.509 
[0.315] [0.313] [0.313] [0.312] 
Region = Diffa 0.024 0.119 
[0.363] [0.371] 
Region = Dosso -0.042 0.034 
[0.359] [0.363] 
Region = Maradi -0.088 -0.042 
[0.354] [0.361] 
Region = Tahoua 0.086 0.117 
[0.360] [0.368] 
Region = Tillaberi -0.176 -0.183 
[0.360] [0.366] 
Region = Zinder -0.128 -0.069 
[0.350] [0.357] 
Region = Niamey -0.146 -0.152 
[0.348] [0.356] 
Observations 6679 2659 2654 2654 6679 2659 2654 2654 
R-squared 0.005 0.021 0.37 0.372 0.001 0.016 0.365 0.368 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Figure 5.11. Relationships poverty-number of aid projects with quadratic fit and 95% confidence interval 
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Chapter 6. Improving People’s Lives 
“Aid is needed and can be highly successful. The issue is how to deliver high-quality aid to the 
world's poorest and most vulnerable people.” 
(Sachs 2014) 
6.1. Introduction 
The relationship between aid and the provision of public goods at household level remains a 
relatively unexplored area. Since the 1990s there has been a move towards analysing the 
transmission channels through which policy-making can improve people’s lives, with an 
emphasis on the provision of public goods – often referred to as ‘public service delivery’ in the 
policy realm. A first step was to investigate whether national budget allocations in certain 
sectors were associated with better sector outcomes, an approach that provided mixed results. 
For instance, the effect of public spending for education and educational attainment was low, 
while for health outcomes the picture was more mixed (Gupta, Verhoeven & Tiongson 1999). 
It has been noted that most public spending on health and education goes to the non-poor, much 
of it fails to reach the frontline service provider, and service providers face weak incentives to 
deliver services effectively (World Bank 2003). Higher spending on water and sewerage might 
not lead to a proportional increase in the quality of service delivery, as leakages –both physical 
and financial– are high (Wolf 2007b). Economists have also analysed other determinants of 
public services, such as leaders’ decision-making processes, to provide public goods in 
resource-rich countries (Sarr, Wick 2010).  
It has been asserted that the key to successful service delivery programs lies in their 
sustainability, not only financial but also in terms of leadership and targeting the most 
vulnerable populations (Mubangizi 2009). Public expenditure systems in developing countries 
are often scrutinized in exercises such as the Public Expenditure Management and 
Accountability Reviews (PEMFAR) undertaken by the World Bank. In Niger, the most recent 
PEMFAR (PEMFAR II) was undertaken in 2011 and highlighted areas for improvement. Some 
of its key takeaway messages were: “Strong political commitment at the highest level and 
adequate technical assistance are key prerequisites for effective public-sector reform”; and 
“serious weaknesses affect the transparency and efficiency of the public procurement system” 
(World Bank 2011c). However, PEMFAR assessments remain an exercise focused on the 
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process of supplying public goods by national administration systems, with little focus on the 
demand side, i.e. households receiving those public goods. 
Relatively little research has been produced on the measure and extent to which aid leads 
to the provision of public goods. Importantly, sometimes the modes of delivering foreign aid, 
by undermining rather than strengthening service delivery in the recipient country, can reduce 
the productivity of public spending in the medium run (World Bank 2003). Bueno de Mesquita, 
explores the issue from a political economy viewpoint (De Mesquita, Smith 2009). Wolf (2007) 
focuses on the effects of aid volatility, important because in low income countries large parts 
of public expenditure for basic services are financed through aid. It has been recognized that 
aid favours the provision of such global public goods as measures to control climate change 
(Kaul, Grunberg & Stern 1999), but at a national level analytical scarcity remains a concern. 
In poor countries, there is usually limited capacity to mobilize internal resources and aid tends 
to be one of the most important financial inflows (e.g. vis-à-vis foreign direct investments). 
These features are visible in Niger: tax revenue in 2007 was equivalent to 11.3 percent of GDP, 
while net FDI inflows amounted to 2.3 percent of GDP and net ODA (despite being only 40 
USD per capita) was equivalent to 13.2 percent of GDP (World Bank 2013). Such figures are 
also reflected in few development initiatives being undertaken at a grassroots level: between 
2000 and 2005, households that benefited from aid saw an average 3.6 projects in their 
communities, far from the 18 estimated as necessary to reduce poverty.80 
The goal of this chapter is to inform decision making through an empirical investigation of 
the best way to deliver development resources in Niger. The criterion to decide what is ‘best’ 
consists of assessing the improvement experienced by households as a result of development 
projects. This addresses the common argument that aid rarely leads to improvements in 
households’ living standards (Rondinelli 1983).  
Three steps have been proposed to avoid seeing aid as a black box: “a) External donors/IFIs 
to policy makers (the way aid is given), b) Policy makers to policies (governance and 
institutional capacity), and c) Policies to outcomes (knowledge of what works)” (Bourguignon, 
Sundberg 2007). The mechanism of interest in this chapter is the provision of public goods at 
the local level, which in Bourguignon and Sundberg’s categorization would be included in 
‘knowledge of what works’. The approach is useful because, as noted by the World Bank, 
foreign-aid donors should reinforce the accountability in these relationships, not undermine it 
(World Bank 2003). 
80 Figures from the previous chapter. 
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Exploring what the most useful initiatives are for households, implies dropping the previous 
chapter’s assumption that all projects are uniform. This allows more flexibility: aid may not 
lead to structural reductions in poverty but it may at least alleviate specific situations, e.g. 
through agriculture-related projects during droughts. The emphasis of this chapter is also on 
aid, but aid is now seen as part of the larger framework of organizations supplying public goods 
in Niger. This larger perspective allows for a comparison between donors.81 Are certain donors 
more efficient than others? Given the lack of donor assessments in general,82 and in Niger in 
particular, this may have significant policy relevance. 
The framework of analysis can be described as follows. First, it is assumed that 
development projects produce public goods (e.g. a hospital or a school) in a generic production 
function as: 
𝑔𝑠 = 𝑔(𝐴, 𝑙, 𝐾, 𝐿) (6-1) 
Where 𝐴, 𝑙, 𝐾 and 𝐿 represent total factor productivity, land, capital and labour, respectively. 
No assumption is made about the function’s returns to scale on each of the production factors. 
The subscript s denotes the supplier (e.g. aid, government). As there are different types of 
suppliers, the possibility that their production functions may differ is considered. In particular, 
suppliers may differ in total factor productivity, that is, 𝐴𝑗 ≠ 𝐴𝑘 if supplier 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. If the factors 
of production are limited, the amount used must be lower than or equal to the available 
resources: 𝑙 ≤ 𝑙,̅ 𝐾 ≤ ?̅? and  𝐿 ≤ ?̅?. 
The usefulness of projects depends on how well the goods supplied address people’s needs 
(the demand). Therefore, households may derive utility based on the type of donor that supplied 
it (owing to how it was supplied), other household characteristics such as its size, and specific 
local conditions such as being in a rural context (Pottier 1993). Public good 𝑔𝑠 is an input into 
households’ utility function: 
?̅?𝑖 = 𝑢(𝑔𝑠, 𝑋𝑖) (6-2) 
In this equation,  ?̅?𝑖 represents the average utility received by household 𝑖 from all the projects 
undertaken in its community, and 𝑋𝑖 stands for a vector of household characteristics. It is also 
assumed that keeping 𝑋𝑖 constant, households’ utility function exhibits diminishing marginal 
81 Comparing donors is particularly relevant in the provision of public goods. In the previous chapter this would 
not have been the case, because the objective of some donors (e.g. private sector) may not necessarily be poverty 
reduction. 





> 0 and  
∂2𝑢𝑖
∂𝑔𝑠2
< 0. For instance, in communities where there is no health centre, the 
first one is likely to have a high marginal return, which would decrease, ceteris paribus, after 
the community has several of them. 
6.2. Data and methodology 
Available data are from a National Survey on Household Living Conditions (ENCVM)83 
undertaken in 2005 by Niger’s National Statistics Institute (INS).84 The objective of the survey 
was to produce baseline data to evaluate and monitor poverty, and its methodology was that of 
Core Welfare Indicators Surveys (INS Niger 2007). 85  The units of analysis are Niger’s 
households, weighted based on their sampling frame representativeness. Households were 
asked if a specific development project (there were 30 types) had taken place in their 
community between 2000 and 2005; if so, who funded it and how much the household’s living 
conditions improved as a result of that specific project. 
The basic research question is whether public goods (i.e. projects) provided by aid were 
more useful to households than those provided by other sources (if no project was undertaken 
in a community, the utility derived by households is assumed to be zero). Formally, the research 
hypothesis can be expressed as: 
𝐻0: ?̅?𝑔𝑎 − ?̅?𝑔𝑛𝑎 = 0 (6-3) 
𝐻0: ?̅?𝑔𝑎 − ?̅?𝑔𝑛𝑎 ≠ 0 (6-4) 
Where ?̅?𝑔𝑎 is the average utility which households derive from the projects that were supplied 
by aid, and ?̅?g𝑛𝑎 is the utility derived from non-aid projects. The ENCVM data available offer 
several key advantages for the research. First, the sample of households is large and considered 
to be representative of the country’s population. Furthermore, it is possible to discriminate 
between development projects by funding source (aid, government, Special Program of the 
Republic’s President (SP), community, private investor, religious community, other, 
unknown). Although respondents were not specifically asked the number of projects, this can 
be calculated from the data, which is useful to assess diminishing returns to scale in terms of 
utility for households. Similarly, it is also possible to calculate the number of donors who 
funded a project, which is useful to test for coordination costs between donors. Finally, the 
83 Enquête Nationale sur les Conditions de Vie du Ménage (ENCVM). More details are provided in Chapter 5. 
84 Institut National de la Statistique (INS) 
85 Questionnaire des Indicateurs de Bien Etre de base (QUIBB) 
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poverty dimension can also be incorporated in the analysis, which is vital to detect donors’ 
purposive targeting. 
Potentially there are some limitations. Endogeneity is one. This may arise mainly from two 
sources: first, if households influence the production of the public goods they receive (Whitaker 
1980); and second, if there is selection bias and households who did receive aid projects and 
those who did not, were not statistically identical ex-ante. To minimize the possibility of the 
first, the analysis focuses only on households who did not contribute to the project (56.9 percent 
of all households who benefited from at least one project did not contribute in any way, i.e. did 
not provide materials, labour, supervision, funds or anything else). The extent to which 
community-driven projects are exogenous to households in their communities is still arguable, 
however. To address selection bias the ENCVM offers two key advantages. First, it has 
information on households’ poverty level before the projects were implemented; this ensures 
that ex-ante differences in the most important dimension (poverty) are accounted for. And 
secondly, the ENCVM data has information on how poor households’ communities were (ex-
post, in 2005), which helps to tackle political economy issues relating to the process of 
allocating development projects.86 Both parameters are included in the models estimated. 
Public goods can be classified in various categories according to two characterisations: 
non-rivalry and non-excludability. It seems plausible that projects are non-excludable, but 
rivalry deserves attention as well: to the extent that public goods go beyond a certain capacity 
threshold, a household’s probability of being reached by projects would be unequal, e.g. if there 
is a certain amount of loanable funds available and the demand for credit is much higher than 
the supply, households living closer are more likely to benefit from credit ceteris paribus. Thus, 
it is assumed that projects are non-excludable and within non-rivalry capacity thresholds. 
It is also assumed that the visibility of different development projects does not bias 
households’ answers, i.e. households know who supplied the public goods that reached them. 
Based on field visits and interviews this also seems plausible; all donor types advertise their 
projects in public boards (some examples in Figure 6.1). 
Finally, as data are based on self-reported categorical data, there is the possibility of 
positive response or social desirability bias (Van de Mortel, Thea F. 2008). While this is 
difficult to address, it is taken care of by the choice of the econometric model: a complementary 
86 Admittedly, it would be better to have data on communities’ poverty ex-ante. However, to the extent that 
poverty in communities is persistent (which a substantial amount of research has shown) this would not be a 
problem. 
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log-log, which assumes that higher categories in the outcome variable (i.e. utility from projects) 
are more probable (Norusis 2012). 
The methodological choice is largely determined by the nature of the available data, with a 
special interest in the dependent variable. If a continuous dependent variable representing 
average improvement from development projects by household i were available, it would be 
useful to estimate the following generic model: 
?̅?𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽𝑧 𝑋𝑧𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖  ∀ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑑  (6-5) 
Where the dependent variable ?̅?𝑖 is the mean improvement in living conditions of household 𝑖
from all projects from which it benefited; projgi denotes whether good 𝑔  was supplied in 
household 𝑖’s community; ℎ𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑖 is a vector of h variables representing the way in which goods 
were delivered, including co-funding, whether there was prior consultation with the household 
and the number of projects; 𝑋𝑧𝑖  stands for other control variables, 𝛽𝑔, 𝛽ℎ and 𝛽𝑧  are the 
associated vectors of coefficients, 𝑒𝑖 is the error term and fund is a dummy variable that fixes 
the funding source. 
The first group of explanatory variables projgi relates to the type of goods provided. In the 
ENCVM g=30 possibilities (all project types and their incidence are shown in Table 6.3). The 
second group of explanatory variables is howhi, which allows one to discern differences in 
practices across donors. It includes three issues that can affect the efficiency of the goods 
delivered: co-funding, information, and the number of projects. Co-funding relates to any case 
in which donors fund a project simultaneously (not necessarily involving aid; e.g. it may be 
funded by a religious community and government). It can be used either to leverage funds 
(more donors can put together more resources, hence have more impact) and/or for reasons of 
political economy (e.g. donors may want to be seen to be participating, or they may want to 
channel other donors’ resources and earn a commission). Whatever the reasons, co-funding is 
common (72.2 percent of all projects involving aid were co-funded) and can have important 
effects on the projects undertaken, either positive (e.g. through donors’ synergies or 
complementarities), or negative (e.g. due to coordination costs that may lead to delays or lower 
the quality of the results). Information relates to consulting households about the initiatives 
required in the community before goods are provided to them. This is not new; claims to seek 
local communities’ participation are widely-accepted as a mechanism through which donors 
may better address households’ needs (Feeney 1998). Finally, the number of projects may be 
relevant if there are economies of scale, e.g. when a minimum critical mass of projects is 
reached, overall utility is boosted. The utility households derive from projects also depends on 
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a vector of household characteristics, 𝑋𝑖. This may include three types of variables: relating to 
individual (e.g. educated household heads may consider that they derive higher utility), 
household (e.g. larger benefits for larger families) or context (e.g. rural households with less 
access to certain public services may benefit more). 
When the dependent variable is not continuous, however, a different econometric technique 
must be used. In the ENCVM, when a specific project had taken place in a household’s 
community, the household head was asked “How much did your household’s living conditions 
improve thanks to that project, on a scale of 0 (Nothing), 1 (Little), 2 (Quite) or 3 (Greatly)?” 
(the structure of the available data is reflected in Table 6.1). Given such a dependent variable, 
it would be tempting to calculate an average of all projects’ utility for a given household or for 
a given project (as in Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1. Data structure (with actual ECVM sample values) with regard to improvement by project 
Household 
Improve Project1 
(0:None, 1: Little, 2: 
Quite, 3:None) 
Improve Project 2 
(0:None, 1: Little, 2: 
Quite, 3:None) 
… 
Improve Project 30 




1 - - … 0 1.8 
2 - - … 0 0 
… … … … … … 
6,690 2 - … - 2 
Average by 
project 
2.368 2.436 … 2.387 2.372 
However, to do this would be incorrect: the categories of the dependent variable can be 
naturally ordered but the numbers do not necessarily reflect the scale, e.g. the difference 
between the first category (0=None) and the second (1=Little) is not necessarily the same as 
that between the second (1=Little) and the third (2=Medium). In this case, ordinal regression 
analysis (also known as ordered choice regression) is suitable (Katchova 2013). The outcome 
variable can be denoted as a latent continuous variable u* (utility from projects) that is 
unobservable. What is observed is that the levels of u, households’ actual answers in the Likert 
scale noted, manifest when u* is within specific threshold values: 
𝑢 = 𝑗  if  𝛼𝑗−1 < 𝑢
∗ ≤ 𝛼𝑗    (6-6)
There are j-1 threshold points and j marginal effects. The model describes probabilities of the 
different j outcomes, as there is “no obvious regression (conditional mean) relationship 
between the observed dependent variable, yi and the covariates” (Greene, Hensher 2009). Most 
applications in ordinal regression analysis use ordered probit, which assumes a normally 
distributed latent variable, or ordered logit, which assumes evenly distributed categories 
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= 𝑝(𝑢𝑖 = 𝑗) = 𝑝(𝛼𝑗−1 < 𝑢
∗ ≤ 𝛼𝑗) = 𝐹(𝛼𝑗 − 𝒙
′
𝑗𝛽) − 𝐹(𝛼𝑗−1 − 𝒙
′
𝑗𝛽) (6-7) 
Another possibility is the complementary log-log, which takes the form ln(-ln(1-Prob(event)) 
and assumes that higher categories are more probable in u* (Norusis 2012). This is the case 
with the available data for ug, improvement from project g (see one example in Figure 6.2).  
Estimating the ordinal regression, we would have the probability that households give a 
certain answer (i.e. the probability that improvement in project g = j), and then we could 
calculate marginal effects. However, given the available data, this approach entails two 
inconveniences. First, it involves the estimation of 30 regressions (one for each project type);87 
more importantly, as the model is estimated for each project individually, the number of 
projects cannot be included as a covariate, which ignores a potentially important determinant 
of households’ utility. 
An alternative to use all the information can be devised as follows. First, the ordinal 
regression model is estimated 30 times, one for each project (g = 30 projects), where the 
dependent variable is improvement from project g, and the explanatory variables consist of the 
aspects explaining project efficiency: funddi (donor type), howhi (previous consultation and total 
number of funding sources), and other controls of context (e.g. being in an urban area): 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 ∀ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝑔   (6-8) 
This model estimated is then used to predict the values of improvement from project g for 
household i. This may then be seen as a new variable û (Table 6.2).  





Project g=1 is …) 
Predicted value 
(improvement for 




Project g=30 is…) 
Mean predicted 
improvement 
1 û1, i=1 û2, i=1 û30, i=1 ū i=1 
… … … 
6,690 û1, i=6690 û2, i=6690 û30, i=6690 ū i=6690 
The new variable û is continuous and can now be averaged across projects, which yields the 
mean predicted improvement from development projects for household i, calculated as: 







𝑔=1  (6-9) 
The mean predicted improvement for household i, or ūi, is then regressed on factors that explain 
to what extent households benefit from development projects. These explanatory variables are 
mainly composed of number of projects (including a ‘number of projects squared’ term to 
assess non-linearity), and a vector of other household characteristics relating to the household 
head (e.g. if female), the household (e.g. its size), and the context (e.g. region), as follows:  
?̅?𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽𝑧 𝑋𝑧𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖   ∀ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑑 (6-10) 
Intuitively, this approach may be interpreted as estimating equation (6-5) in two steps. It is 
worth noting that as the dependent variable in equation (6-10) is based on predicted values, the 
information as to its underlying predictors is already included. This means that if those 
predictors are introduced again as explanatory variables in equation (6-10), the R2 will 
approach one. In the same vein, predicting new values based on the second model and 
regressing them on the initial predictors (e.g. to see how much of the variance in the final model 
is explained by them), the statistical relationship will naturally be strong. 
6.3. Results 
Data on the incidence of development projects are summarized in the annex (Table 6.3). Such 
projects as building a school/classroom or a health centre were the most common between 2000 
and 2005, due to Mamadou Tandja’s priorities when he came to power (Gouvernement du 
Niger 2010). At that time, it also became clear that microfinance initiatives for women in South 
Asia had been successful, and substantial efforts were made to replicate them (with so much 
emphasis that other segments of the population such as the youth did not benefit much).  
With regards to aid funding, the overall pattern was similar although there were some 
marked differences. For instance, aid was generally much more active in the agricultural sector 
(e.g. breeding forages, wells and agricultural inputs) and gender initiatives (i.e. women and 
women’s microfinance). Other projects were less commonly financed by aid, especially if they 
were seen as more ‘private’ in nature. This was the case for the promotion of home ownership 
and the purchase of agricultural inputs, which were driven by community funding (correlation 
coefficients: 0.5179*** and 0.1377***, respectively) and private investors (correlation 
coefficients: 0.2756*** and 0.2287***, respectively). Aid was also notably less focused on 
transport infrastructure projects (e.g. rehabilitation of roads and transport services). 
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The most common source of finance for development projects has been government, 
although others such as aid and the SP have been notable (Table 6.4). As these are projects at 
the local level, this leads in the case of aid to criticism for creating parallel structures (to the 
national) to implement projects, associated with duplication of efforts and inefficiencies 
(OECD 2012). The case of the SP may not be different; when Niger was considered for 
accessing the HIPC Initiative in 2001, the international creditor community wanted to make 
sure that their condoning of Niger’s debt would have positive effects on poverty reduction, and 
favoured a new funding vehicle. Hence, President Mamadou Tandja instituted the SP as 
separate from Government’s regular functioning, although similarly aligned with the country’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and relying on the country’s decentralized structure: Préfets, 
Sous-Préfets, regional and sub-regional executives (Gouvernement du Niger 2010). The SP 
operated until 2005. 
Equation (6-8) is estimated 30 times (once for each project) with three ordinal regression 
models: ordered probit, ordered logit and complementary log-log (results not shown). The 
predicted values are averaged across all projects for each household, which yields the mean 
predicted utility (1st step). Of the three models, the complementary log-log shows the highest 
values (Table 6.5), and is the most indicated for the frequency distribution of the available 
data.88 Taking the mean predicted utility as a dependent variable, equation (6-10) is estimated 
(the second step) and two specification tests are executed: the Ramsey RESET and the link test 
(results given in Table 6.6). Both tests support the specification adopted. The model’s residuals 
are also examined, for all funding sources and separately for each of them (Figure 6.3). The 
only graph of residuals that is clearly not normally distributed belongs to projects funded by 
religious communities, which may be understandable as there are only 19 observations. The 
results for the estimation of equation (6-10) are shown for all donors and decomposing for each 
of them (Table 6.7), which allows for a comparison to see who drives the overall result. 
The number of projects exhibits a concave function: as households benefit from more 
projects, their average utility increases but at a decreasing rate (Table 6.7). Based on donors’ 
coefficients, the most useful are communities, the SP, private investors, aid and government. 
Decreasing returns are most important for communities and the SP, and of very little 
importance for private investors, supporting the view that private investors are more efficient 
than public sector entities. 
88 Not shown for all 30 projects. Figure 6.2 shows the frequency distribution for the first project as an example. 
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Niger is a vast country with a low population density and large geographical distances 
associated with high costs, which is a critical determinant in accessing such services as 
microfinance (Pedrosa-Garcia, Do 2011). In this context, urban households have a clear 
advantage vis-à-vis rural ones when it comes to accessing a critical mass of other services that 
will enhance the impact of development projects (column 1). Urban households are more able 
to benefit from projects than rural households, a result driven by aid, government and private 
investors (Table 6.7). Private projects are led by such firms as French AREVA’s subsidiaries 
in Niger (Somair and Cominak), often as part of their corporate Social Responsibility (Daouda 
2014). To the extent that firms are interested in getting recognition and/or future potential 
demand for their projects (their main goal is not to reduce poverty), it is not surprising that they 
are more interested in executing projects in urban areas. 
The results give some interesting insights on poverty. Overall, poor communities and 
households (either in 2000 or in 2005) are not associated with reaping higher benefits from 
development projects (Table 6.7). When Tandja took office one of his priorities was to tackle 
poverty, especially in rural areas (Gouvernement du Niger 2010), which translated in poorer 
communities –but not poorer households– benefiting more from government projects (column 
3). These results reflect political economy aspects at the local level: when communities finance 
their own projects, wealthier households benefit more than their poorer neighbours (column 6). 
Conversely, projects financed by religious organisations are more able in wealthier 
communities (who fund them through donations) to cater for poorer households (column 7). 
Aid, the SP and private investors fail to take into account poverty (both at the household and 
community level). 
In terms of households’ characteristics, two results are remarkable besides regional 
specificities. First, women are less likely to reap benefits from projects. This is driven by SP 
projects and may reflect the fact that the SP was a short-lived, quick-action program 
implemented by decentralized posts held by men in a conservative Muslim society. Secondly, 
as education level increases, the average improvement from projects decreases: when the 
household head can only read and write (the majority of whom are self-employed), their 
households benefit more from projects. On the other hand, when the head is a professional 
(most of whom are employed by someone else) households benefit less. 
The other item of interest relates to variables on how a project is supplied, namely co-
funding, number of funders and prior consultation. Based on the second model estimated, a 
new variable is predicted, called final mean predicted utility, which is then regressed on the 
explanatory variables of the first model explicitly to show their relationship (results in Table 
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6.8). Not only does co-funding impose a coordination cost on the project’s utility; public donors 
who tend to be more bureaucratic (SP, Government and Aid) pay the biggest toll, while 
communities and private investors (less formal and more agile) show the smallest negative 
coefficients on co-funding. Impact increases by adding more types of donor, but with 
decreasing marginal returns. Finally, consulting households becomes irrelevant when co-
funding aspects are included, which suggests that information may not necessarily be collected 
from households: co-funders also provide valuable information to improve projects. 
The final mean predicted utility summarized by donor (Table 6.9), shows that aid is the 
second lowest source of utility (only better than communities, which have few resources as 
they depend on their constituents). The type of project (Figure 6.4) and sector (Figure 6.5) is 
largely irrelevant; what is vital is information or the number of funders (Figure 6.6). Finally, it 
is worth noting that based on the number of projects, the highest utility is reached with 10-18 
projects (depending on the donor), which is consistent with the number required to start curbing 
poverty (Figure 6.7).89 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that development projects improve people’s lives. In contrast to 
poverty reduction (previous chapter), improvements start from the first project. The peak 
coincides with the estimated 10-18 projects needed to reduce poverty. This supports the 
importance of interconnectedness between development projects as a way to fight poverty, 
highlighting –as in the previous chapter– the need for a critical mass of projects if people are 
to be lifted out of the poverty trap. 
For an efficient provision of development projects, political economy considerations must 
be considered. Notably, government efforts translate to poorer communities benefiting more, 
but not poorer households. When communities finance their own projects, wealthier 
households benefit more than their neighbours, and projects financed by religious organisations 
have a preference for wealthier communities (from which their donations come) to cater for 
poorer households. Aid, the SP and private investors fail to take into account poverty both at 
household and community levels. 
The type of project by itself is largely irrelevant; what is important is to adapt the 
intervention to the households which benefit from it. And for this, the key is information. As 
important as consultations to households may have seemed, information can also be collected 
89 Estimated in the previous chapter. 
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through co-funding agencies. Co-funding involves clear coordination costs that depend on the 
donor’s nature, and the more donors there are, the more projects will be useful, although at a 
decreasing rate. 
Based on the model estimated aid projects do help people, but most other donors are better 
at doing so. This puts aid in the spotlight and can raise several questions, but one is central: 
should (or perhaps could) aid be channelled through other donors that are more efficient? 
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6.5. Annexes 
Figure 6.1. Examples of real project boards from several funding sources 
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Figure 6.2. Cumulative distribution of answers from project 1 (build a school or classroom) 
Table 6.3. Incidence of development projects 
Project All Niger Aid-funded: Yes Aid-funded: No T test 
count mean sd count mean sd count mean sd (Aid:Yes-no) 
1: Build school or classroom 6690 0.462 0.499 1,937 0.569 0.495 3440 0.559 0.497 0.01 
2: Rehabilitate school 6690 0.122 0.327 1,937 0.123 0.328 3440 0.165 0.371 -0.042***
3: Build health centre 6690 0.25 0.433 1,937 0.361 0.48 3440 0.269 0.444 0.092*** 
4: Rehabilitate health centre 6690 0.05 0.219 1,937 0.067 0.25 3440 0.058 0.233 0.009 
5: Health / Hygiene improvements 6690 0.028 0.165 1,937 0.045 0.206 3440 0.027 0.163 0.018*** 
6: Build road 6690 0.047 0.212 1,937 0.066 0.248 3440 0.053 0.223 0.013** 
7: Rehabilitate road 6690 0.055 0.229 1,937 0.048 0.213 3440 0.08 0.271 -0.032***
8: Transport service 6689 0.022 0.146 1,937 0.012 0.108 3439 0.036 0.186 -0.024***
9: Village and breeding forages 6689 0.121 0.326 1,937 0.218 0.413 3439 0.103 0.304 0.115*** 
10: Village and breeding wells 6690 0.166 0.372 1,937 0.242 0.429 3440 0.177 0.382 0.065*** 
11: Water channelling 6689 0.035 0.183 1,937 0.051 0.219 3439 0.037 0.189 0.014** 
12: Rehabilitation of water channelling 6690 0.019 0.137 1,937 0.027 0.162 3440 0.021 0.143 0.006 
13: Access to credit for agricultural inputs 6690 0.056 0.23 1,937 0.11 0.313 3440 0.042 0.2 0.068*** 
14: Better access to agricultural inputs 6690 0.041 0.199 1,937 0.079 0.27 3440 0.033 0.178 0.046*** 
15: Purchase of agricultural products 6690 0.054 0.226 1,937 0.048 0.215 3440 0.077 0.267 -0.029***
16: Availability of supplementary services 6690 0.025 0.156 1,937 0.042 0.201 3440 0.023 0.15 0.019*** 
17: Build veterinary centre 6690 0.018 0.133 1,937 0.026 0.159 3440 0.019 0.138 0.007 
18: Work opportunities 6689 0.033 0.177 1,937 0.068 0.252 3439 0.022 0.146 0.046*** 
19: More people owning their homes 6690 0.141 0.348 1,937 0.085 0.279 3440 0.226 0.418 -0.141***
20: Police service 6690 0.011 0.105 1,937 0.006 0.075 3440 0.018 0.134 -0.012***
21: Access to credit to women’s groups 6690 0.312 0.463 1,937 0.448 0.497 3440 0.337 0.473 0.111*** 
22: Credit to young graduates’ organizations 6690 0.013 0.115 1,937 0.021 0.145 3440 0.013 0.114 0.008** 
23: Access to credit for milking cows 6690 0.055 0.229 1,937 0.056 0.231 3440 0.075 0.263 -0.019***
24: Other types of access to credit 6690 0.107 0.309 1,937 0.185 0.388 3440 0.095 0.294 0.09***
25: Access to electricity 6690 0.046 0.209 1,937 0.071 0.256 3440 0.047 0.211 0.024***
26: Build weir 6690 0.01 0.097 1,937 0.019 0.136 3440 0.007 0.084 0.012***
27: Build mini-dam 6690 0.03 0.171 1,937 0.058 0.234 3440 0.023 0.151 0.035***
28: Actions favouring women 6690 0.121 0.326 1,937 0.222 0.416 3440 0.1 0.299 0.122***
29: Rehabilitate hydro-agricultural equipment 6690 0.012 0.111 1,937 0.011 0.103 3440 0.018 0.133 -0.007**
30: Others 4880 0.137 0.344 1,411 0.298 0.458 2538 0.081 0.274 0.217*** 










0 1 2 3
Improvement derived from project 1
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Table 6.4. Dummy variable on source of funding: “Was the project financed by the following source?” (1:yes, 0:no) 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 5,377 0.386 0.487 0.0 1.0 
Government 5,377 0.443 0.497 0.0 1.0 
SP 5,377 0.363 0.481 0.0 1.0 
Private Investor 5,377 0.304 0.460 0.0 1.0 
Community 5,377 0.258 0.438 0.0 1.0 
Religious community 5,377 0.005 0.068 0.0 1.0 
Others 5,377 0.002 0.048 0.0 1.0 
Unknown 5,377 0.022 0.145 0.0 1.0 
Table 6.5. Summary of mean predicted utility, estimated through 3 ordinal regression models 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ordered probit 5,377 0.161 0.437 -1.063 2.712 
Ordered logit 5,377 0.240 1.041 -2.275 7.451 
Complementary log-log 5,377 1.036 1.196 -1.763 3.933 
Table 6.6. Result of specification tests 
Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables Link Test (1) 
_hat 1.100 
H0:  model has no omitted variables F(3, 3022) =     1.72 [0.0645]*** 
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Table 6.7. Regression results of mean predicted utility 
All Aid Govt. SP Private Community Religious Other Unknown 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Number of projects 0.267 0.28 0.132 0.368 0.287 0.382 1.692 1.275 0.255 
[0.036]** [0.067]** [0.036]** [0.058]** [0.054]** [0.060]** [4.123] [.] [0.168] 
Number of projects squared -0.012 -0.011 -0.008 -0.014 -0.01 -0.015 -0.241 -0.067 -0.012 
[0.002]** [0.005]* [0.002]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [1.051] [.] [0.009] 
Urban household (1:yes, 0:no) 0.354 0.648 0.462 0.251 0.437 -0.103 0.797 -1.765 0.716 
[0.146]* [0.235]** [0.109]** [0.174] [0.196]* [0.232] [1.871] [.] [0.455] 
Poverty level of community in 2005 (0:richest - 9:poorest) -0.032 -0.039 0.054 0.022 -0.037 0 -0.568 -2.418 -0.204 
[0.019] [0.039] [0.019]** [0.036] [0.044] [0.074] [0.044]** [.] [0.163] 
Poverty level of household in 2000 (0:richest - 9:poorest) -0.017 0.016 -0.011 0.027 -0.035 -0.149 0.548 -0.373 -0.051 
[0.019] [0.040] [0.022] [0.025] [0.029] [0.069]* [0.023]** [.] [0.104] 
Poor household in 2005 (1:yes, 0:no) 0.101 0.099 0.112 0.036 0.045 0.069 -0.859 0 -0.067 
[0.058] [0.097] [0.067] [0.099] [0.107] [0.153] [1.429] [.] [0.237] 
Household size 0.011 0.011 0.008 -0.016 0.005 -0.004 0.069 0.505 -0.002 
[0.008] [0.013] [0.008] [0.013] [0.015] [0.018] [0.269] [.] [0.021] 
Sex of household head is female (1:yes, 0:no) -0.244 -0.194 -0.145 -0.348 -0.003 0.01 0 0 -0.591 
[0.097]* [0.163] [0.102] [0.131]** [0.179] [0.249] [0.000] [.] [0.386] 
Education = Islamic -0.096 -0.149 -0.056 -0.016 -0.128 -0.309 -0.075 0 -0.399 
[0.080] [0.136] [0.101] [0.124] [0.139] [0.185] [2.420] [.] [0.356] 
Education = Read & Write 0.518 0.373 0.475 0.531 0.664 0.41 0 0 0 
[0.209]* [0.348] [0.215]* [0.463] [0.232]** [0.211] [0.000] [.] [0.000] 
Education = Primary 0.015 -0.181 0.029 0.019 0.08 -0.141 0 0 -1.607 
[0.083] [0.103] [0.100] [0.149] [0.174] [0.261] [0.000] [.] [0.483]** 
Education = Secondary -0.165 -0.113 0.104 -0.349 -0.417 -0.367 0 0.48 -0.88 
[0.124] [0.221] [0.121] [0.177]* [0.163]* [0.302] [0.000] [.] [0.787] 
Education = Professional / Technical -0.424 -0.637 -0.217 -0.583 -0.364 -0.159 0 0 -1.04 
[0.139]** [0.304]* [0.133] [0.196]** [0.198] [0.281] [0.000] [.] [0.557] 
Education = University -0.421 -0.537 -0.02 -0.478 -0.376 -0.448 0 0 -0.305 
[0.235] [0.446] [0.162] [0.353] [0.322] [0.296] [0.000] [.] [0.579] 
Region = Diffa 0.323 0.173 0.14 0.65 1.174 0.409 0 0 0 
[0.181] [0.247] [0.310] [0.319]* [0.305]** [0.481] [0.000] [.] [0.000] 
Region = Dosso 0.535 0.2 0.012 1.018 1.106 -0.105 0 0 0.796 
[0.229]* [0.297] [0.201] [0.399]* [0.308]** [0.549] [0.000] [.] [0.491] 
Region = Maradi 0.508 0.531 0.411 0.648 1.16 1.41 0 0 1.179 
[0.211]* [0.261]* [0.204]* [0.334] [0.411]** [0.455]** [0.000] [.] [0.957] 
Region = Tahoua 0.23 0.392 -0.125 0.088 0.478 -0.25 -2.421 0 0.381 
[0.209] [0.249] [0.212] [0.351] [0.247] [0.437] [0.854]* [.] [0.468] 
Region = Tillaberi 0.493 0.848 -0.048 0.735 1.136 0.284 -0.223 0 0.828 
[0.186]** [0.316]** [0.198] [0.325]* [0.219]** [0.413] [2.663] [.] [0.415] 
Region = Zinder 0.77 0.456 0.281 1.157 1.362 0.693 -1.425 0 0.97 
[0.183]** [0.235] [0.189] [0.314]** [0.262]** [0.468] [1.713] [.] [0.471]* 
Region = Niamey 0.487 0.383 -0.42 1.173 1.105 0.468 -0.758 0 0.149 
[0.207]* [0.353] [0.196]* [0.361]** [0.276]** [0.476] [3.718] [.] [0.555] 
Observations 3047 862 1516 1087 858 353 14 8 87 
R-squared 0.144 0.214 0.148 0.303 0.28 0.353 0.94 1 0.436 
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
138 
Table 6.8. Estimated improvement and variables relating to how public goods are supplied 
All Aid Govt. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) 0.005 -0.019 -0.019 -0.015 -0.044 -0.005 -0.004 0.008 -0.01 -0.06 -0.062 -0.058
[0.013] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.022]* [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.016]** [0.016]** [0.016]** 
Co-funding: number of funders > number of projects (1:yes, 0:no) -0.171 -0.4 -0.3 -0.44 -0.233 -0.447
[0.045]** [0.040]** [0.055]** [0.046]** [0.060]** [0.053]** 
Number of donor types involved 0.232 0.269 0.28 0.238 0.342 0.376 0.211 0.337 0.356 
[0.006]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.009]** [0.036]** [0.036]** [0.008]** [0.035]** [0.034]** 
Number of donor categories squared -0.009 -0.009 -0.021 -0.026 -0.025 -0.027
[0.004]* [0.004]* [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** 
Observations 5356 5356 5356 5356 1934 1934 1934 1934 2510 2510 2510 2510 
R-squared 0.003 0.238 0.238 0.252 0.018 0.276 0.28 0.312 0.006 0.205 0.209 0.231 
SP Private Religious 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0 0.06 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.224 0.036 0.039 0.039 
[0.020] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.022]** [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.161] [0.138] [0.143] [0.143] 
Co-funding: number of funders > number of projects (1:yes, 0:no) -0.342 -0.486 -0.185 -0.41 0 0 
[0.083]** [0.074]** [0.075]* [0.063]** [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of donor types involved 0.202 0.322 0.331 0.235 0.396 0.417 0.191 0.251 0.251 
[0.009]** [0.039]** [0.039]** [0.009]** [0.039]** [0.038]** [0.057]** [0.237] [0.237] 
Number of donor categories squared -0.023 -0.024 -0.031 -0.034 -0.011 -0.011
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.040] [0.040]
Observations 2050 2050 2050 2050 1643 1643 1643 1643 19 19 19 19 
R-squared 0.008 0.19 0.194 0.21 0.008 0.289 0.297 0.315 0.103 0.476 0.479 0.479 
Community Others Unknown 
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)
Household consulted about project to do (1:yes, 0:no) -0.01 -0.011 -0.014 -0.003 0.113 0.159 0.091 0.091 -0.011 0.016 0.014 0.014 
[0.027] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.219] [0.198] [0.114] [0.114] [0.089] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] 
Co-funding: number of funders > number of projects (1:yes, 0:no) -0.189 -0.302 0 0 0 0 
[0.050]** [0.036]** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of donor types involved 0.279 0.423 0.46 0.155 1.113 1.113 0.176 0.197 0.197 
[0.009]** [0.037]** [0.037]** [0.079] [0.202]** [0.202]** [0.040]** [0.110] [0.110] 
Number of donor categories squared -0.027 -0.033 -0.177 -0.177 -0.007 -0.007
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.036]** [0.036]** [0.034] [0.034]
Observations 1232 1232 1232 1232 14 14 14 14 138 138 138 138 
R-squared 0.012 0.454 0.461 0.49 0.022 0.275 0.784 0.784 0 0.128 0.128 0.128 
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Table 6.9. Estimated improvement by donor type 
Aid Govt. SP Private Community Religious Other Unknown 
Mean 1.046 1.105 1.126 1.051 0.983 1.072 1.157 0.885 
Std. Dev. 0.454 0.454 0.451 0.452 0.436 0.359 0.394 0.519 
Min -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 -0.3 -2.4 0.6 0.5 -2.4
Max 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.7 2.1
Obs. 1,934 2,510 2,050 1,643 1,232 19 14 138
Figure 6.4. Estimated improvement by type of project 
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Figure 6.6. Estimated predicted improvement and number of funders, with quadratic fit 
Figure 6.7. Estimated predicted improvement and number of projects, with quadratic fit 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
“...practically every individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique 
information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions 
depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation” (Hayek 1945). 
As noted by Riddell (1987), there is no obvious theoretical framework linking aid and 
development, though this need not be the case. From the time of aid-growth regressions, 
research has gathered considerable knowledge on the intricacies through which aid can help. 
For example, international experience shows that if done well, aid can bring significant positive 
results at a micro level, especially in key sectors such as education or health. 
Given the relevance of specific local conditions, it is worth evoking the “knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek 1945, p.521). Aid research has moved away 
from universal truths and methods of analysis towards knowledge of the local context and 
tailored approaches. Indeed, having specific knowledge of the utility which households –given 
their specific characteristics– derive from public interventions, it is easier to tailor such 
interventions to provide those with the highest marginal utility. This approach to development 
planning, rarely used, has enormous potential and must therefore be highlighted as an 
innovative option. 
Despite the tendency towards understanding the specific circumstances of time and place, 
few authors adopt middle-ground views – notable exceptions being Riddell (1987) or Krueger 
et al. (1989). In recent years, views on aid are certainly polarized: from economists who think 
it will end poverty (Sachs 2005), to others who blame it for countries’ poverty in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Moyo 2009). The reason for this conundrum may be that, despite the better 
understanding we have gained, we still know little about the mechanisms through which aid 
works, which leads to oversimplification. The consequences of this shortfall become more 
onerous at household level and in poor countries – especially if those countries cannot rely on 
international capital markets or other financial flows such as foreign direct investment. Another 
compounding factor is that the aid literature has largely neglected the coexistence of aid and 
other sources of development projects. Combined, these factors make it problematic to inform 
policymaking. 
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Against this backdrop, this dissertation has focused on Niger, and adopted an empirical 
perspective with the goal of shedding light on those gaps. Relatively infrequent in the literature, 
my idea is that instead of calls for more or for less aid, the emphasis should be on calls for 
better aid. What would better aid look like?  
Drawing from lessons in the literature and the findings of this thesis, basic elements can be 
sketched for the three broad types of aid modalities: project-based aid, policy-based lending, 
and budget support (BS). Chapters 5 and 6 focused on project-based aid delivered to 
households, where poverty and its circumstances are taken as the goal (as opposed to growth). 
I find that in Niger, aid is correlated with higher levels of poverty, as expected when it is 
targeted at the poor. However, receiving aid projects is also associated with increases in 
poverty. To shed more light on this, households who benefited from aid projects are compared 
with those who did not benefit from any projects at all, and with those who benefited from non-
aid funded projects. Relative to the first group, aid does not increase or reduce poverty. 
Considering the second, households who benefit from projects implemented by non-aid donors 
enjoy greater reductions in poverty than households who benefit from aid.  
A minimum critical mass of projects should be undertaken so that synergies between them 
can arise and poverty can be reduced. That threshold coincides with the peak in utility which 
projects provide to households. This critical mass of projects is consistent with idea that a 
country may be in a poverty trap.  
The issue can also be considered as: is aid the best method for improving people’s lives – 
especially those of the poor? Understood as a means to improve people’s lives, aid is one of 
the worst vehicles to channel development initiatives in Niger. A valuable insight from the 
findings is that information is vital, especially at the community level where political economy 
dynamics must be well understood. Information can be obtained through cooperation with other 
donors, which is more important than consultations with households. Despite coordination 
costs, aid initiatives do better when they associate with other donors. The more donors co-fund, 
the greater the projects’ effectiveness, although at a decreasing rate. If it can be assumed that 
information is better disseminated in a State with a more decentralized structure, Niger should 
also boost progress on decentralization. Simultaneously, mechanisms to tailor aid to the needs 
of Nigeriens better should be improved. 
These findings could be used to call for less aid, but several arguments may also counter 
such calls: first, aid in Niger is small relative to the size of the economy, not having reached a 
level at which it would allegedly have negative effects. Second, despite the high growth in its 
number of donors, current levels of ODA per capita are equivalent to those in the mid-1960s. 
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Third, even aid critics have recognized that in specific circumstances (e.g. for vaccines), aid 
can be very beneficial. Fourth, although aid is not associated with poverty reduction, aid 
projects do improve people’s lives. And fifth, the models estimated suggest that the relationship 
between aid and poverty reduction is non-linear. 
The chapter on the case study between the IMF and Niger pertains to a different modality 
of giving aid: policy-based lending. It becomes clear that Niger’s requests for assistance are 
accompanied by promises to undertake reforms; however, once aid is disbursed, these 
undertakings rarely materialize. Despite this record of poor (and deteriorating) compliance, 
IMF aid continues to flow, engendering perverse incentives and moral hazard. Niger’s 
Government gets aid flowing in, whilst avoiding the implementation of those political reforms 
which would create most resistance. As a counterpoint, the IMF gets that number of actions 
necessary required for its continued support of the country, support which it needs to provide 
if it is to demonstrate its relevance and thereby provide utility to its shareholders. It is in the 
interests of both parties that the reforms are those easiest to undertake. Thus, the outcome 
reforms implemented are unlikely to be the structural ones which may be clearly needed. It 
also seems clear that what is promoted are development inputs (e.g. PRSPs) instead of 
development results.  
To improve the incentive systems in policy-based lending some recommendations can be 
made – not all of which are new. For instance, there may be a case for having less (but key) 
conditionalities, adopting reforms that embrace economic role of the State, or pursuing fiscal 
consolidation mainly through revenue side (Mosley, Harrigan & Toye 1991). An insightful 
recommendation would be to identify the stakeholders that lose with the planned reforms and 
find a way to compensate them (ibid). Continuous schemes, whereby growth rate in a result 
indicator leads to an equivalent growth rate in aid disbursed, are also preferable. 
Based on these findings, it is recommended that aid donors stop doing development projects 
at the community level. To keep their aid flowing they have several options:  
First, donors could redirect their project-based aid through other donors that are more 
efficient at implementing projects, recognizing the realities of the situation and therefore 
becoming more of a pure source of finance than of development interventions. (This may be 
unlikely, insofar as it would imply a recognition of inefficiency by donors). 
Second, they could start giving their aid as policy-based aid (with loans or with grants) 
based on conditionalities à la IMF. Based on past evidence, however, ex-ante conditionalities 
do not work and although the incentive system could be restructured, a high number of donors 
taking this route would likely lead to high coordination costs. 
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Third, aid donors could channel their assistance through national systems, notably BS – 
which would be in line with the Paris Declaration. BS in Niger has not been analysed in this 
dissertation. However, its key features are well known, e.g. when countries with poor 
institutional systems receive substantial amounts of funds, mismanagement of funds is a 
possibility, and it can reduce recipients’ incentives to undertake reforms or mobilize internal 
resources. On the other hand, BS can greatly reduce coordination costs incurred by recipient 
countries. 
Overall, BS is recommended but two issues are central and should be addressed: its 
incentive structure (i.e. it should be designed to avoid BS’s potential shortcomings), and the 
role of donors (i.e. whether they would be willing to accept the role of a mere funder instead 
of a development partner, which they like to boast). Most importantly, innovative approaches 
such as Cash on Delivery, i.e. aid is only delivered when ultimate results such as lower maternal 
mortality are achieved and proven (as opposed to development inputs) should be the 
cornerstone of BS foreign assistance. Some donors have recognized this and are already 
exploring how to implement it. Notably, in 2012 the World Bank developed the Program-for-
Results (PforR), which consists in linking disbursement of funds to the achievement of specific 
results. Furthermore, the system should have performance indicators embedded as results 
(based on objectives to be negotiated and agreed between donors and recipient country’s 
Government), e.g. when a country mobilizes more resources internally, donors should 
recognize and reward that achievement. Finally, BS should be well coordinated among donors. 
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